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0. Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
Many modern approaches to the evolution of mind have claimed that the fundamental 
drivers of our cognitive capacities and cultures are genetically specified psychological 
adaptations, which evolved in response to evolutionary pressures deep within our 
lineage’s history. Many of our cognitive capacities are innate. Recent approaches to moral 
cognition have similarly argued that moral cognition is innate. In this thesis, I argue that 
even though our capacity for moral cognising is an adaptation, it is a learned adaptation. 
Moral cognition is not innate. In arguing this thesis I will question many of the 
assumptions of traditional cognitive science and evolutionary approaches to the mind. By 
incorporating theory and evidence from cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, I 
apply the explanatory frameworks of embodied and extended cognition to the domain of 
morality: moral cognition is both embodied and extended cognition. This places 
particular importance on the role of our bodies and world in the fundamental structuring 
and scaffolding of the development and execution of moral cognition. Putting this in an 
evolutionary framework, I develop a dual inheritance model of the non-nativist evolution 
of moral cognition focusing on the roles of niche construction, biased learning and active 
learning in the transfer of moral phenotypes between generations. Morality is a learned 
adaptation that evolved through the dynamic and reciprocal interaction between genes 
and culture.  
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0. Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The idea that morality has evolutionary origins is not new. Indeed, Charles Darwin 
proposed that our moral sense is a product of evolution by natural selection. In more 
recent times there has been a renewed interest in evolutionary accounts of individual 
moral capacities and society-wide moral systems. These accounts have been, by and large, 
nativist. Although they vary as to the exact nature of our moral sense and the degree to 
which it contributes to our capacities for moral thought and action, they typically 
maintain that the central causal determinants of these capacities are innate, domain-
specific, information processing, psychological mechanisms. The positing of an innate 
moral cognition is thought to explain the origin, maintenance and structure of individual 
moral behaviours as well as society-wide moral systems. These mechanisms are proposed 
to have evolved in response to adaptive problems in our species’ evolutionary past – our 
moral minds have been shaped by environments deep within our lineage’s history. In this 
thesis, I propose an alternative account for the evolution of moral cognition.  
 
This project will be largely integrative. Drawing on theory and evidence from 
evolutionary biology, developmental psychology, cognitive science and the philosophy of 
mind, I will present an empirically tractable hypothesis for the evolution, development 
and deployment of moral cognition. I will propose that, in contrast to the view that our 
moral minds were populated deep in our ancestral past, the fundamental structuring of 
our moral minds occurs within one’s life history. This does not, however, mean that 
there is no evolutionary story to be told. Our moral environments, which scaffold the 
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development and execution of moral cognition, have an evolutionary history, as do the 
various non-moral psychological capacities which allow the establishment of moral 
cognition. It is these interacting non-moral biological and moral cultural components and 
their joint evolutionary history which give rise to the moral agents and worlds we see 
today.  
 
The focus of this thesis will be on two types of explanations that are central to any 
account of the evolution of moral cognition. The first are ultimate explanations: 
population-level explanations that focus on the selective pressures that led to the various 
traits in question. The second are proximate explanations, which focus on the various 
mechanisms and processes (both ontogenic and synchronic) that give rise to the various 
traits within an organism’s lifetime. From these, we can see that there are two important 
questions for any study of the evolution of morality: ‘what are the evolutionary forces 
that gave rise to morality?’, and ‘what are the various mechanisms and processes that 
generate moral cognitions over one’s life-history?’ 
 
With respect to the first question, the central problem in explaining the evolution of 
moral cognition is to account for the apparent fitness-sacrificing behaviours of morality. 
Often moral behaviours do not appear to be in our individual fitness interests. If this is 
the case, how did morality evolve? Proposed solutions to this problem based on kin 
selection and reciprocity have, for a long time, been popular in explaining the evolution 
of morality. Recently though, such accounts have been shown to be inadequate 
explanations for the large-scale group phenomena that we see in the real world. As such, 
alternative solutions have been proposed which focus on punishment and group-level 
cultural dynamics. These evolutionary explanations involve the modelling of proximate 
mechanisms beyond the physical bounds and behaviours of any individual agent, giving 
us some insight into the types of mechanisms that are central to the evolution of moral 
cognition.  
 
In regard to the second question, many current accounts of the mechanisms of moral 
cognition have posited an innate moral faculty (as described earlier). These explanations 
typically make specific commitments to the complexity and information processing 
nature of internal cognitive mechanisms. I will critically assess one argument recently 
presented in support of an innate moral faculty. Rejecting moral nativism, however, does 
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not conflict with my assertion that morality is an evolutionary adaptation. Natural 
selection acts upon heritable variation in fitness and this variation can have genetic or 
non-genetic origin, or both. Variations with non-genetic origins can be inherited with 
reasonable fidelity through cultural learning and perhaps other mechanisms. Adaptations 
evolve by natural selection; they are selected for because of the fitness effects they have 
on their bearers. Accordingly, adaptations need not be of genetic origin. Therefore, under 
a gene-based conception of innateness, adaptations need not be innate. 
 
Given the shortcomings of nativist accounts, I will argue that understanding moral 
cognition and its evolution requires a broader explanatory focus whereby our moral 
cognitive processes extend beyond our brainbound neural systems, outwards into our 
bodies and the world. The body and external world become proper parts of our moral 
cognitive system. Moral cognition is embodied and extended. Moral adaptations need not 
reside in the head of the moral cogniser. Such a view changes our explanatory focus from 
one which is brain-centred to one which focuses on the dynamic interplay between agent 
and their moral environment.  
 
Instead of looking inside for solutions to adaptive problems we must also look outward; 
by focusing solely on internal mechanisms we fail to capture the essential contributions 
of beyond-the-brain mechanisms in the development, execution and evolution of moral 
cognition. Moral cognising alters our moral environments, but importantly it also alters 
the moral environments of developing children with profound evolutionary effects. If 
our evolved moral cognitive traits are complex skills that are scaffolded or even partly 
constituted by our social environments, then we need to account for the ways in which 
those environments exist over generations, allowing the cumulative evolution of the 
processes that they support. As I will explain, there are mechanisms through which our 
moral environments are reliably inherited between generations such that cumulative 
evolution can occur. A purely gene-based account of inheritance fails to explain this 
important role of the environment.  
 
This thesis will proceed in four stages over the next six chapters. The first provides an 
overview of the different ways in which morality is thought to have evolved. The second 
argues against one specific argument in favour of the view that there is an innate moral 
faculty that underwrites moral cognition – we have reason to think that moral cognition 
 Introduction  
 
4
is not innate. The third presents an account of moral cognition that emphasises the 
essential role that our bodies and environments play as constituent parts of the 
development and execution of moral cognition. And the fourth presents a dual 
inheritance evolutionary account that incorporates the central role of our embodied 
interactions with our moral worlds, paying special attention to the role of extended 
cognitive systems that structure and scaffold our moral cognitive processes and those of 
our offspring. 
 
The following is a brief summary of the six chapters of this thesis.  
 
Chapter 1: The Evolutionary Problem of Morality  
 
Moral cognition is an adaptation that evolved due to the cooperation and group 
coordination benefits it confers. In this chapter I will give an overview of different 
evolutionary paths to human morality, with the aim of establishing that there is a 
plausible evolutionary explanation. Reciprocity-based accounts have been especially 
popular amongst theorists exploring evolutionary accounts of morality. But they are 
probably insufficient to explain large-scale cooperative behaviours such as those found in 
human adherence to social-wide moral norms. Reciprocity-based solutions fail to “scale-
up” to large groups. Recent approaches involving reputation, punishment and cultural 
group selection provide plausible solutions to this problem. These accounts explain 
morality in large groups by positing proximate mechanisms that operate beyond the 
physical bounds of any one individual. As we will see, this becomes important when 
giving accounts of both moral cognition and its evolution. This chapter summarises work 
from the evolutionary sciences.  
 
Chapter 2: The Wealth of the Moral Stimulus 
 
After developing a plausible case that morality is an adaptation in chapter 1, I will 
critically assess one recent argument in support of the claim that we have an innate, 
domain-specific faculty dedicated to the task of moralising. This innate moral faculty 
supposedly explains not only individual morality but also the generation of society-wide 
moral systems. There are various different accounts of what exactly a moral faculty is and 
the nature of the arguments in support of such a faculty. Here I will focus on one high 
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profile account that draws strong methodological and structural parallels with nativist 
arguments in linguistics. Poverty of the stimulus arguments have been—either explicitly 
or implicitly—central to a number of recent defences of moral nativism. The argument 
rests upon two claims: the first is that the information available to the child is 
impoverished and therefore inadequate to explain the acquisition of the relevant capacity. 
The second is that the learning task is too complex to be accounted for via domain-
general learning alone. In sum, it is argued that there is a gap between informational 
input and achieved competence that can only be bridged by innate information. Drawing 
on evidence from developmental psychology as well as expanding upon some recent 
critiques of the moral nativists’ argument, I will argue that neither of these two claims are 
sufficiently warranted to establish that we have an innate moral faculty.  
 
Chapter 3: Cognition: Embodied and Extended 
 
The traditional view of cognitive science and the philosophy of mind has typically been 
individualistic: the underlying metaphysical and methodological assumptions are that the 
structure of the mind is internal, and the methods by which it is characterised and 
individuated is by this internal structure alone. Individualistic accounts typically confine 
cognitive processes to what goes on in the head of the cogniser. In this way, 
individualism makes specific claims about the inner complexity of cognitive processes 
and the specific roles that are attributed to body and world with respect to the cognitive 
system. After detailing the ways in which traditional accounts of cognition are 
individualistic, I will look at two prominent accounts of individualism relevant to the 
project at hand: moral cognition as presented by the moral grammarians (discussed in 
chapter 2) and evolutionary psychology. An alternative view is that cognition is not 
confined to computational manipulations of amodal symbolic representational structures 
in the head of the cogniser. Cognition often incorporates both the body and the world. 
This has implications for evolution; if our moral adaptations incorporate more than 
brainbound psychological processes, then those additional processes must be inherited.  
 
Chapter 4: The Embodiment of Moral Cognition 
 
Building upon some of the ideas of embodied cognition introduced in chapter 3, I will 
explore how moral cognition involves reciprocal feedback between brain and body. Body 
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structures do some of our moral information processing and those structures become 
constituent parts of that system. This is important because much of the fundamental 
structuring of moral cognitive processes are not confined to the head of the moral 
cogniser. As such, an explanation that excludes the processes of brain-body feedback-
loops will necessarily be incomplete. Drawing on recent work in embodied cognition 
detailing how many of our cognitive processes are embodied, I will argue that moral 
cognition is embodied and look at some of the implications of this a view.  
 
Chapter 5: Extending the Moral Mind 
 
In this chapter I develop the ideas of moral cognitive-extension, arguing that moral 
cognition extends into the world. Such a view places our external environments, their 
structure and our interactions with them as constituent components of the moral 
cognitive system. The moral environments in which we are embedded are structures over 
which we offload moral cognitive processes. Many of our moral cognitive problem-
solving routines are thus instantiated by distributing moral cognition over brain, body 
and world. The body and environment make a non-trivial contribution to the 
establishment of the moral phenotype. Those cognitive extensions and the society-wide 
systems that support them are visible to natural selection and are inherited by future 
generations. We actively alter our moral environments and those routines have fitness 
bearing effects on generation N and N + 1. This chapter will explore work in the 
philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences demonstrating how our cognitive systems are 
not bound by our physical boundaries. I will apply these ideas to moral cognition, 
arguing that moral cognition is extended cognition.  
 
Chapter 6: The Gene-Culture Coevolution of Morality 
 
In the previous chapters I argued that morality is plausibly both an evolutionary 
adaptation and an embodied and cognitively-extended complex skill that we learn from 
our moral environments. In this final chapter I draw many of the earlier chapters 
together to propose an account of the evolution of moral cognition. Drawing on recent 
work in dual inheritance accounts in evolutionary theory, I present a gene-culture 
coevolutionary model of the evolution of moral cognition. The constituent structures 
involved in the development and expression of the moral phenotype are inherited in 
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both the genetic and cultural channels. I identify some of the key mechanisms that allow 
the reliable, high-fidelity transmission of the moral phenotype over generations required 
for the cumulative evolution of moral cognition. The model pays specific attention to the 
ways in which moral culture plays a unique evolutionary role by altering the fitness 
landscapes within which genetic evolution occurs. In turn, genetic evolution alters our 
cultural worlds. Each dimension influences the evolutionary dynamics of the other. 
Selection acting on culture becomes an evolutionary efficacious mechanism in its own 
right. 
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1. The Evolutionary Problem of Morality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter gives an overview of evolutionary mechanisms that sustain cooperative 
behaviours, which will in turn provide us with some understanding of the individual and 
group mechanisms that instantiate and sustain morality. By showing that morality does 
not have a single evolutionary origin, I demonstrate that there are a variety of proximate 
mechanisms that support individual moral behaviours and social-wide moral systems. 
 
1.1 Morality is an adaptation 
 
Organisms evolve and many of their current traits exist because the effects of those traits 
furthered the reproductive interests of their ancestors. Moral cognition is no different. 
We are the moral agents that we are today because our ancestors’ capacity for moral 
cognising contributed positively to their reproductive fitness.1 The capacity for cognition 
was selected for by natural selection and is an adaptation. But the claim that morality is 
an adaptation seems counterintuitive when we consider the apparent fitness sacrificing 
nature of much of moral behaviour. We often refrain from cheating when it appears to 
                                                 
1. Whether or not moral cognising currently positively contributes to fitness is an interesting empirical 
question, but not one that will be considered here. What is important for our present explanatory project is 
the claim that moral cognition, broadly conceived, evolved as an adaptation. 
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be in our best interests to cheat. People go out of their way to prevent others from 
cheating, even when such actions are of no benefit to them. Many people regularly give 
their time and money to charities, again, often at no obvious benefit to themselves. One 
of the central tenets of Darwinian thinking is that natural selection favours those traits 
that further an organism’s reproductive interests. If moral behaviours were obviously 
fitness enhancing then explaining their evolution in Darwinian terms would be relatively 
straightforward. Yet this is not the case. Many moral behaviours appear to run counter to 
an individual’s reproductive interests, and hence ought to be selected against. From an 
evolutionary point of view, the fact that individual organisms are prepared to sacrifice 
their fitness on such a wide scale, persisting over generational time-frames, cries out for 
explanation. Explaining these behaviours is the evolutionary problem of morality.  
 
The problem fits into a broader one of explaining the evolution of cooperation. 
Individual moral behaviours and wider moral systems are largely solutions to cooperation 
problems between individuals and groups. Although some moral norms are not 
obviously solutions to cooperation issues, a large and significant number of moral norms 
are. Cooperative interactions have the potential to generate benefits that positively affect 
the reproductive interests of agents. Yet, in many cooperative situations there arises the 
problem of maintaining the cooperative interaction in the face of temptation to free-ride. 
Because many of the mechanisms that maintain cooperation are moral, understanding 
cooperation will provide us with some understanding of moral cognition and its 
evolutionary history. Further, many dyadic and group-wise cooperative interactions in 
human populations are underwritten by norms which regulate the cooperative 
behaviours of agents. Many of these norms are moral norms: those that pertain to 
betrayal, stealing, and cheating. They operate in the service of cooperation by prescribing 
the particular behaviours one ought to follow in cooperative interactions.  
 
Morality also fits into the explanatory framework of the evolution of cooperation 
because the adherence to moral norms is itself a cooperation problem. Group-wide 
moral norms regulate social behaviours, but individual agents will often have an interest 
in violating moral norms because moral adherence often incurs a cost, such as the loss of 
potential individual benefits of non-moral behaviour, acting in altruistic ways, or 
enforcing another’s compliance with moral norms. In this way, individual moral 
adherence can be considered a cooperative act, whereby the moral agent provides 
The Evolutionary Problem of Morality 
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benefits to others often at an individual cost to oneself.  
 
Morality maintains the adherence to moral norms through the controlling or influencing 
of both our own and others’ behaviours in relation to those norms – morality is a means 
of regulating norm-based behaviour. Moral thinking does this by contributing a particular 
motivational element to our judgements and actions. Normal people are not indifferent 
to the moral judgements they make and are motivated to comply with their moral 
obligations. As we will see, this regulating of behaviour may be self-interested or 
altruistic, individually driven or enforced by third parties or groups. Many self-directed 
moral judgements, for example, can be seen as solutions to cooperation problems by 
increasing individual commitment to cooperative norms and removing the need for 
costly mechanisms of external sanction (Joyce 2006). Feeling guilt about cheating is an 
effective way of preventing future cheating without needing to invoke external threat as a 
deterrent. Even self-directed moral judgements and norms that are not obviously 
cooperative in nature, such as those pertaining to sexual purity, can indirectly aid 
cooperation by inducing group conformity. As we will see later in this chapter, and again 
in chapter 6, group conformity is one of the mechanisms that facilitate cultural group 
selection, which in turn is proposed as a driver for the evolution of cooperation (Boyd 
and Richerson 2004).  
 
From this perspective we can see how the benefits of cooperative action were the drivers 
for the evolution of our individual moral cognitions and group-wide moral systems. 
Being moral allowed our ancestors to have more babies primarily because it facilitated 
the expansion of large cooperative groups and the fitness benefits that came with those 
groups. Understanding the evolutionary forces that drove cooperative activity will 
therefore give us some purchase on the evolution of moral systems and the various moral 
cognitions that maintained them.  
 
1.2 The problem of cooperation 
 
Humans are unique in the primate group in the extent of cooperation that occurs 
between agents. Cooperation is a powerful mechanism that allows the generation of 
benefits typically unavailable to groups of non-cooperating individuals: multiple pairs of 
eyes are more successful at identifying threats and potential food sources than a lone pair 
The Evolutionary Problem of Morality 
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of eyes; hunting in a team is more successful in bringing down large game, from which all 
can enjoy the spoils, compared to the difficulty of the task for a lone hunter. But it is also 
the case that agents can reap the rewards of others’ cooperative behaviours without 
contributing to the costs of cooperation themselves. A big-game hunter may deviously 
fail to contribute as much as the others in a dangerous hunt, yet still feast on its spoils. 
Such free-riding behaviours can undermine the generation of benefits from cooperative 
activity, and various mechanisms are needed to restrain such behaviours.  
 
It comes as no surprise that valuable resources such as food are often associated with 
moral norms prescribing collective action associated with their collection, distribution, 
preparation and consumption. As archaeologist Martin Jones explains:   
 
Meals that are strictly bounded by moral code are … widespread among human 
societies around the world. Indeed, human meals of all kinds are framed within 
moral codes about sex, age, rank, and ethnicity, and the dinners do not typically 
sense that these rules are negotiable. They are set at some other time, by some other 
authority, part human and part divine. The rules of conduct are passed down from 
each generation to the next. This seems to mark us apart from our closest relatives. 
(2007:37-38) 
 
In cooperative interactions each agent has the opportunity to cooperate or defect (free-
ride). Cooperation entails individually costly behaviour that benefits the other partner in 
the interaction. Defection entails not cooperating while still receiving any benefits 
offered from other cooperating agents. Both agents cooperating will receive net benefit 
from the cooperative enterprise. In cases where only one agent cooperates, and the other 
defects, the cooperating agent pays all the cost while recouping no benefit, or incurring 
additional cost, while the defector receives benefits without paying the costs. Although 
everyone will be better off if everyone cooperates, defectors are individually even better 
off if they defect while others cooperate. Defection in these cases is, prima facie, the 
evolutionarily favoured strategy. The problem of cooperation therefore involves 
explaining how the group beneficial cooperative behaviours we see in human populations 
can be maintained in the face of individual temptation to free-ride. 
 
 
 
The Evolutionary Problem of Morality 
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There are two types of explanations that are important for gaining an understanding of 
the mechanisms which support cooperation: proximate and ultimate.2 It is worth briefly 
discussing these two types of explanations, the relationship between them, and the ways 
in which they can mutually inform each other.  
 
1.3 Proximate and ultimate explanations 
 
Proximate explanations involve mechanisms that generate a particular behaviour over an 
individual’s life history. These include individual psychologies, biologies, ecologies, 
genetics, learning, reproductive strategies, environmental resources, group structure and 
interaction. Affection for close family members, for example, helps maintain cooperative 
behaviours towards those family members. We protect and cooperate with them, in part, 
because our affections motivate us to. Ultimate explanations, on the other hand, depend 
on more general patterns of population-level dynamics over generations, and involve 
mechanisms such as kin selection, reciprocal altruism and group selection. For example, 
consider two explanations of human preference for sweet foods. The proximate 
explanation is that we have taste buds that are sensitive to sugar molecules, inducing 
pleasurable sensations upon contact. The ultimate explanation is that we have 
preferences for sugary foods because eating sugary foods provided a ready source of 
energy for our ancestors, increasing their relative fitness compared to those who did not 
have such preferences, thereby spreading the preference for sugary foods in our ancestral 
populations. 
 
Both types of explanation are empirically constrained. Their explanatory success or 
failure is ultimately an empirical matter. Also, ultimate explanations inform the proximate 
explanations and vice versa (see Box 1.1). Mathematical models of evolutionary dynamics 
can be used as a way of testing hypotheses about the roles of various proximate 
mechanisms. For example, the modelling of psychological theories of culture and 
learning in evolutionary models allows one to establish the effects of learning over 
evolutionary time frames, providing useful empirically testable hypotheses into the roles 
                                                 
2. Tinbergen (1963) proposes an alternative four way distinction amongst explanatory projects: 
adaptive, evolutionary, developmental and proximal. I will view adaptive and evolutionary explanations as 
broadly corresponding to ultimate explanations and developmental and proximal explanations as broadly 
corresponding to proximate explanations.  
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of various proximate mechanisms in the transmission of cultural variants. Without 
mathematical models of cultural transmission it would be difficult to establish under 
what conditions maladaptive cultural traits might be transferred within a population 
(Laland 1993). Because the two types of explanation are mutually informing, 
understanding the mechanisms involved in the evolution of cooperation will help inform 
us of the relevant psychological mechanisms, or otherwise, that underwrite cooperative 
(and in terms of this project, subsequently moral) activity.   
Box 1.1 Ultimate explanations informing proximate explanations and 
vice versa in reproductive conflicts in Dinoponera queenless ant 
colonies 
Ultimate explanations inform proximate explanations and vice versa. A clear example 
of this comes from the use of inclusive fitness modelling in eusocial insects. Ratnieks 
and colleagues (2001) detail how Hamilton’s (1964) inclusive fitness theory has 
provided some novel predictions with respect to facultative sex allocation and worker 
policing in social insects.3 In the queenless ant colonies of Dinoponera quadricepts and 
D. australis, all female ants can potentially become reproductive in their lifetime. 
When they do they are called gamergates. Because reproduction is limited to one or a 
few gamergates at any one time, dominance hierarchies of a small number of 
potential reproducing gamergates emerge, below which are the worker ants. This 
hierarchical ranking system means that the higher ranked females will spend most of 
their time engaged in aggressive struggles to increase their rank and therefore the 
probability of being gamergate and passing on their genes (i.e., increase reproductive 
fitness).  
Inclusive fitness models make empirically confirmed predictions about how the 
length of the hierarchies will be affected by colony size and the shape of the 
hierarchy itself. The models show under which parameters it is more fitness 
enhancing to become a worker and help further one’s genetic interests via the 
genetically related colony, or to directly further one’s genetic interests by attempting 
to become the next gamergate. Here we have a case in which models of the ultimate 
causes (i.e., inclusive fitness models) make predictions which are empirically 
confirmed by the subsequent studies of proximate causes, such as specific dominance 
behaviours of gamergates (Monnin and Liebig 2008). 
                                                 
3. As the authors state, this is important in that the scientific theory can make novel predictions as 
opposed to, what might be seen as, post hoc rationalisations. 
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Inclusive fitness models make predictions about individual behaviours within the 
colony. Under certain conditions selection can favour individual ants overthrowing a 
gamergate to more directly further their own reproductive interests. Genetic 
modelling by Monnin and Ratnieks (unpublished, reported in Ratnieks, Monnin et al. 
2001) details which conditions this type of strategy will arise in the population, 
namely when the gamergate is old and the overthrow is highly likely to benefit the 
overthrowing ant. But their models also predicted that “other workers and the 
gamergate should oppose early overthrow” (2001:204). These predictions are in line 
with previously poorly understood observations that workers will seemingly punish 
other ants who challenge the active gamergate by physically restraining them for up 
to three days. Here, ultimate explanations give understanding of what certain 
proximate behaviours are for, namely informing us that the ants are immobilising 
other ants which have prematurely tried to usurp the gamergate. These models also 
predict that ants need some method of age-assessing the reproducing gamergate. 
Dominance behaviours that the gamergate performs with the other higher-ranked 
females, such as blocking and abdomen rubbing, are “honest signals of vitality” 
which can be used by other females to gauge the age of the gamergate, and therefore 
whether or not she should be overthrown. Ant behaviour is better understood 
because of the mutually informing nature of ultimate and proximate explanations.  
 
1.4 The Evolution of Cooperation  
 
In human populations, no single explanation is sufficient to understand all observed 
cooperative phenomena and it is very likely that cooperation evolves and is maintained 
by multiple mechanisms. The explanation as to why we have norms of moral behaviour 
towards our kin, for instance, may be different from explanations as to why we have 
norms of moral behaviour towards our friends, and again, towards complete strangers. 
The norms that prescribe those different behaviours are likely to be understood through 
a variety of different mechanisms (Harms and Skyrms 2008). I will now outline some of 
the most prominent accounts in the literature on the problem of cooperation, providing 
insight into the types of psychological and other mechanisms involved in the evolution 
and execution of moral cognition.  
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1.4.1 Kin selection (inclusive fitness) 
 
If we are to classify an organism’s fitness in terms of its ability to pass its genes on to 
future generations then we can see how the helping of one’s offspring is a fitness 
enhancing act. The improvement of the health and welfare of one’s offspring, even at a 
cost to oneself, will increase the likelihood of one’s genes being passed on to future 
generations. In such cases, what would appear to be an individually altruistic act of 
helping one’s offspring is, from a genes-eye perspective, actually a genetically-selfish act. 
By viewing such behaviours in terms of one’s propensity to pass on one’s genes, we can 
broaden our explanatory scope to include altruistic behaviours towards relatives that are 
not direct decedents. Under the right conditions, it is in one’s genetic self-interest to aid 
genetically related relatives even at an individual cost to oneself. In these cases, the 
degree of relatedness multiplied by the reproductive benefits to the recipient is greater 
than the reproductive cost incurred by the altruist, mathematically expressed as rB>C 
(Hamilton 1964).  
 
Viewing cooperative behaviours through the lens of inclusive fitness, helping offspring 
and helping a relative are to be understood within the same explanatory framework: both 
are in one’s genetic self-interest because both further the transmission of one’s genes from 
one generation to the next (Hamilton 1964). However, it is not clear that inclusive fitness 
models can explain many of our moral behaviours relating to kin. Looking after one’s 
genetically related parents or grandparents when they are beyond breeding age isn’t 
explained by inclusive fitness models – the costs are high but the inclusive fitness 
benefits appear to be somewhat less. In such cases, our fondness for our non-
reproducing relatives might just be an artefact of already developed familial-directed 
affective mechanisms that were selected for via kin selection. Furthermore, kin selection 
requires some means for preferential assortment of genetically related individuals, such as 
the ability to identify genetically related family members. This is not always plausible. 
More generally though, explanations for cooperative behaviours based on inclusive 
fitness are limited to groups of closely related organisms and therefore fail to explain 
cooperative interactions between unrelated individuals. As such, inclusive fitness is 
inadequate to explain the large-scale cooperation amongst non-related individuals 
witnessed in human populations.   
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1.4.2 Reciprocity 
 
Cooperation with non-kin can be favoured by natural selection if the costs of cooperative 
actions are returned in the future. Robert Trivers proposed that the prospect of future 
reward could drive the evolution of cooperation between non-related individuals (1971; 
Axelrod 1984). Reciprocity (often referred to as direct reciprocity) of this sort is 
summarised in the well known saying, “I’ll scratch your back if you scratch mine”. 
Reciprocators are agents who will cooperate in the first instance and continue 
cooperating so long as their partner does so. If their partner does not cooperate or ceases 
to cooperate they will in turn refuse to cooperate any further. Reciprocators are first-shot 
unconditional cooperators and subsequent conditional cooperators. In the case of one-
off interactions or the last interaction in a series of repeated interactions, it is in one’s 
interests to defect and receive the benefits of the other’s cooperative actions without 
incurring the costs – in this way reciprocators are selected against and defection becomes 
the favoured strategy. Yet this is not necessarily the favoured strategy in cases where 
there is a significant probability that the agents will meet again in repeated interactions. 
Here, one might receive higher payoffs by cooperating through repeated interactions 
rather than defecting and forgoing those cooperative benefits. Selection for cooperation 
based on reciprocity depends on an adequate number of repeated future interactions. In 
models of prisoner dilemma scenarios, the probability of an encounter between the same 
two agents needs to exceed the cost-to-benefit ratio from the altruistic act for 
cooperation to evolve by reciprocity of this kind (Nowak 2006).  
 
Yet, models of cooperation based on reciprocity are limited in explanatory scope. Firstly, 
they still face the problem of defection because free-riding agents can move from player 
to player in a group, thereby accruing the benefits of defection without contributing the 
costs of cooperation. Individual-level selection therefore acts against the altruistic 
cooperative behaviours of reciprocators. One proposed solution to this problem is that 
agents have the ability to recognise each other, keep a track of all their past interactions, 
and preferentially cooperate with those whom they have previously successfully 
cooperated (I will address this type of reciprocity in 1.4.3). If such conditions are met, 
defection will not remain a viable strategy because free-riders will eventually run out of 
agents to interact with. Long-term cooperation will be selectively favoured over short-
term defection strategies.  
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Secondly, reciprocity is limited to interactions in small groups (Bowles and Gintis 2003; 
Boyd and Richerson 2004). Reciprocity models do not scale up from two person dyadic 
cooperative interactions to those of n-person interactions involving cooperation between 
large numbers of agents. If reciprocators are cooperating in a group, where the 
cooperative activity is between all group members, then if one defection (or even a 
mistaken defection) occurs, all reciprocators in the group will cease to cooperate and 
everyone, including other non-defecting reciprocators, will be denied the benefits of 
future cooperation. Reciprocity is therefore not a sufficiently discriminatory mechanism 
to sustain successful cooperation in large groups. Evolutionary models by Boyd and 
Richerson (1988) and others have shown that reciprocity based cooperation can only be 
sustained in small groups, because in large groups of reciprocators, a small number of 
defectors will break down cooperation. These models of cooperation using n-person 
prisoner’s dilemma show that cooperation is unlikely to be favoured by natural selection 
in groups of around 10 or more unrelated individuals (see also Henrich and Boyd 
2001:79). Successful reciprocity also requires that interactions are repeated, which is not 
always possible in large, dynamic groups.  
 
Thirdly, although we witness reciprocity in many of our dyadic relationships such as 
those between husband and wife, family, friends and some economic transactions, 
beyond these, evolutionary explanations based on reciprocity do not accord with much 
of the empirical evidence. Reciprocity fails to explain why agents in real world and 
experimental settings will cooperate with strangers in both non-repeated interactions as 
well as the final round of a repeated interaction. As Bowles and Gintis point out, in times 
of war and group threat for example, “precisely when a group is most in need of 
prosocial behaviour, cooperation based on reciprocal altruism will collapse” because the 
prospect of one’s cooperation being repaid in the future is diminished and hence so is 
the incentive to cooperate (2003:434).  
 
Finally, reciprocity, like kin selection, requires some means of preferential sorting, such as 
by way of agent identification. For reciprocation to work agents typically need to be able 
to preferentially cooperate with those who have previously cooperated and avoid who 
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have defected, as well keep track of past interactions.4 This is an unlikely scenario in the 
case of large groups where many interactions are often fleeting and the vast number of 
interactions makes bookkeeping of this sort impractical. In the human case, we do not 
have the requisite psychological (proximate) mechanisms for the evolution of 
cooperation under reciprocity alone.   
 
It is most likely that kin selection and reciprocal altruism explain many of our cooperative 
behaviours. Although they may be limited in explanatory scope, they still tell us 
something about the types of proximate mechanisms that we might expect to see for the 
limited class of human cooperative activities they do explain. Kin selection requires an 
ability to identify family members and motivation to cooperate with them. Reciprocity 
requires some form of discriminatory bookkeeping mechanisms so one can remember 
who to cooperate with – or not – in future interactions. Neither kin selection nor 
reciprocity can adequately explain the evolution of cooperation in large groups of 
unrelated individuals because they rely on strong probabilistic assumptions involving 
positive correlation between types, population size, cost-benefit ratios, and numbers of 
repeated interactions. Their applicability is limited with respect to the large, dynamic, 
often random and non-repeating interactions we see in human populations. More 
recently, two proposed solutions to the problem of cooperation in large-scale societies 
have proven to be both more theoretically and empirically viable than either kin selection 
and/or reciprocity. The two solutions involve reputation based and punishment based 
strategies.   
 
1.4.3 Reputation 
 
We saw above that reciprocal altruism involves cooperative acts between two people 
which result in both gaining net benefit from the act. Any subsequent acts of cooperation 
are conditional on the outcome of previous interactions. What reciprocity does not take 
into account is an agent’s cooperative track record with third parties. An agent’s previous 
behaviour towards others is irrelevant to the decision-making process of the altruistic 
reciprocator. In contrast, reputation-based strategies present a more promising account 
of large-scale, n-player cooperation. Reputation based strategies for the evolution of 
                                                 
4. It should be noted that there are some situations in which agents can satisfy the cost/benefit 
structures of a reciprocal exchange even if they never encounter each other.  
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cooperation, called indirect reciprocity, have been proposed by Richard Alexander (1987).  
 
Indirect reciprocity occurs when one does not receive the benefits of cooperation from 
the agent to whom one has behaved altruistically. Instead, one is the recipient of altruistic 
acts from some other agent. In a group of indirect reciprocators, agent A will help agent 
B who will help agent C and so on. Indirect reciprocity can be summarised as “You 
scratch my back, and I’ll scratch someone else’s” and “I scratch your back and someone 
else will scratch mine” (Nowak and Sigmund 2005:437). There have been various 
mechanisms proposed by which cooperation via indirect reciprocity can be achieved. 
‘Image scoring’ is one such mechanism, whereby cooperating with others increases your 
image score, while refusing to cooperate with others decreases your image score. 
Discriminating group members can then preferentially cooperate with those who have a 
good image score over those who do not. Models show that under the right conditions 
cooperation can evolve via image scoring mechanisms (Nowak and Sigmund 2005).5 
There is also empirical evidence that people do actually discriminate by image scoring 
(see Milinski (2002) and discussion below).  
 
One problem with simple reputation based strategies is that although agents gain poor 
reputations for non-cooperation, those reputations don’t take into account the reason for 
non-cooperation. All acts of non-cooperation are judged the same. This means that one 
can gain a reputation as a non-co-operator for not cooperating with those agents with 
poor reputations! A proposed solution is to introduce the notion of a ‘good standing’, 
which individuals lose if they fail to help others with a good standing, but retain if they 
refuse to cooperate with others who have a bad standing (Leimar and Hammerstein 
2001). In contrast to image scoring, this is a more discriminatory strategy because it is 
responsive to not only the cooperative reputation of agents, but also the reputations of 
those with whom they do or do not cooperate with. One’s standing is not damaged 
through non-cooperation with non-cooperators.  
 
Like direct reciprocity above, these cooperative strategies are conditional strategies. But 
unlike direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocal strategies are based upon the other agents’ 
                                                 
5. One of the proposed problems with the image scoring account is that agents damage their image 
score when they refuse to cooperate with other agents with poor image scores. In other words image 
scoring in this way doesn’t sufficiently discriminate between non-cooperation with good vs. poor image 
scorers. For discussion see Leimar and Hammerstein (2001) and Nowak (2005). 
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interactions with other agents. Indirect reciprocators preferentially cooperate with those 
who have cooperated with others in the past. Of central importance for the sustaining of 
cooperation in these models is reputation: agents cooperate conditionally with respect to 
another’s reputation as a cooperator. Interactions witnessed by third party, non-
participatory observers provide information to be used as part of their own decision-
making process in future interactions. In this way, agents do not have to interact with 
other agents to establish their cooperative credential; they need only observe, or by some 
other means obtain the relevant information about, their behaviours.  
 
This means that reputation has consequences for one’s ability to either cooperate or 
defect on future interactions. A system of reputation-based reciprocity fosters individual 
concern for one’s own reputation because it becomes in one’s best interests to maintain a 
reputation and build up the trust of other agents. Failure to do so will result in the 
exclusion from future cooperative activities, not only with those with whom one has 
defected, but also all those who have heard of your defection. If one gains a poor 
reputation, one not only loses the potential to gain rewards from cooperative 
interactions, but also the rewards to be had from defecting in future interactions. 
Discriminating against agents with poor reputation acts as a form of punishment 
whereby they are denied the potential rewards of others’ cooperative activity. Under such 
circumstances, selection can favour the evolution of cooperation where the decision to 
cooperate is based on the reputation of the interacting agents. Evolutionary models by 
Panchanathan and Boyd (2004) linking indirect reciprocity with norms of collective 
action have shown that the threat of exclusion from a system of indirect reciprocity can 
sustain cooperation in large groups. Helping others cultivates a good reputation. This in 
turn encourages others to cooperate with those who have good reputations and provides 
motivation to contribute to cooperative activity, even for purely self-interested agents.  
 
Intuitively, reputation counts. We care about what other people think of us, whether we 
like it or not. And we seem to especially care about our moral reputations as well as those 
of others with whom we interact. Not only is indirect reciprocity theoretically and 
intuitively appealing, empirical evidence supports the claim that it plays a significant role 
in the maintenance of cooperation. In public goods games players are more generous to 
those whom they have witnessed contributing to the public good (Milinski, Semmann et 
al. 2002). People are also more generous to those whom they know have previously 
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donated to a charitable organisation (Milinski 2002; Nowak and Sigmund 2005).  
Additionally, we can see reputations playing a central role in online auction sites such as 
eBay. These use image scoring as a means of regulating cooperative behaviours by 
placing self-interested value on having a good reputation. In this way, reputation acts as a 
means of deterring defection and signalling trustworthiness to third-party potential 
cooperators.  
 
In the above discussion, the assumption has been that individual agents are witness to 
the interactions of others. Clearly this cannot always be the case. Within groups of 
interacting agents, every interaction is not witnessed by all other agents, especially in large 
groups. Agents will not always be party to the information required to successfully 
employ the conditional strategies and maintain cooperation. For indirect reciprocity to 
work in large groups, there must therefore be some mechanisms which allow the relevant 
information to be distributed amongst the group, in what McElreath et al. (2003) call 
“distributed bookkeeping”. In this way, cooperatively relevant information is stored and 
transmitted via social relationships. Other agents become a central part of our moral and 
cooperative decision-making processes and the establishment of moral trust. This idea of 
social image, reputation and distributed bookkeeping accords well with our propensity 
for moral gossip: one is much less likely to cooperate with those one has had failed 
cooperative interactions with before, and people tend to tell others about this. As we will 
see later in chapters 5 and 6, distributed mechanisms such as moral gossip play a large 
and centrally important part in moral cognition.   
 
Indirect reciprocity provides a sound theoretical and empirical basis for much of our 
cooperative activity, but it is not the explanatory silver bullet for the evolution of 
cooperation. Although language and culture provide relatively cheap means of increasing 
the probability of knowing someone else’s reputation through gossip (Dunbar 1996), the 
degree to which indirect reciprocity succeeds will be constrained by the nature of the 
population and the relationships between its agents: “In a fluid population, in which 
most interactions are anonymous and people have no possibility of monitoring the social 
scores of others, indirect reciprocity has no chance” (Nowak and Sigmund 2005:1296). 
Like the models of direct reciprocity, many indirect reciprocity models are also based on 
dyadic interactions which cannot account for n-player cooperative interactions (an 
exception to this is the previously mentioned work by Panchanathan and Boyd (2004), 
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which links reputation to norms of collective action). 
 
However, indirect reciprocity is a significant evolutionary mechanism sustaining 
cooperative acts and is indicative of some of the proximate mechanisms facilitating 
cooperation. It requires mechanisms to make appraisals about the cooperative actions of 
others (like we do in moral judgement), track and memorise the behaviours and 
reputations of others, communicate that information to group members, and to perceive 
and judge one’s self-image. Furthermore, culture, group structure, and the nature of the 
interactions and social relationships within groups all have a central place in the 
mechanisms that facilitate group cooperation through indirect reciprocity. As we will see 
in later chapters, group structure and agent interaction play a central role in moral 
cognition.  
 
The mechanism of indirect reciprocity demonstrate how one’s reputation, and hence 
one’s cooperative prospects, can be altered depending on one’s cooperative history. In 
this way, reputation can encourage punishment for failing to cooperate. The link with 
morality is clear. Moral reputation and associated punishments enforce moral norms 
which give rise to large-scale cooperation.  
 
1.4.4 Punishment 
 
One of the proposed solutions to the problem of cooperation is the introduction of 
targeted third-party punishment. An example of this is strong reciprocity, or what is often 
referred to as moralistic punishment (Trivers 1971; Henrich and Boyd 2001; Fehr, 
Fischbacher et al. 2002; Boyd, Gintis et al. 2003; Bowles and Gintis 2003; Fehr and 
Fischbacher 2004; Henrich, McElreath et al. 2006). Strong reciprocators are conditionally 
altruistic cooperators as well as conditionally altruistic punishers; they will initially 
cooperate and continue cooperating with other cooperators but will also undertake 
individually costly punishment of those who fail to cooperate with them, as well as on 
behalf of others. Importantly, they will punish even when there is no future payback for 
such punishment. The strong reciprocator’s actions are a benefit to other group members 
(by punishing defection), even when at a cost to themselves, and therefore strong 
reciprocators are providing a public good (Boyd, Gintis et al. 2003; Bowles and Gintis 
2003). If the punishment meted out by the strong reciprocator is sufficiently severe and 
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appropriately targeted, then the individual benefits of defecting diminish and the relative 
benefits of cooperating increase. Cooperation becomes the more profitable strategy. 
“Once the cooperative equilibrium becomes common, it is plausible that natural selection 
acting on genetic variation will favor genes that cause people to cooperate and punish 
because such genes decrease an individual’s chance of suffering costly punishment” 
(Henrich and Boyd 2001:87). Boyd and Richerson (1992) have shown mathematically 
that only a small number of strong reciprocators are required to induce group 
cooperative activity. Strong reciprocators can invade a population of self-regarding 
individuals and reach equilibrium (Bowles and Gintis 2003).  
 
Intuitively, punishment-based models such as strong reciprocity appear to model real 
world phenomena and the intimate connection between punishment and morality. Not 
only do we typically punish those who commit moral infractions, we desire and are 
motivated to punish them. We get angry and want to punish those who betray us. 
Importantly, we also get angry and want to punish those who betray others, and not only 
when we have had relationships with those betrayed. Disgust at child abuse and slavery 
for example are not limited to instances in our own social groups, ethnicities, or 
countries. And neither is a desire to punish the perpetrators of such actions. 
Experimental evidence also shows that strong reciprocator behaviours are common. A 
large number of subjects will punish low contributors in public goods games at a cost to 
themselves even when there is no chance of recouping the costs, and even when they are 
only witness to the violation and not directly affected (Fehr, Fischbacher et al. 2002). 
Costly punishment is also a cross-cultural phenomenon. Experiments by Henrich et al. 
(2006) show that people from a diverse range of different cultures will similarly punish at 
direct cost to themselves when they are victims of non-cooperative norm violations. (For 
a brief overview and further evidence see Gintis 2000.) 
 
However, punishment does not come without cost to the punisher, although this cost 
varies substantially depending on the type of punishment. Physical punishment, for 
example, can be a potentially dangerous affair. Ostracism by group members on the 
other hand is a comparatively cheap form of punishment. So too is the spreading of 
another agent’s poor reputation amongst potential cooperators. But neither is without 
cost. There are costs involved in the observation and monitoring of behaviours, and 
subsequent information dissemination. Additionally, these acts can elicit potentially 
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vengeful reactions from the recipient of the punishment. Cost can be significantly 
reduced if they are distributed over a number of punishers, whereby individual costs of 
punishment decrease with an increasing number of punishers. However, there is still a 
cost involved in punishment, no matter how small.  
 
The fact that punishment is costly raises a cooperation problem which is often referred 
to as the second-order defection problem. Punishment may be an effective means by which to 
sustain various norms, but why should an agent undertake individually costly 
punishment? Agents who punish are providing a public good and are open to 
exploitation, thereby posing the second-order defection problem (Henrich and Boyd 
2001; Boyd and Richerson 2004). Agents can cooperate, avoiding potential punishment 
themselves, but refrain from inflicting costly punishment on others (so called non-
punishing cooperators). They are enjoying the public benefits of the strong reciprocators 
administering punishment on group members but are not prepared to bear the costs of 
punishment themselves. In this case the second-order free-rider benefits from higher 
payoffs than the punishers do. Therefore punishment is not an evolutionary stable 
strategy (Henrich and Boyd 2001).   
 
There are a number of responses to this problem. In cases where there is a large 
(enough) number of prospective punishers, the number of first-order non-cooperators 
will be low, because as we saw above, the costs of defection become greater than the 
costs of cooperation. If this is the case, instances of first-order defection will be rare and 
the need to undertake punishment will itself be correspondingly rare. The costs of 
punishment will therefore be low as will the fitness benefits from being a non-punishing 
cooperator (i.e., second-order free-riders) since the probability of defection decreases as 
the cost of punishment also decreases. If this is the case, instances of second-order 
defection will be rare and, although there will be fitness advantages accrued to second-
order defectors, these will be small relative to the strong reciprocators (Boyd, Gintis et al. 
2003).  
 
Another solution to the problem of second-order defection is the introduction of higher-
order punishment. In this instance, punishment is meted out to those who fail to punish 
first-order defectors, imposing costs on being a non-punishing co-operator such that it is 
no longer in one’s interests to be a second-order free-rider (Boyd and Richerson 1992). 
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Although evidence for higher-order punishment is rare, evidence from audience effects 
on the behaviours of third-party punishers is suggestive. Kurzban et al. (2007) found that 
in the presence of an audience, third party punishers are more likely to punish, and more 
likely to punish more severely. Reputational effects would appear to play a role in our 
propensity to punish norm violators, whether or not we are aware of these effects. If we 
consider that reputational mechanisms are closely aligned with punishment (as per above) 
then we can tentatively see how the threat of punishment (i.e., loss of reputation) may 
play a role in the maintenance of higher-order punishment. Still, the problem with meta-
punishment strategies such as this is that they give rise to infinitely recurring orders of 
free-riding and corresponding punishment strategies. Transferring the cost of 
punishment over infinitely recurring levels seems an unrealistic mechanism by which to 
stabilise punishment (Henrich and Boyd 2001).  
 
One further solution is that the selective forces favouring second-order free riding are 
overcome by other adaptive behaviours. If the relative costs of being a strong 
reciprocator are low, then it will only require relatively weak mechanisms to stabilise 
punishment. Henrich and Boyd (2001) argue that because of this, the propensity of 
humans to adopt the behaviours of others through learning can potentially prevent 
second-order free-riding. Humans use a variety of psychological mechanisms and social 
learning rules to adopt the adaptive behaviours of their groups (such as “copy the 
successful” and “copy the majority”). These mechanisms will also see the adoption of 
norms of behaviour that underwrite punishment. If the conformist transmission of 
punishing is sufficiently strong (and it need only be very weak) then it will counteract the 
small fitness advantage that exists in being a second-order free-rider and hence stabilise 
costly punishment. In this way, the within-group evolutionary forces of conformist 
transmission that drive other adaptive behaviours can stabilise punishment and sustain 
cooperative behaviours.6  
 
Experimental evidence shows that institutions adopting sanctioning mechanisms that 
maintain cooperative behaviours have a competitive advantage over institutions that do 
not sanction. In an experiment by Gurerk et al. (2006), subjects were allowed to freely 
                                                 
6. Henrich and Boyd (2001) point out that the stabilisation of punishment itself is in fact a maladaptive 
side-effect of conformist transmission. i.e., it may be in one’s individual self-interest to be a second-order 
defector, but the capacity for conformist transmission which has been selected for other adaptive reasons, 
means that we inadvertently copy the social norms that entail we punish defectors.  
The Evolutionary Problem of Morality 
  
26
 
choose whether they joined a sanctioning or non-sanctioning group of potential 
cooperators. Each group then partook in a public goods game to establish conditions of 
conflict between self and collective interests within each group. Agents were allowed to 
freely move between the two groups after each round of the game. The authors found 
that over time subjects moved from the non-sanctioning institution to the sanctioning 
institution until nearly all agents had moved to the sanctioning group. The presence of 
free-riders in the non-sanctioning group resulted in the collapse of cooperation, thereby 
reducing the potential benefits derived from cooperation as well as the number of 
cooperators which the free-riders could exploit. Additionally, in the sanctioning group, 
punishment increased the group contribution of agents by making free-riding more 
costly. As such, it became more profitable to be a non-free-riding cooperator in the 
sanctioning group than a free-rider in the non-sanctioning group.  
 
In sum, strong reciprocity is one mechanism that can maintain cooperation with non-
related individuals in large groups with both dyadic and non-dyadic interactions and is 
intuitively, theoretically, and empirically sound. The link with morality is clear. 
Punishment is mediated by norm recognition and recognition of norm violation, both of 
which are central to morality. In moral terms, punishing minds are moralising minds.  
 
1.4.5 Group selection and norms of collective action 
 
Mechanisms based on reputation and punishment can explain the stabilisation and 
maintenance of cooperative behaviours in the face of defection. However, neither 
mechanism is sufficient to explain why it is that we see specifically cooperative behaviours 
on such a large scale. This is because, as Boyd and Richerson (1992) have shown, 
punishment-based mechanisms can stabilise just about any norm of behaviour: “if 
evolutionary change is driven only by individual costs and benefits, then moralistic 
punishment can stabilize cooperation, but it can also stabilize anything else…. Since 
cooperative behaviors are a tiny subset of all possible behaviors, punishment does not 
explain why large-scale cooperation is so widely observed” (Boyd 2007:201).7 Richard 
Joyce also explains: if “a good reputation means sharing food indiscriminately with the 
group, then an indiscriminate food-sharing trait will develop; if a good reputation means 
                                                 
7. This is an especially important point when we consider the vast array of moral norms and behaviours 
with which we find across a multitude of different domains.  
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wearing a pumpkin on your head then a pumpkin wearing trait will develop” (2006:33). 
And similarly, Joseph Henrich tells us that “the same reputational and sanctioning 
mechanisms that can stabilize cooperation can also sustain maladaptive practices such as 
consuming the brains of dead relatives, flattening the foreheads of infants, or binding the 
feet of young girls” (2006:60). Cooperative norms of behaviour are only a fractionally 
small portion of all possible norms that exist, so we must ask why we see a 
disproportionate profusion of group beneficial prosocial norms as opposed to say group 
harmful norms. The reason is, quite simply, that groups with prosocial cooperative 
norms will out-compete those groups with neutral or harmful norms (Bowles and Gintis 
2003; Boyd and Richerson 2004; Joyce 2006). This is group selection.  
 
Natural selection operates on variation to produce adaptive change. Within populations 
individual agents vary in their phenotypic traits which will often differentially contribute 
to the survival and reproduction of bearers of those traits. Selection in this case occurs 
between individuals within the population but can also, under the right conditions, occur 
between groups. In cases where there is heritable variation between groups, sufficient and 
sustained homogeneity within groups and competition between groups, then selection 
will act on between-group fitness differences. In most cases, these conditions will not be 
adequately met. The main problem with group selection when cashed out in terms of 
genetic selection, for example, is that it is hard to maintain variation between groups 
when there is even small migration between those groups (Boyd and Richerson 2004). 
But if we understand group selection as being driven by culture and various within-group 
mechanisms that resist the corruption of within-group similarities, we can see how group 
selection can occur. Cultural learning, for example, helps explain both between-group 
differences and within-group similarities required for such selection.  
 
Between-group conflict is common.8 While some forms of inter-group conflict are direct 
conflict, such as in the case of warfare, there are also non-direct conflicts whereby one 
group will out-survive another in times of famine and pestilence. Groups can also 
compete against each other through cultural practices such as hunting and food 
gathering. One group out-competes another when the latter group becomes extinct or 
                                                 
8. Selection between the groups does not necessitate the extinction of the individuals within one or 
other of the competing groups – only that those individuals from the losing group either adopt the 
practices of the more successful or disperse, thereby maintaining the winning group’s integrity and intra-
group homogeneity (Boyd and Richerson 2004). 
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adopts the behaviours and practices of the former. In many instances, groups that are 
cooperative will have a better chance of survival than those that are not. As we also saw 
above, there are a number of mechanisms that can buffer within-group variation but 
these mechanisms can also amplify and sustain between-group differences. Human traits 
such as imitation and conformist learning, moralistic punishment, and normativity do just 
that. As Kim Sterelny points out, these mechanisms magnify “the influence of group 
selection by increasing the variation between groups and decreasing it within groups, for 
in different groups, different innovations appear and are picked up … Once the 
conditions for group selection are in place, between-group selection will act powerfully in 
favour of cooperative groups” (2003:127). Within-group cultural evolution will mean 
different groups reach different behavioural equilibria with different fitness payoffs. 
Selection at the level of groups operates on these between-group fitness differences. 
Where cooperative behaviours positively contribute to group fitness differences, inter-
group competition will favour mechanisms that give rise to those cooperative 
behaviours. Hence, we see the profusion of norms that promote group beneficial 
cooperative behaviours (Henrich and Boyd 2001; Boyd and Richerson 2004; Henrich 
2006). There is obvious conflict between individual-level selection operating within the 
group, and group-level selection operating between groups. But as we have seen above, 
mechanisms such as punishment can work to mitigate the disparity between the two and 
allow weak selective processes such as group selection to select for group beneficial 
mechanisms. Theoretical mathematical models give credence to this picture by showing 
how cultural group selection can favour particular group-beneficial behaviours over non-
cooperative behaviours (Boyd, Gintis et al. 2003).  
 
Earlier we saw that systems based on reputation and punishment provided explanations 
as to how group cooperative norms are maintained. What they didn’t explain was why 
there is a profusion of group cooperative norms as opposed to non-cooperative norms. 
Group selection provides us with an explanation of why we have specifically group 
beneficial cooperative norms such as many of our moral norms.  
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1.5 The evolution of cooperation and the proximate 
mechanisms of morality 
 
None of the above explanations – kin selection, reciprocity, reputation, punishment and 
cultural group selection – are complete explanations for the evolution of cooperative 
behaviours. It is most likely that they all play a part, possibly in addition to other, as of 
yet, less thoroughly investigated evolutionary mechanisms of cooperation, such as sexual 
selection (Miller 2007) and costly signalling (Gintis, Smith et al. 2001). Importantly 
though, they provide some insight into the proximate mechanisms that are involved in 
cooperative action. Although there is cross-over, each of the mechanisms discussed 
select for some different proximate mechanisms. When we think of human populations, 
kin selection requires, among other things, a way of identifying family members. 
Reciprocity requires some means of identifying cheaters9, bookkeeping and the ability for 
future discrimination. Reputation-based strategies again require capacities for cheater 
detection, tracking behaviours and intentions over time, agent discrimination skills, 
awareness of one’s own and others’ reputations, and group-wide communicative systems. 
Punishment-based strategies require various methods of punishment, cheater detection, 
and special motivational mechanisms. Group selection requires transmission of cultural 
traits and mechanisms that maintain within-group homogeneity and between-group 
differences such as punishment and conformist mechanisms. Many require an ability to 
identify and follow norms of behaviour and all require some form of motivational 
mechanisms such as emotions. These are just a sample of the proximate mechanisms 
involved in cooperative activity.  
 
Morality acts in aid of cooperation. And if morality is, as I have claimed above, 
constituted by a range of mechanisms that sustain cooperative activity, then many of 
those mechanisms are going to be central to moral cognition. We have seen individual 
and group-level traits that arise via multiple levels of selection. Kin selection, for 
example, involves the selection for traits that benefit groups of related individuals, while 
cultural group selection involves traits that benefit groups of unrelated individuals. We 
can see how many of the proximate mechanisms that sustain cooperation are 
recognisably central to our moral lives: punishment, norms, reputation, judgement and 
                                                 
9. See, for example, the work by Tooby and Cosmides on cheater detection (1989; Cosmides and 
Tooby 1992). 
The Evolutionary Problem of Morality 
  
30
 
gossip. Morality is not a single trait, like, for example, colour vision. It is composite. This 
plurality of mechanisms helps explain the existence of our conflicting moral intuitions. 
Ought one to steal food to feed their family if they are hungry but cannot afford food? 
Ought one turn in a close friend to police if he has committed a crime? The mechanisms 
that drive preferential support for kin might conflict with one’s adherence to group 
beneficial norms. One’s reputation amongst friends (depending on who your friends are) 
might also conflict with one’s belief that it is a moral duty to be a law abiding, group 
beneficial citizen.   
 
What is also clear is that many of the adaptive mechanisms that sustain cooperation 
involve mechanisms external to any one individual agent. In some cases we see individual 
benefits, and in other cases group benefits, involving both individual and group-level 
adaptations. In the case of the group, extending the ‘object of selection’ beyond the 
organism places special importance on beyond-the-organism environments in our 
explanations. But, as Dawkins (1982) has made clear, adaptations need not be traits that 
reside in an individual organism. The beaver’s damn is an adaptation that resides outside 
the bodies of many beavers. Morality (and moral cognition), I will later claim, is no 
different in this respect. It emerges from the integration of various disparate mechanisms 
that span across brain, body and world. These are causally integrated into our moral 
problem-solving routines in such ways that they are best considered an extended part of 
our moral cognitive processes. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
Morality is an adaptation. We are moral agents and have the social-wide moral systems 
that we do because being moral conferred adaptive advantage on our ancestors: morality 
primarily allowed the formation and sustaining of cooperative social relationships. The 
evolutionary mechanisms that gave rise to this are numerous, as are the various 
proximate mechanisms that underwrite individual and group cooperative behaviours. 
Understanding evolutionary mechanisms works in tandem with evidence from moral 
psychology, developmental psychology and other cognitive sciences. Jointly, these 
provide the tools to construct a more comprehensive understanding of those 
phenomena.   
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1.7 Summary 
 
In this chapter I have argued that morality is an adaptation and that moral cognition 
involves a suite of proximate mechanisms that gave rise to and sustained cooperation in 
our evolutionary past. By looking at the evolutionary mechanisms that sustained 
cooperation we can gain some insight into those proximate moral mechanisms that 
evolved in aid of cooperation. The main points from this chapter are as follows:   
 
• Morality is an adaptation primarily selected for as a means of generating the 
fitness benefits from cooperative interaction.  
 
• Morality is an individual and group-level adaptation involving multi-level 
selection 
 
• Kin selection, reciprocity, reputation, punishment and group selection are 
amongst the evolutionary processes that gave rise to morality. 
 
• These evolutionary processes inform the nature of the proximate mechanisms 
that underwrite morality. 
 
• Evolutionary considerations suggest that moral action is sustained by several 
proximate mechanisms, not just one.   
 
In the following chapter I will reject one particular but very influential argument in 
support of the claim that morality is innate. This in turn raises the issue of how morality, 
if it is not innate, can be an adaptation. I will address this issue in subsequent chapters. 
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2. The Wealth of the Moral Stimulus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is in our minds, nativists argue, is richer than what could be learned from 
experience. Hence, nativists conclude, what is in our minds must be innate. 
(Cowie 1999:31) 
 
It has to be the case that the human mind has certain innate capacities that enable 
us—but not chimpanzees, dolphins, or parrots—to see certain moral distinctions 
and appreciate their significance for our lives and the lives of others … there 
must be some innate structure to guide which bits of experience are taken on as 
part of one’s moral knowledge. 
(Hauser 2006b:297-298, italics added) 
 
 
The advent of evolutionary psychology has witnessed the proliferation of nativist 
arguments about a great many of our psychological capacities (see for example Barkow, 
Cosmides et al. 1992; Wright 1994; Pinker 1997). Moral psychology has not been 
immune. In fact, moral psychology appears ripe for nativist hypotheses: it is a human 
universal, it appears relatively early in human ontogeny and, as was shown in the previous 
chapter, it is likely to be an adaptation. But not all evolutionary hypotheses need be 
nativist hypotheses (for recent examples see Sterelny 2003; Boyd and Richerson 2004). It 
is my contention that, even though morality is an adaptation, our capacity for moral 
cognising is not innate. This will have important implications for the type of evolutionary 
explanations that we give.  
 
In this chapter I will argue against one of the central arguments for modern moral 
nativism, namely the poverty of the moral stimulus (POMS) argument. We will see that 
much of the evidence used in support of an innate moral faculty can be explained 
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without appealing to any moral domain-specific structures or bodies of information. This 
gives us good reason to doubt the moral nativist’s positing of an innate moral faculty.1 I 
will proceed by outlining the basic disagreements between nativists and empiricists 
before detailing the specific argument moral nativists have employed in defence of the 
view that we have an innate moral faculty. This argument rests on the claim that there is 
insufficient information available for the learning child to acquire the moral competence 
that they display and the requisite information must therefore be innate. There are two 
facets to this argument which I will address. The first rests on the claim that 
development is largely invariant to changes in informational exposure. The second is that 
the move from data to output is an especially difficult one. Neither claim is sufficiently 
supported. Finally, I will take a close look at one nativist argument that focuses on the 
specific criterion judgements that we make about moral and conventional norms. In 
particular, how children recognise that these norms differ in their dependence relations 
with authority. Some moral nativists claim we could not learn this relationship. I will 
argue that nativists have mischaracterized this relationship and that the learning task is 
not as difficult as proposed. The distinction between moral and conventional norms can 
be learned.  
 
2.1 Nativism vs. empiricism  
 
Nativism is the view that particular traits are innate. Nativism about the mind is, 
accordingly, the claim that some particular psychological/mental capacities are innate. 
Empiricism about the mind, on the other hand, claims that particular psychological 
capacities are learned rather than innate traits. No one in the current nativist vs. 
empiricist debates about the mind claims that all and every mental trait is innate, or that 
all and every mental trait is learned. The distinction is one of degree, rather than being 
absolute. Clearly some traits are in fact innate. Children show a remarkable visual 
sensitivity to the faces of others within a few hours of birth. Because it is visual it cannot 
be learned prenatally, nor is it likely to be learned in the short time after birth. Children 
must therefore be born with some innate visual information (Plotkin 2007). Yet they also 
show remarkable ability to acquire novel and often complex knowledge, such as learning 
                                                 
1. It should be noted that I am not arguing against nativist accounts of the mind per se. I am only 
arguing against a nativist account of the moral mind, which is still perfectly consistent with all other mental 
capabilities being underwritten by innate, domain-specific faculties – however likely or unlikely that may be.   
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the rules of games like chess and cricket at an early age. No one thinks that we have 
innate knowledge of chess or cricket. It is clear that the entire mind is not a tabula rasa, 
nor is it wholly innate. Modern debates between the nativist and the empiricist are not 
about whether the mind is innate, but what particular aspects of the mind are innate and 
what are acquired experientially. 
 
One of the problems confronting this debate is that there is no clear definition of what it 
means for something to be considered innate. The literature on both our folk and 
scientific concepts of innateness is extensive and growing (see for example Bateson 1991; 
Samuels 2002; Griffiths 2002; Griffiths, Machery et al. 2009). Paul Griffiths (2002) has 
claimed that innateness is a “confused notion”, while Matteo Mameli and Patrick Bateson 
(2006) have identified no less than 26 different candidates for the scientific conception of 
innateness. Table 2.1 gives a summary of many of those surveyed by Mameli and 
Bateson. Even though there is no consensus on a single conception of innateness, it does 
not mean that debates about nativism need to be postponed until we have one.  The 
moral nativists we will encounter below often appeal to more than one of these 
conceptions of innateness. Marc Hauser (2006), for example, claims that our innate 
moral sense is genetically determined, follows regular patterns of development, is not 
learned, and is a species-typical Darwinian adaptation. By looking at some of the specific 
claims that the moral nativist makes, we can critique their nativism. Furthermore, we 
have many clear, intuitive examples of what we consider innate. Hair, arms, hearts, and 
legs are innate, as is our ability to visually locate faces. Language, considered by many to 
be the paradigm case of mental nativism, is also innate.2 In contrast, the making of 
clothes, riding a bicycle, playing cricket and playing the flute are not innate. Although 
these examples do not define the necessary and sufficient conditions for innateness, they 
do provide us with some idea of the terrain. They vary in both the types of innate 
structures they posit and specific contributions that the environment makes to the 
establishment of the trait. Is moral learning, and the structures and processes that 
underwrite that learning, more like the case of language or is it more like riding a bicycle? 
To answer this question we need to take a close look at the specific commitments the 
nativist makes to the moral acquisition process.  
 
 
                                                 
2. Although see Cowie (1999) and Tomasello (2003) for sceptical views on language nativism.  
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Table 2.1 Conceptions of innateness 
Basis of 
innateness 
Conception of innateness  Some problems 
Non-acquisition and 
regularities in 
development 
 
Innate traits are not 
acquired; they are present at 
birth and/or appear at 
particular developmental 
phases. 
All traits are acquired in some sense, 
including prenatal traits.  
 
Regular development is still 
compatible with a trait being learned. 
Genetic influence 
 
Innate traits are genetically 
influenced or genetically 
encoded.  
 
 
 
Development doesn’t 
involve extraction of 
information from the 
environment.  
 
All phenotypes are genetically 
influenced, including learned 
phenotypes. It is hard to account for 
the distinctive contributions genes 
make.  
 
It is difficult to distinguish between 
environments which are 
developmental supports vs. those that 
make specific information 
contributions. 
Heritability 
 
If heritable phenotypic 
variation within a 
population is dependent on 
genetic differences then a 
trait is innate.  
If the innate status of a trait depends 
on the statistical composition of the 
population, then changes in the 
population can determine the innate 
status of a trait, irrespective of 
whether individual organisms have 
themselves changed. Heritability of 
traits is also compatible with learning.  
Lack of learning and 
adaptive plasticity 
 
Innate traits are not learned. 
 
All traits have some environmental 
influence. It is difficult to 
differentiate between learning 
processes and those processes which 
merely trigger the expression of 
innate traits.  
Non-malleability 
 
An innate trait is robust in 
terms of its development 
and is difficult to modify it 
once it has developed.  
 
All traits, including learned traits, are 
to some degree insensitive to 
environmental variation. There is no 
principled way to decide the degree of 
malleability an innate trait is 
permitted.  
Species typicality 
and adaptation 
during evolution 
Innate traits are species-
universal traits.  
 
 
 
Innate traits are Darwinian 
adaptations.  
Issues with what is species typical. 
Queen bees, for example, are not 
typical members of their species. 
Learned traits can be universal. 
 
Adaptations need not be genetic, 
some adaptations are learned. 
This table summarises some of the concepts of innateness presented in Mameli and 
Bateson (2006). For more detailed analysis and examples of these and many others, refer 
to original article.  
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The nativist vs. empiricist debate can be broadly framed around two central claims. The 
first is about the division of labour between genetic and cultural factors in the 
development and expression of a particular trait. Both sides agree that genetic and 
experiential factors make important contributions to phenotype expression. Yet 
fundamental disagreements exist with regard to the extent these factors contribute to the 
learning situation: the issue is not about whether there is a division of labour, but where 
the division of labour resides.  
 
The second claim is to do with the mechanisms involved in that division of labour. Both 
the nativist and empiricist think that we have innate learning mechanisms, but have 
different views as to the nature of these mechanisms. Nativists believe that the 
acquisition of a particular trait requires some specific machinery dedicated to that 
acquisition. There are different suggestions as to the makeup of those innate structures; 
perhaps they are concepts, representations, informational biases, neurological structures, 
or functional modules. Either way, what is central to the nativist’s claim is that certain 
learning tasks are skill specific, requiring innate learning mechanisms that are task- or 
domain- specific: “each is peculiarly adapted to the performance of one of the various 
learning tasks with which we will, as we mature, be confronted” (Cowie 1999:90).3 
Empiricists on the other hand stress the generality of our innate learning mechanisms: 
the mental machinery involved in learning a specific capacity is not confined to learning 
in that specific domain. 
 
One of the mistakes nativists often make in their criticism of empiricism is the 
assumption that empiricist learning is purely an inductive problem (Sripada 2008a; 
Sterelny forthcoming). I take ‘induction’ in this instance to mean “reasoning from 
observation alone”. For example, in her criticism of moral empiricism, Susan Dwyer 
writes: “How does she then, just by observation, learn that some rule-governed regularities 
are merely conventional … while others are moral” (2006:240-241, italics added). As we 
shall see, moral acquisition is not a purely inductive task. It involves active ‘learning by 
doing’ through embodied agent-environment interactions, biased cognitive mechanisms 
                                                 
3. Domain specificity can be read as either a claim about the specialisation of proximate mechanisms, 
or a selective claim about specific adaptive problems for which the mechanism was selected to solve. 
Although the moral nativists addressed here typically talk of the former, I take the moral nativist’s position 
to endorse both claims.    
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and highly structured moral environments with explicit directives from caregivers. 
 
 
We now have a picture of the moral nativist’s position: to some degree our moral 
capacities are the product of an innate moral structure that makes a specific and 
necessary contribution to the moral acquisition process. It is not enough for the moral 
nativist to claim that biologically inherited faculties are employed in the task of moral 
acquisition, those faculties must be task- or domain- specific: they must be devoted to 
operating in the domain of morality. The moral nativist is “committed to the existence of 
some cognitive mechanisms that are specific to the domain of morality. These we term 
the moral faculty” (Hauser, Young et al. 2008a:172).  
 
Moral nativists differ in their views on the nature of the moral faculty. A number of 
authors have recently broadly identified three kinds of nativist hypotheses about the 
moral mind. (For various examples of these and some critiques see Nichols 2005; Joyce 
2006; Hauser 2006a; Mikhail 2007; Hauser, Young et al. 2008b; Prinz 2008a; Sripada 
2008a). One proposal is that the moral faculty contains specific information or 
propositional knowledge in the form of moral imperatives such as “Do not steal” or “Do 
not kill”. Such a view is not widely held. It would mean that there are very tight 
constraints on the impact that culture and development could have on specific moral 
behaviours and there is too much variation in our moral norms and moral development 
to make it a likely hypothesis. Another option is that the genetically endowed moral 
faculty contains universal moral principles to which culture sets the various parameters. 
These cultural parameters are said to determine individual moralities and the various 
moral systems that human populations have (see Hauser 2006a, 2006b; Dwyer 2006; 
Mikhail 2007). A third proposal is that the innate moral faculty gives us, minimally, the 
capacity to make moral judgements – to see the world in terms of right and wrong. One 
recent proponent of this view is Richard Joyce, who maintains that it is the concept of a 
moral norm that is innate: the moral faculty “enables us to categorize the world in 
morally normative terms” (2006:131).  
 
These hypotheses can all be seen as differing along the two central claims discussed 
earlier. The division of labour varies between the three options above from very little 
input from culture in the first example, increasing through to a substantial cultural 
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contribution in the last. We can also see variations in the type and richness of innate 
structure that they posit. The first case posits explicit propositional knowledge; the 
second posits underlying schematically structured principles; while in final example, we 
see the positing of innate moral concepts.  
 
With these possibilities in mind, we can now turn to an analysis of the moral nativist’s 
argument in favour of the moral faculty, where the focus is on moral learning. With the 
mental and environmental resources that we have, how can we come to be the moral 
creatures that we are? Moral nativist Marc Hauser states the issue as thus: “what issues 
like this boil down to is a question about the relationship between a learning mechanism 
and the input it grabs on to…. The empirical question here is whether this capacity could 
be acquired through observation or teaching” (2006b:302). I will now outline the 
structure of one specific argument in favour of an innate moral faculty, namely the 
poverty of the moral stimulus argument. I will then proceed to critique this argument and 
conclude that we have reasons to reject the moral nativist’s position (see Box 2.0).  
 
2.2 The poverty of the moral stimulus 
 
Arguments in support of nativism typically consist of two threads involving a negative 
and a positive thesis. The negative thesis involves the denial of domain-general learning 
as a plausible explanation for the acquisition of the trait in question. If domain-general 
learning cannot account for acquisition, then we are led towards a nativist conclusion 
(Cowie 1999). The positive thesis involves positing the requisite innate, species-universal 
acquisition mechanism with which to account for the particular trait. The negative and 
positive theses can be seen at play in the paradigm nativist case, language. Chomsky’s 
famous poverty of the stimulus argument is based on the claim that there is inadequate 
data in the environment for a child to learn the complexities of language required to 
achieve mature competence. Therefore, the requisite data must be innate. This data 
comes in the form of a universal grammar which specifies the structural information 
required for language acquisition in the impoverished environment (Chomsky 1986; 
Pinker 1994).  
 
The poverty of the stimulus family of arguments draws attention to a supposed 
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explanatory problem: that our experiential input is inadequate to account for particular 
mental resources that we have. There is nothing in our experience that could account for 
some of our cognitive abilities so we must appeal to some form of innate, domain-
specific information or structure. Poverty of the stimulus arguments combine claims 
about development and task analysis with respect to a particular task- or domain- specific 
activity (Sterelny 2003): 
 
• The developmental claim relates to the ontogenic expression of a particular 
mature competence in question – although dependent on information to trigger 
expression, it is relatively independent of variance in informational exposure: 
change in developmental environment does not necessitate a difference in 
development of competence. 
 
• The task analysis claim “takes mature competence in the focal domain to rest on 
a theory of that domain, and argues that the task of generating a theory from 
perceptual evidence is an excessively challenging one” (Sterelny 2003:195). The 
move from perceptual data to theory formation can only be accounted for via 
innate faculties. 
 
Recently, philosophers and psychologists have drawn strong analogies between language 
and morality. These ‘moral grammarians’ have exported aspects of the Chomskyian 
linguistics research programme to the domain of morality. Here again, we see the 
negative and positive threads of the nativist argument. The moral grammarians claim that 
the informational exposure in the environment is inadequate to explain moral 
competence through domain-general learning alone. The gap between informational 
exposure on the one hand and achieved moral competence on the other cannot be 
bridged by domain-general learning mechanisms and the environmental resources 
available to the moral learner. Therefore, some form of innate moral information or 
structure must be posited to bridge the gap between exposure and competence. This is 
the crux of the poverty of the moral stimulus (POMS) argument. Analogously, they also 
argue that there is an underlying Universal Moral Grammar, based upon the Principle 
and Parameters model in linguistics, which can explain the universality, diversity, 
compositionality, and computational nature of moral acquisition and competence (Dwyer 
1999, 2006; Harman 2000, 2008; Mikhail 2002, 2007; Hauser 2006a, 2006b; Hauser, 
The Wealth of the Moral Stimulus 
 
 
40
Young et al. 2008b).  
 
Although the focus of this chapter will be on acquisition, the structure of moral 
competence is relevant. How much evidence is required in the learning environment will 
depend on what one has to learn, because the possibility of moral competence through 
learning will depend in part on the nature of that competence. If, for example, one thinks 
that moral competence involves the possession of abstract principles, as the moral 
grammarians do, then the learning environment needs to contain the relevant 
information to learn those principles. If the learning environment is impoverished with 
respect to this information, the innate components of the moral mind must contain the 
relevant information. One of the reasons for focusing on acquisition in this chapter is 
that the POMS argument is not confined to specific structural claims of the moral 
grammarians. It is endorsed, in some form, by all moral nativists (see for example, Joyce 
(2006)). (For detailed criticism of the structural parallels between language and morality 
see Dupoux and Jacob 2007.; See also Prinz 2008a; Sripada 2008a; Sterelny forthcoming.) 
 
Box 2.0 Against the poverty of the moral stimulus  
Since the advent of the poverty of the moral stimulus argument there have been a 
number of critiques directed at it on both empirical and theoretical grounds. Shaun 
Nichols (2005) argues that domain diverse emotions play a special role in generating non-
conventional judgements (including moral judgements). Jesse Prinz (2008a, 2008c) looks 
at the role that emotional consequences of norm violations and the differences in the 
enforcement of moral and conventional norms play in the moral acquisition process. 
These he argues, provide sufficient learning resources for the non-nativist moral child. 
Chandra Sripada (2008a, 2008b) maintains that compared to language acquisition, the 
learning target in moral learning is less complex. He also argues that moral learning, 
unlike language learning, need not be inductive; it often involves explicit instruction, 
whereas language learning does not.  
I will, among other things, provide further analysis of these ideas as well as the 
implications of further empirical evidence on the poverty of the moral stimulus 
argument. 
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The acquisition argument, in the form of poverty of the stimulus arguments, has been, 
either implicitly or explicitly, central to recent defences of moral nativism.4 A significant 
piece of evidence cited in support of the POMS relies on the early emergence of 
sensitivity to a distinction between moral and conventional rules. Evidence for the 
moral/conventional distinction came from research into social domain models of social 
cognition, in which morality was identified as a distinct developmental and conceptual 
domain (cf. domain-specificity above). All children, except those with psychopathic 
disorders, show proficiency at drawing the distinction from an early age along the same 
dimensions as adults do. Moral norms are typically identified as more authority 
independent, more generalisable, more serious than conventional norms, and 
justifications in the moral domain typically appeal to issues of harm and welfare. Children 
show this ability at an early age, some younger than three years old. (Turiel 1983; Turiel 
1998; Smetana 2006; Tisak, Tisak et al. 2006).5 This is taken as evidence by the 
proponents of the POMS argument that firstly, morality is a distinct domain of social 
knowledge, and secondly, that children’s proficiency at this task indicates that moral 
competence comes on-line at an early age, a level of competence beyond anything that 
the child has been taught (Dwyer 2006; Hauser 2006a, 2006b; Joyce 2006; Mikhail 
2008b). I will argue below that the evidence offered by the nativist in support of the 
POMS argument, including proficiency at the moral/conventional distinction, is not 
adequate to establish the argument for nativism.  
 
In terms of the developmental claim, the POMS argument asserts that moral competence 
comes on early in life, too early to be explained by reference to the information exposure 
that children receive. Further, moral development is invariant to differences in moral 
information exposure in the child’s environment. All normal children attain moral 
competence in varying moral environments. With respect to task analysis, the POMS 
argument makes two claims. Firstly, a child’s moral learning environment is noisy; it is 
awash with norms that are not explicitly nor adequately identified as moral or 
                                                 
4. From here on, I will understand the term ‘moral nativist’ to refer to those who employ the poverty of 
the moral stimulus argument. It is an interesting and open question as to whether all nativist arguments 
necessarily employ poverty of the stimulus type arguments, but not a question that will be addressed here.  
5. It should be noted that some authors have recently questioned the moral/conventional distinction. 
Kelly and Stich (2007; Kelly, Stich et al. 2007) point out that the class of transgressions over which it has 
been tested has been very narrow. They provide evidence that the distinction is not robust over a larger 
class of transgressions. This seriously questions the basic datum of the moral nativists who appeal to the 
moral/conventional distinction in support of nativism. See also Prinz (2008a). 
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conventional, so the evidence is inadequate to explain the acquisition of the capacity to 
draw the moral/conventional distinction. Therefore, the information available to the 
child from the environment alone is impoverished. Secondly, the complexity of the 
learning task is especially difficult because “to solve it one must identify a class of 
considered moral judgements and a set of principles from which they can be derived” 
(Mikhail 2008b:353-354). The task of rule extraction from the surrounding 
environmental data is too complex to be accounted for in terms of empiricist learning 
alone because “empiricist accounts radically underestimate the complexity of the task 
that faces the young child with respect to rule recovery” (Dwyer 2006:239). Moral 
nativists also often claim that the principles that guide our moral behaviour are 
unconscious and cognitively inaccessible, and therefore unlikely to have been learned. 
(As I will explain in section 2.4.3 below, I see this last claim as being, in part, about the 
complexity of the learning task.) In summary, we have an informational gap that is due to 
both the inadequate resources available to a non-nativist moral learner and the 
complexity of the moral learning task. According to the nativist, this gap between 
informational input and behavioural output can only be bridged by some form of innate, 
domain-specific, information or mechanism – i.e., the said moral faculty. 
 
I will now argue against the POMS argument by looking at both the developmental and 
task analysis claims, showing that the moral stimulus is not impoverished; there is no gap 
between the informational input of experience and the output of behaviour. Before 
moving to this analysis, there is an important point to note with respect to a non-nativist 
account of moral acquisition: there are no constraints on the nature of the inputs and 
cognitive mechanisms of moral acquisition except that the internal cognitive resources 
must not be specific to the moral domain. In other words, any non-moral cognitive 
capacities (be they innate or otherwise) and any external (including moral) resources can 
freely operate as inputs and mechanisms in the acquisition process. To this extent, the 
moral non-nativist need not claim that the mind is a tabula rasa, only that the moral mind 
is.  
 
2.3 The poverty of the moral stimulus: development 
 
The developmental trajectory with which a particular trait develops can often be 
indicative of the trait’s innate status. Again, take the paradigmatic nativist case, language. 
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Linguistic competence arrives rapidly relative to environmental stimulus, and linguistic 
development is independent of variations in linguistic informational exposure. It is 
claimed that the attainment of moral competence is analogous. All morally competent 
adults are believed to make the moral/conventional distinction. Very young children’s 
ability in making this distinction is touted as evidence that moral competence comes on 
very early, outstripping the environmental inputs available. Susan Dwyer writes:  
 
The capacity to distinguish between different socio-moral normative domains 
and the heightened sensitivity to permission rule violation appear to be central 
aspects of adult human moral competence. These capacities do not represent a 
sort of proto-morality limited to childhood. Rather it would appear that, over a 
remarkably short period of time, human children acquire moral capacities that 
are shared with adult members of their communities. (2006:239) 
 
And the developmental trajectory is said to be invariant to variations in moral experience. 
Marc Hauser writes:  
 
If experience really drives the ability, then it should be possible to accelerate 
the timing of its expression by early training, giving children additional 
exposure to permission rules. If, on the other hand, the capacity to detect 
violation is part of our innate moral faculty, then children living in different 
cultures, with wildly different experiences in school and home, should emerge 
with this capacity at around three years of age. One signature of an innate 
faculty is a narrow time window for expressing a skill that is relatively immune 
to differences in experiences. (2006b:303)  
 
The developmental trajectory of moral acquisition does not give the nativist grounds for 
their case. When we look at the broad developmental trajectory of the moral child, we 
can see that it corresponds to increasing levels of complexity, and in comparison to 
language, over comparatively longer time-scales. What we see is that children as young as 
two and a half years old can draw the distinction between moral and conventional 
transgressions. However, this applies only for a very small class of transgressions, namely 
those involving physical harm and welfare but not psychological harm, and is less 
consistently identified with transgressions involving fairness (Smetana 1981, 2006). In 
middle childhood, development progresses to understanding fairness associated with 
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equality between people. As the child moves into preadolescence, concerns with equality 
broaden into notions of equity taking into consideration people’s different needs and 
status. Then, during adolescence, moral concepts such as fairness become “more broadly 
comprehensive, universally applicable, and generalizable across situations” as well as 
more context sensitive (Smetana 2006:124). There is change in the child’s moral 
capabilities over the course of ontogeny, and this change is slow. Children do not start 
off life as mature moral agents; they progress through gradual stages of increasing 
complexity over time.  
 
This is important for several reasons. Firstly, it may be the case that “over a remarkably 
short period of time, human children acquire moral capacities that are shared with adult 
members of their communities” (Dwyer 2006:239) but these capacities are very limited in 
scope in early ontogeny. It is true adults and children both make the moral/conventional 
distinction, but the range of norms over which adults make this distinction is vast. Very 
young children on the other hand, only make such distinctions over a limited range of 
norms, namely emotionally salient instances involving harm and welfare. This is 
important because at this early age non-moral emotional abilities aid the categorising of 
moral, as distinct from conventional, norm violations (Nichols 2004, 2005; Dunn 2006; 
Smetana 2006; Prinz 2007, 2008b). As I will detail in section 2.4, emotional responses do 
this by providing different information on the two types of norms. Very early 
competence at the moral/conventional distinction is more indicative of emotional 
abilities rather than any specific moral competence. This raises the question of when one 
can legitimately say that the child acquires the moral capacities of the adult. From the 
picture of general moral development above, full moral competence, including the ability 
to generalise complex moral concepts and principles, would appear to come late. This is 
in contrast to language, where children show near-adult competence at early ages.   
 
The developmental trajectory is also important because the longer the learning child has 
to achieve moral competence the more they experience relevant informational exposure. 
This will include first-hand moral experience; being the subject or perpetrator of a moral 
violation and any subsequent consequences such as parental admonishments. In addition, 
they also receive second-hand moral experience, such as the many moral stories and 
fables children encounter throughout childhood (see section 2.4.2 below). 
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Finally, the longer the acquisitions period, the more time the learning child has for the 
development of non-moral mental capacities (Prinz 2008a) and the arrival of certain 
concepts with which to aid domain-general learning. This goes some way towards 
explaining why there are limitations on accelerating the timing of various moral 
competencies through extra moral training. It is no surprise that children apply concepts 
of welfare to physical harm much earlier than they do to those which entail psychological 
harm (Smetana 2006:124). To identify the latter, children need to be able to reason about 
the effects of acts upon the often opaque psychological states of others. Such abilities 
will require, among other things, theory of mind to have developed. Children cannot, for 
example, expand their notions of equality to equity until they understand that people are 
not all the same. But, once they have this understanding, it allows that development and 
expansion of other concepts and abilities. Here we can apply Dennett’s (1995) concept of 
a crane: products of one process enable and amplify the development of other processes. 
In this case, we acquire cognitive machinery which helps build further cognitive 
machinery.  
 
Children do not follow a fixed developmental timeline; some children develop faster than 
others and gain moral competencies earlier. As we will see below in section 2.4.2, 
children vary over ontogeny in moral competence, including that ability to make the 
moral/conventional distinction, due to variations in informational exposure. For 
example, studies show that parental disciplinary practices affect children’s moral 
development. Children whose parents undertake other-orientated reasoning during 
disciplining commit fewer moral transgressions than those whose parents undertake 
power-assertive techniques (Smetana 1997; Thompson, Meyer et al. 2006). Psychologist 
Judith Smetana concludes, “children’s failure to apply moral criteria to moral events and 
differentiate morality from social convention can be attributed at least partly to 
differences in parents’ child rearing practices” (2006:139). Individual developmental 
trajectories are sensitive to, and constrained by, both the onset of relevant cognitive 
capacities and variations in environmental stimuli (Prinz 2008a). Evidence from a vast 
array of cultures does show that children consistently make the moral/conventional 
distinction (Smetana 2002). But even this evidence fails to show invariance. Some 
cultures demonstrate greater competency at this task than others, which is thought to be 
due to variations in informational exposure through parenting practices (see section 2.4.2 
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below). Also, even though the ability to make the moral/conventional distinction is a 
cross-cultural phenomenon, this does not mean we need favour a nativist explanation. If 
the ability can be explained through recourse to non-moral learning resources and it is 
also the case that all normal children are in possession of those resources, then given 
similar learning environments this is what one would expect to see, even under non-
nativist accounts. Not all cross-cultural phenomena are innate. 
 
Given the above, we have reason to doubt the nativist claim that the trajectory of moral 
development supports the nativist argument. Still, these are not complete arguments 
against the POMS. Even if the developmental trajectory taken by the moral learner is 
slow, susceptible to environmental variations, and consistent with domain-general 
learning accounts, it does not follow that the acquisition process is. It may be that the 
resources available to the learner are completely inadequate to facilitate moral learning 
without positing an innate moral faculty. To address this issue, we need to look at the 
second claim of the POMS argument: task analysis. 
 
2.4 The poverty of the moral stimulus: task analysis 
 
Task analysis gives an account of the move from perceptual input to mature competence. 
The moral nativist claims that this could not occur via non-moral learning mechanisms 
alone because the move from data to theory is radically underdetermined. In what 
follows, we will see that the nativist has mischaracterised the learning strategies employed 
in moral learning and underestimated the resources available to the moral learner. 
Furthermore, the moral nativist has over-estimated the complexity of the move from 
perceptual input to mature competence. Various non-moral capacities of the learning 
child as well as resources in the external moral environment allow the child to distinguish 
moral from non-moral transgressions as required for moral learning. Although each of 
these resources may not be individually sufficient to attain moral competence, together 
they provide the requisite information for moral learning. In section 2.5 I will look at 
how this information allows the child to make the specific criterion judgements of the 
moral/conventional distinction.       
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It will be helpful to divide task analysis into the following three components in order to 
understand where the moral nativist goes wrong:  
 
• Internal resources available to the learner 
 
• External resources available to the learner 
 
• Complexity of learning target and tacit moral knowledge 
 
I will address each of these in turn.  
 
2.4.1 Internal resources available to the moral learner  
 
What, if anything, is contributed to the learning situation by the child? 
 
Moral nativists claim that the non-moral learning resources available to the empiricist are 
inadequate to account for the complex task of moral acquisition. The POMS argument is 
severely weakened if an account can be given of how the child’s moral learning resources 
can be enriched. There are numerous capacities involved in making the 
moral/conventional distinction that arrive long before children actually show the ability 
to make that distinction. Here I will look at these non-moral resources and show how 
they contribute to the acquisition process. (In section 2.5 we will see how these resources 
contribute to the specific properties of the moral/conventional distinction.)  
 
We saw earlier that young children initially only make the moral/conventional distinction 
over a small class of norm violations, namely those pertaining to emotionally salient 
moral issues involving physical harm and welfare. This is important, because it suggests 
that the young child’s emotional sensitivities are one of the primary resources they have 
for making this distinction (Nichols 2004, 2005; Dunn 2006; Smetana 2006; Prinz 2007, 
2008a). We are born primed for assessing our emotional worlds – not only our own 
emotional reactions but also the emotional displays of others (Saarni and Harris 1989). 
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Although pro-social emotions alone are not sufficient for genuine moral judgement 
(Joyce 2006), they make the task of moral learning significantly easier. Emotional 
capacities contribute to moral learning by making particular aspects of the environment 
more salient, narrowing the learner’s search space. Children use the affective 
consequences of acts to make inferences about whether they are moral or conventional 
norm violations (Arsenio 1988). At an early age, they have the resources to see that 
primitive rule violations are moral when the consequences of those violations elicit 
emotions such as empathy, and that they are conventional when they don’t. 
 
Experimental studies support this claim. Children consistently rate moral transgressions 
as more affectively salient. They also attribute negative emotions to the recipients and 
observers of the transgression due to harm, loss or injury to the victim. In the case of 
conventional transgressions, young children attribute “neutral or somewhat negative” 
emotions to the participants, more specifically attributed to those in positions of 
authority who did not want their rules to be violated (Dunn 2006; Turiel 1998; Smetana 
2006). Additionally, the justifications that children give for their moral classifications 
pertain to the emotionally salient features of the acts such as the harm and welfare of 
victims, whereas their justifications for conventional classifications typically appeal to 
authority. Smetana concludes that “[c]hildren’s direct experiences (as victims and 
observers of transgressions) provide one source of knowledge about the intrinsic 
consequences of acts for others’ welfare and rights” (2006:136; see also Dunn 2003; 
Dunn 2006). We have good reason to think that early proficiency on the 
moral/conventional task is affect based and therefore is more indicative of the child’s 
affective capacities than moral competence.  
 
Soon after birth infants show an ability to adopt the emotional states of others around 
them (Saarni and Harris 1989). ‘Emotional contagion’ provides a direct, pre-theoretical 
resource which forms the developmental foundation for interpreting the emotional states 
of others. By the end of the first year the learning child has developed the capacity for 
‘social referencing’, using the emotional expressions of others to evaluate novel objects 
or situations. For example, children are more likely to cross a glass-covered cliff or play 
with novel toys if their mothers display positive emotional states, whereas the opposite is 
true if they display negative states. In this way children use affective information in their 
environments to make decisions and guide their actions (reviewed in Thompson, Meyer 
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et al. 2006). Both of these skills are essential for the future ability to assess the emotional 
states of others when identifying moral violations and using that information to make 
decisions with regards to those violations.  
 
Between the ages of 12 to 18 months toddlers start to respond to others’ negative 
emotional states in the form of ‘distress reactions’. They will show concern and display 
prosocial behaviour towards another’s distress by attempting to comfort them through 
both physical action and talk (Dunn 2003). Here we see that from a very early age 
children are motivated to prevent or reduce the harm caused to others. This is important 
for marking the qualitative difference between emotion-inducing moral violations and 
non-moral violations, as well as providing a motivational dimension to moral learning. 
Children are motivated to prevent harm, not because they are necessarily told to by an 
authority figure, but because they are independently motivated to do so. Distress 
reactions also indicate the perceived seriousness in the eliciting event. These facts are 
significant when we consider that moral violations are deemed independent of authority 
and more serious than conventional norms (see discussion below in section 2.5). Infants 
also show the ability to use facial and vocal displays as a means of identifying different 
emotional states in others, such as fear and sadness (Harris and Saarni 1989). Abilities 
like these are vital tools for identifying the various emotional states of victim, 
transgressor and admonisher in moral learning. Learning the emotional consequences of 
actions enables us to identify distinctions between the various causal components of 
both moral and conventional violations.  
 
Evidence from studies of atypical populations also shows that capabilities are essential 
for the ability to make the moral/conventional distinction. Psychopaths, who show 
diminished emotional responses towards the suffering of others, also show diminished 
abilities in making the distinction from an early age (Blair 1995; Nichols 2004). Yet 
emotions are not the only mechanisms involved in the moral acquisition process. Autistic 
children who show deficits in theory of mind and intentional attribution can successfully 
make the distinction but have trouble with respect to violations that require mind reading 
capacities to understand the event, such as instances involving lying (James and Blair 
1996; Nichols 2002a). This is consistent with autistic children showing less of an ability 
to lie than normal children (Sodian and Frith 1992). Moral acquisition involves many 
cognitive abilities: the ability to identify causal chains and consequences; reason 
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counterfactually; follow norms; make abstractions and generalisations. This is especially 
true in the case of complex moral competencies. Many of these are in place in early 
infancy. 12-month-old children, for example, start to show an awareness of others as 
“deliberate and subjective partners” as seen through such displays as expectation, 
imitation and joint attention (Thompson, Meyer et al. 2006). The ability to perceive 
intentional behaviours of others is an important tool in generating the relevant causal 
structure of more complex events involving the attribution of purposeful vs. accidental 
behaviours and deceptive behaviours.  
 
By integrating additional informational resources into their evaluations, children make 
more nuanced and complex moral judgements. Arsenio and Love (1995) argue that 
young children’s sensitivity to the emotional states of others provide them with the 
information needed to anticipate the morally relevant consequences of their behaviours. 
These ‘emotion-event expectancies’ provide information from which children, over time, 
can construct abstract and generalisable moral principles. However, Arsenio and Love 
also point out that it is not solely the emotional capacities that allow the construction of 
these principles; it is through the integration of various experiential and developing 
cognitive resources that the child comes to make more subtle evaluations of their moral 
worlds. Young children initially view all perpetrators of moral violations as happy 
because the child thinks the perpetrator has gained from the transgressing act. But, as the 
child’s social and affective experience increases and is combined with the development of 
various other cognitive skills, the child comes to appreciate that the perpetrator may not 
necessarily be a “happy victimiser”. Children come to understand that perpetrators may 
also be sensitive to the negative effects of their actions. The important point is that moral 
cognitive abilities develop in conjunction with the development of other capacities. As 
these come online, the resources available to the moral learner grow, allowing the 
acquisition of greater moral competence.  
 
The upshot so far is that the data-to-theory gap has been narrowed by the child without 
employing innate, domain-specific moral mechanisms. The internal resources contributed 
by the learning child help to identify basic norms specific to the moral domain, resources 
which form the basis of moral acquisition. Whether any of these specific capacities 
themselves are innate or not is an open question but one that is not under examination 
here. What is important is that these capacities are not specifically moral. Each is readily 
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employed in domains other than moral cognition. This is an important point that Jesse 
Prinz (2008a) emphasises in his non-nativist account of moral acquisition. He explains 
that the awareness and assessment of the emotional states of others, for example, arise in 
domains far beyond that of morality; emotions such as empathy are invoked in instances 
such as car accidents and natural disasters, as well as other contexts such as interpreting 
the mental states of others (Shaun Nichols (2005) also makes this point). Looking at 
other resources available to the child we see that situational assessment via social 
referencing is, again, not specific to morality. Nor are consequential, counterfactual, 
general reasoning, theory of mind and norm following abilities. These internal resources 
are not specific to morality; they cannot be considered a unique part of any domain-
specific moral faculty. 
 
So far we can conclude that the child’s mind is a biased learning machine – non-moral 
mental resources contribute substantially to reducing the learning gap. Importantly, 
children also learn by doing. As we will see later, it is their active, embodied participation 
in a highly structured moral world that facilitates the transmission of external moral 
information to the learning agent (see chapters 4 to 6). Children interact with and explore 
their worlds, and importantly their moral worlds interact with them. We will now look at 
some of the ways in which the structured moral world contributes substantially to moral 
acquisition. 
 
2.4.2 External resources available to the moral learner 
 
What, if anything, is contributed to the learning situation by the environment? 
 
We have seen that the child does not learn through dispassionate observation alone. The 
many emotional biases and cognitive capacities that are used in navigating their social 
worlds contribute substantially to the evidence required to differentiate moral from 
conventional transgressions. But the child’s social relations and the subsequent 
structuring of their moral environments are an essential source of directed information for 
the development of the moral learner – enriching the evidence available to the learning 
child.  
 
In her account of the POMS, Susan Dwyer (2006) makes the claim that there is very little 
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evidence concerning rule violations that could cue the child as to whether a moral or 
conventional rule had been broken. Yet, intuitively, it does not seem to be the case. 
Given that normal adults identify the two domains along lines of authority dependence, 
seriousness and generalisability, and differentiate between the types of justifications they 
give, one would expect them to treat them as such (Prinz 2008b). Empirical studies of 
parenting techniques confirm this intuition - parental disciplinary responses to children’s 
moral and conventional transgressions are qualitatively different (Smetana 1989, 1997, 
1999; Dunn 2006; Thompson, Meyer et al. 2006).  
 
Judith Smetana (1999) identifies two components of parental transgression responses 
that are relevant to the acquisition process. The first is the cognitive component. The ways in 
which parents communicate with their children are domain specific and impact upon 
moral development. Studies of maternal parenting practices show that verbal responses 
to moral transgressions typically focused the transgressor towards the consequences of 
the act in terms of injury, loss, emotional reaction, rights and welfare. With the exception 
of rights, these are consequences that children are emotionally sensitive to at a very early 
age. In contrast, maternal responses to conventional transgressions typically focused on 
social order and regulation. (Smetana 1989, 2006). Here we have clear evidence that 
parenting techniques provide explicit informational differences between the two 
domains. 
 
The second component of transgression responses is an affective component. The emotional 
displays of caregivers help children to understand and encode moral information by 
focusing the child on the act and consequences of the transgression (Arsenio and Lover 
1995). As with the cognitive component, studies in maternal parenting practices show 
that their affective responses are qualitatively different in the two domains. In the moral 
domain parents typically exhibit more negative emotions and increased anger than they 
do in non-moral domains, providing a qualitatively different experience for the learning 
child between the two transgressions (Smetana 1999; Thompson, Meyer et al. 2006). In 
this way, the affective and cognitive elements are complementary sources of different 
information to aid moral acquisition.  
 
Importantly, research also shows that parental disciplining methods that focus on 
domain-specific explanations and consequential reasoning improve moral and social 
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development (Zahn-Waxler and Chapman 1982; Smetana 2006). Children of caregivers 
who explicitly undertake other-oriented reasoning during admonishment, are reported to 
commit fewer moral transgressions. Children of parents who frequently discussed 
feelings during evaluations of moral behaviours were more likely to exhibit guilt after 
committing a transgression compared to those of parents who did not. Furthermore, the 
degree to which parents undertake reasoned argument, provide justifications and discuss 
emotions during conflict resolution with toddlers is a good predictor of future moral 
development (Laible and Thompson 2002; Thompson, Meyer et al. 2006). Parental 
reasoning encourages children to reflect on the consequences their actions have upon 
others, a skill that facilitates making the moral/conventional distinction.  
 
In contrast, power assertive parenting techniques, such as strict and aggressive rule 
enforcement, with little or no consequential or emotional explanations, are effective at 
inducing short-term moral compliance, but do not facilitate long-term moral 
development. Power assertive techniques fail to provide adequate information about the 
nature of the transgressions, and do not encourage children to reflect upon their action 
because the emotional focus (anger from the parent and fear in the child) is on the 
transgressing child and their feelings, rather than the consequences to the victim of the 
transgression (Zahn-Waxler and Chapman 1982; Smetana 2006). Furthermore, the act is 
prohibited because the caregiver says so, not because the act has negative consequences 
on the victims of the transgression. Here we see environmental effects on developmental 
trajectory, confirming the importance of domain-specific content in moral development 
and showing that moral development is not invariant to exposure. Children’s proficiency 
at differentiating moral and conventional violations is, in part, dependent on the 
information the developing child receives through parenting practices (Smetana 
2006:139).  
 
Cross-cultural studies show that people across a broad range of ages differentiate moral 
from conventional norms. Although very little of this cross-cultural research has focused 
on pre-schoolers’ competencies (Yau and Smetana 2003), one study by Yau and Smetana 
looked at category distinctions made by pre-school Chinese children in Hong Kong. 
They found that in comparison to US children, a much larger percentage (almost all) of 
the Chinese preschoolers they tested gave justifications for moral transgressions in terms 
of welfare and fairness. The authors write that it appears “young Chinese children have a 
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more sophisticated understanding of the intrinsic wrongness of moral transgressions than 
do comparatively aged US children…” (2003). They suggest this difference could be due 
to Chinese disciplinary practices that focus on eliciting guilt and shame through the 
narrative retelling of transgressions committed by the child.6, 7 This is evidence that 
informational exposure differences in the form of parental disciplinary practices affect 
the rate of moral acquisition.  
 
We also see quantitative differences with respect to the context in which domain-specific 
transgressions occur. The majority of moral transgressions and moral conflicts happen in 
sibling and peer relationships (Smetana 1989, 2006; Dunn and Slomkowski 1992). These 
interactions provide first-hand experience of the effects (particularly emotional) of moral 
transgressions and a means by which to actively explore the moral domain. When a child 
unfairly takes a toy from another, they experience the negative emotional consequences 
that come with that type of transgression. The primary source of conflict within the 
conventional domain, on the other hand, happens with authority figures such as parents, 
and these conflicts are not typically victim orientated. Because learning is frequency 
dependent, the contexts in which the different types of transgressions occur is an 
important means by which to differentiate between the two domains.  
 
Finally, it is not solely through first hand experience as perpetrator, victim or observer 
that children obtain all domain-specific information. Second-hand information plays a 
role in providing emotionally salient exemplars of moral and non-moral behaviours and 
their consequences. From a very young age children experience fables, nursery rhymes, 
and children’s stories that positively emphasise moral behaviours while negatively 
emphasising immoral behaviours. The narrative structure of story telling allows the child 
to see the causal structure of the socio-moral events and their consequences.  
 
From what we have seen so far, the child’s external environment is full of resources 
which direct the child to the differences between moral and non-moral transgressions, 
thereby structuring their learning environments and reducing the gap between learning 
                                                 
6. It should be noted that the authors only suggest this is only a possible reason that requires further 
research (Yau and Smetana 2003). 
7. Although the inducement of shame is found to negatively correlate with moral development, guilt is 
found to correlate with moral development (Yau and Smetana 2003). Note also, this is not to claim that 
young children necessarily experience guilt or shame, but that the parenting practices focus on guilt and 
shame. 
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target and achieved competence. It might be objected that the paradigm cases of moral 
transgressions, such as those involving harm and welfare, are obviously emotional in 
nature. What about differentiations between more abstract and less obviously emotion 
generating transgressions? For example, Susan Dwyer gives two transgression examples 
that are not so obviously emotionally salient, claiming that “…it’s worth noting that ‘You 
ought to keep your promises’ has precisely the same form as ‘You ought to put the fork 
on the left.’” (2006:240). Dwyer, unfortunately, does not provide evidence that children 
can and do make this specific distinction at a sufficiently young age to warrant support of 
the POMS argument. As we have seen above, ontogenic time of expression is relevant if 
that competence is to be held as evidence for nativism.  
 
These two prohibitions have the same syntactic structure, but they do not have the same 
consequential structure. Children have numerous examples and first-hand experiences of 
promise-keeping as well as failures to keep promises and the consequences of both. 
When a father promises to take his child to the zoo and subsequently fails to do so, the 
child has good evidence of both what a broken promise is, and what it feels like to be the 
recipient of a broken promise. Children also learn that promise-keeping is embedded in a 
web of social interactions, preferences and desires. Learning that “you ought to keep 
promises” is not just about learning a particular norm; it also involves learning the 
various relations between agents, their desires and preferences, and the consequences of 
promise-breaking on those relationships. One keeps promises not just because there are 
norms about promise-keeping, but because one has, among other things, a desire to not 
hurt another, to maintain another's trust, or perhaps to please or impress others. These 
factors are all relevant to the identification of promise-keeping as a moral norm. 
Violations of a social regularity such as fork placement norms on the other hand are 
unlikely to be treated in the same way. It may have the consequence of annoying or 
upsetting the enforcer of that regularity and children identify it as such, but in most cases 
it is unlikely that parents’ emotional and reasoning responses will be like that of a moral 
transgression.8 Again, we see the consequences in the two domains as different, and it is 
these consequences that mark the qualitative difference between moral and conventional 
violations (see also Prinz 2008b). 
                                                 
8. Some children do view some conventional transgressions as having “second-order moral 
consequences”, justified by not wanting to hurt another’s feelings. Should the authority be sufficiently 
upset at incorrect fork placement, then child may view the transgression as harming the authority in this 
way (Yau, Smetana et al. 2009). 
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It is apparent that early competence at making the moral/conventional distinction 
involves drawing inferences from features of the acts as opposed to specific knowledge 
of the norms pertaining to those acts (Turiel 1998; Smetana 2006). From this, we can see 
how the features of the two prohibitions are quite different. Internal and external 
resources draw attention to those features and structure and support the learning 
experiences in the two domains. It is not merely through observation of regularities in 
the moral environment that children become disposed to moral education. Children 
commit, and are the victims of, transgressions, and in doing so they actively participate in 
the learning experience and their environment actively participates with them. It is the 
total experience that provides the requisite information for moral acquisition. The 
channels of moral information are more directed and salient than many authors 
promoting the POMS argument are willing to concede. 
 
2.4.3 The complexity of the learning target and tacit moral 
knowledge 
 
It is apparent that internal and external resources contribute to moral learning, making 
the learning target more salient, easier to identify and therefore easier to learn. However, 
while it may be the case that moral norms and their violations are clearly signposted as 
distinct from the non-moral, whether or not morality is learnable is another issue. John 
Mikhail writes:  
 
to explain the observable data we must attribute unconscious knowledge 
and complex mental operations to the child that go well beyond anything 
she has been taught…. These concepts and principles which underlie 
them are as far removed from experience as the hierarchical tree 
structures and recursive rules of linguistic grammars. It is implausible to 
think they are acquired by means of explicit verbal instruction or 
examples in the child’s environment. (2008b:355)  
 
There are two related aspects with respect to the learning target and the problem of 
acquisition as highlighted by Mikhail. The first is what I will term the Problem of 
Complexity. The complexity of the learning target and the task of information extraction is 
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such that we are unable to extract the relevant moral information from the environment. 
We can, for example, be taught to identify a mathematician working on complex 
mathematical problems. However, the task of extracting the relevant information 
required for acquiring the mathematic skill of, for example, differential calculus is 
difficult, if not impossible, without detailed and explicit instruction as well as relevant 
background information such as various principles of mathematics. Similarly, due to the 
complex nature of the task, it may be impossible to extract the relevant principles of 
morality without the appropriate instruction. Because we do not have this detailed and 
explicit instruction, we cannot possibly learn the underlying structural principles of 
morality. Mikhail writes: “for it is the complexity, or lack thereof, of the output of the 
acquisition model which determines whether or not the stimulus is impoverished with 
respect to that output” (2008b:353).  
 
The second reason for believing that moral competence cannot be learned is the claim 
that moral knowledge is tacit knowledge. Marc Hauser, for example, claims that “the key idea 
driving my argument for the moral faculty, is that much of our knowledge of morality is 
… intuitive, based on unconscious and inaccessible principles for guiding moral 
judgements of permissibility” (2006b:125). There are two reasons why one might think 
this is the case. Firstly, people often fail to justify many of their moral behaviours and 
cannot articulate the principles that underwrite those judgements, so it is unlikely that we 
come to those principles through reason alone. Secondly, these principles are not 
explicitly presented to us in our environments, so it cannot be the case that they have 
been learned (“Parents can’t teach what they don't know” (2006b:423)). If we can neither 
reason nor learn certain moral knowledge, then that knowledge must be innate.  
 
Although the issues of complexity and tacit principles come apart, their connection is 
implicit in much of the nativist’s argument. The complexity of the task gives more 
credence to the nativist’s claims of ‘intuitive, unconscious principles’. If the tacit principle 
to be learned is simple, then implicit learning without explicit instruction is more 
plausible. We can, for example, plausibly implicitly learn that ‘hitting is wrong’ from 
salient exemplars in our environment. On the other hand, it is not as obvious how we 
can implicitly learn such principles as the doctrine of double effect, which holds that ‘it is 
sometimes permissible to cause harm if that harm is an unintended side-effect of 
bringing about a good, but it is impermissible to cause harm if it was intended as a means 
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to bring about the that good’. The complex nature of some tacit principles makes implicit 
learning less likely, and hence provides a stronger case for the moral nativist.  
 
I will address each of these aspects in turn. We will see that the task of moral acquisition 
is typically not that complex, and is often not specifically moral at all. It will also become 
apparent that we have reason to think complex tacit moral principles can be learned 
without explicit instruction. Furthermore, some examples of tacit moral principles used 
by moral nativists can be explained without recourse to innate, tacit moral principles at 
all.  
 
The problem of complexity 
 
The child’s learning environment is awash with moral and non-moral norms. The nativist 
claims that the learning task of extracting the correct principles and corresponding 
judgements appears to be so difficult that it cannot be explained by learning. We have 
already seen that early proficiency at the moral/conventional distinction does not require 
moral rule recovery: the focus is on the features of the acts, rather than the norms 
prohibiting those acts. So the moral nativist needs to be careful not to overstate the 
complexity of the learning target in the early years of moral development. The young 
child does not require an understanding of the principles that underwrite harm 
prohibitions to accurately identify instances of harm and be motivated not to cause harm. 
Natural aversions of the young child can lead the child to act in accordance with a moral 
rule without accepting, internalising or understanding that rule. The learning child is not 
necessarily performing rule extraction from the environment because competence at the 
task does not require mastery of a general rule. 
 
As we saw in the previous section, the complexity of rule extraction is reduced 
substantially by the internal and external resources available to the moral learner. This 
then leaves the task of rule extraction itself. Yet, importantly, it is not specifically a moral 
problem as it pertains to all forms of rule extraction from one’s environment, be that 
etiquette, sports, games, or social norms, to name but a few. Children can learn many of 
these early in life and in many cases without explicit instruction. We know therefore that 
the ability for rule extraction itself arrives early. Rule extraction in general may often be 
very complex, and the capacity may be underwritten by an innate rule learning faculty 
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(Sripada and Stich 2005), but because it is a process we find across many different 
domains it cannot be considered a constituent part of an innate moral faculty. Rule 
extraction is a problem to be addressed independent of a nativist moral faculty and hence 
is not captured by the POMS argument. This objection is specifically problematic for 
defenders of a rule or principle-based moral faculty.  
 
What about the later stages of moral acquisition? Perhaps here we see complex mental 
operations beyond anything that could have been taught. In defence of the POMS 
argument, John Mikhail uses psychological research to argue such a case. According to 
Mikhail, in complex trolley bus problems, eight-year-old children have shown sensitivity 
to the doctrine of double effect and intentional battery, beyond anything that they could 
have learned from their environment. He writes: “In the case of trolley bus problems, for 
example, children must represent and evaluate these novel fact patterns in terms of 
properties like ends, means, side effects, and prima facie wrongs such as battery, even 
where the stimulus contains no evidence of these properties. These concepts and the 
principles which underlie them are as far removed from experience as the hierarchical 
tree structures and recursive rules of linguistic grammars. It is implausible to think that they 
are acquired by means of explicit verbal instruction or examples in the child’s environment” 
(2008b:355, italics added). 
 
A proper analysis of Mikhail’s example requires the separation of those properties that 
are specific to the moral domain and those that are not. The complexity of the moral 
acquisition task is not as great as Mikhail maintains, as the ability to identify and evaluate 
ends, means, and side effects are not specific to the moral domain. Much of the relevant 
information therefore is recoverable from the environment with the aid of these 
capacities, independent of positing an innate moral faculty. From Mikhail’s list, battery is 
the only property that is specific to the moral domain. So, assuming that the notion of 
battery really is a requirement for making distinctions in the trolley bus examples, the 
question becomes whether or not a child can learn, by eight years of age, the notion of 
‘intentionally harming without consent’. There seems no reason why concepts such as 
battery cannot be learned from a child’s environment over such a timeframe.  
 
So far I have argued that early moral competence need not be a case of rule extraction 
and that, in cases where it is, the problem of rule extraction is not specific to the moral 
The Wealth of the Moral Stimulus 
 
 
60
domain. Furthermore, many cases of moral acquisition that appear to be complex and 
beyond the information available are not as complex as it would first appear. I have not 
yet mentioned whether agents are aware of, or can cognitively access, aspects of their 
moral knowledge. This brings us to an additional argument put forward by the moral 
nativists: we have tacit knowledge of certain moral principles that operate over 
representational structures such as means, ends and side effects. Because we cannot 
readily identify or articulate those principles and they are not explicitly presented to us in 
our environments, it is unlikely, the nativist concludes, that we could have learned these 
principles. Therefore, they are likely to be innate.  
 
Tacit moral knowledge  
 
Many moral nativists have been drawn to their conclusions from the observation that 
agents make what are perceived to be complex intuitive moral judgements without an 
explicit understanding of why they make those judgements. For example, the observation 
that agents typically make judgements in accordance with the doctrine of double effect but 
cannot explicate the principle, is cited by many as one such source of evidence (see 
Dwyer 1999, 2006; Cushman, Young et al. 2006; Hauser 2006b; Mikhail 2007, 2008b; 
Harman 2008).9 Gilbert Harman writes that “[s]upposing there is widespread implicit 
acceptance of [the principle of double effect], it would seem that ordinary people have no 
explicit instruction of it, and it would appear not to be transmitted by explicit instruction. 
If there is no other obvious way for the principle to be learned, the hypothesis suggests 
itself that the principle is somehow innate…” (2008:346). And Marc Hauser claims that 
an innate moral faculty explains the “principle of double effect, a principle that is 
operative but not expressed when people are asked to justify their responses” (2006b). 
 
It is clear that this argument from unconscious tacit moral principles does not apply to 
many of the basic moral principles that guide our lives. Throughout development the 
learning child witnesses many clear and cognitively accessible examples of principles like 
fairness and equality through their participations in childhood activities. Caregivers also 
provide explicit instruction and justifications by appealing to moral concepts and 
                                                 
9 Dwyer (2009) has recently claimed that the principles of moral grammar cannot even be expressed in 
moral principles such as doctrine of double effect. Moral grammar is deeper and more abstract. On this 
point, Dwyer differs from some previous work by moral grammarians like Hauser and Mikhail on the 
doctrine of double effect.  
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principles, such as “why having more ice-cream than your brother is unfair”. Unlike the 
‘subjacency principle’ in linguistics, many of the basic principles that underwrite moral 
judgement such as harm, welfare and fairness are encoded in ordinary language and 
salient to both transgressor and victim. People can also typically give justifications for 
most of their moral judgements that appeal explicitly to these moral concepts and 
associated principles.  
 
With respect to complex moral knowledge, such as the case of the doctrine of double 
effect, the question is whether or not complex tacit knowledge can be learned without 
explicit instruction. If it can, then we have some reason to doubt the nativist’s argument. 
There are many examples of learned knowledge that are tacit. Most people who can ride 
a bike cannot explain in any great detail the coordinated actions and various skills 
involved in doing so. They cannot, for example, articulate how one calculates the angle 
relative to speed with which to lean into corners. We may be taught how to ride a bike, 
but these required competencies are never explicitly explained. Bike-riding knowledge is 
one example of tacit, learned knowledge.  
 
In their book Mind Over Machines, Hubert Dreyfus and Stuart Dreyfus (1986) detail how 
we can gain advanced intuitive, unconscious, pattern-recognition based skills through 
learning. They cite the example of Grandmaster chess players, who can play multiple 
high-level, high-speed chess games simultaneously with very little time to reflect on the 
moves they make. Their moves are intuitive and show minimal reliance on conscious 
reasoning. Beginner chess players, on the other hand, make decisions based on conscious 
reasoning and explicit applications of the rules of chess which they have been taught. 
With experience, the learning chess player starts to show less reliance on conscious 
explicit rules and more on maxims and strategic play. As they progress towards the level 
of expert, the chess player operates heavily by intuition, without relying on conscious 
considerations of the rules of chess to make their judgements. Their strategic goals are 
more general and they can identify very large numbers of board positions and their 
profitability without reflection. By the time he reaches expert, the chess player is a master 
at intuitive, unconscious pattern recognition. These are patterns that he may not be 
explicitly aware of, and importantly, patterns that have been learned through repeated 
play and simulation of various game positions. Chess players learn by doing and not 
always through explicit instruction. Expert chess is a clear example of how complex tacit 
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knowledge can be learned. It is plausible that the acquisition of tacit moral knowledge 
can proceed in an analogous way (Sterelny forthcoming). We learn and implement 
explicitly taught simple moral concepts and principles, graduating through development 
to more general, exemplar-based pattern recognition skills. High-level moral competence 
under such a picture is intuitive pattern recognition rather than the application of specific 
principles like the doctrine of double effect.  
 
We also have reason to doubt that moral principles are inaccessible as moral nativists like 
Hauser claim. Kim Sterelny (forthcoming) points out that the principles of morality can 
be made explicit in natural language and understood by the folk moraliser (see also Prinz 
2008b). Once we know of those moral principles, we can use that explicit knowledge to 
guide future judgements in novel and more complex moral dilemmas. This is not 
something that we do in the case of language; even once linguistic experts learn the 
syntactic structure of language they do not use that conscious knowledge to guide their 
parsing. Furthermore, Sterelny also makes the point that our reflections about moral 
dilemmas alter our intuitive moral behaviours; through debate and reflective moralising 
people can reject previously held principles and adopt new ones.10 Adopting a 
consequentialist ethic that rejects the doctrine of double effect is, under the moral 
grammarian’s picture, a rejection of a structural principle of universal moral grammar. 
Yet we can still morally converse with, debate and understand the different moral 
positions of the consequentialist. We could not do the same with anyone who rejected 
structural principles of language. (In chapter 5 we will see that the purpose of moral 
debate is to allow the flexible and successful group navigation of the social world. This 
would be severely limited if morality were as rigid as some nativists maintain.) Some of 
our moral principles may be tacit, but they are neither inaccessible, unable to be made 
conscious, nor unchanging in the way the syntactic principles of language are.   
 
If it is true that complex tacit principles can be learned without the aid of explicit 
instruction, then it is possible that moral principles like the doctrine of double effect can 
also be learned without explicit instruction. Yet, it may be that we need not invoke 
complex tacit moral principles at all to explain apparently complex moral behaviours. 
                                                 
10. Note how this fits with the evolutionary picture drawn in chapter 1 involving punishment and 
group conformity. One of the adaptive benefits of moral cognition was the influence and control of other 
moral views, to argue, to debate and punish to make others change their moral outlook. (See also, chapters 
5 and 6). 
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Jesse Prinz (2008c) argues that the contrasting results of trolley bus examples can be 
explained as the product of conflicting moral norms rather than singular, tacit, complex 
innate moral principle such as the doctrine of double effect, as proposed by Hauser, 
Mikhail et al. Prinz points out that in the trolley bus cases, we have two conflicting 
norms: a norm for helping, and a norm that prohibits killing. In the case where we are 
asked to pull a lever and divert a trolley bus down an alternative route, saving five 
innocent people but in the process killing one, we have norms of helping (saving the five) 
and norms against killing (killing one). But in this case the killing of one person by 
diverting the trolley is not a paradigm instance of prohibited killing, such as, for example, 
shooting someone. Nor, Prinz claims, is it an emotionally intense form of killing. 
Therefore, norms of helping trump the less salient and less obviously applicable norm 
against killing. In contrast, killing a man by pushing him off a bridge into the path of an 
on-coming trolley bus, thereby preventing the death of five others, is generally deemed 
impermissible. Prinz argues that this is because pushing a man to his death in front of a 
trolley bus is more emotionally salient and is also a paradigm case of forbidden killing. In 
such a case, norms prohibiting killing outweigh norms for helping. Other factors such as 
proximity to action and the violent nature of the death will also manipulate our 
emotional responses to the various acts and play a significant role in our judgments of 
moral permissibility in such cases. What is key to Prinz’s argument against moral nativism 
is that these norms of helping and norms prohibiting killing can be learned (2007, 2008c). 
So, although moral principles are involved, one does not need to posit a singular, tacit, 
innate principle of double effect to explain the observed phenomena. (See also Shaun 
Nichols (2005) who suggests separate utilitarian and deontological psychological systems, 
rather than universal moral grammar, explain judgments in accordance with doctrine of 
double effect.)  
 
Other evidence suggests that observations such as the doctrine of double effect may in 
fact be an artefact of domain-general causal reasoning. Waldmann and Dieterich (2007) 
examined whether causal reasoning had any bearing on the outcome of the observed 
phenomena. What they found is that the point of causal intervention has a bearing on 
people’s moral permissibility judgements. The domain-general processes of causal 
psychology result in people preferentially focusing on one particular causal path to the 
exclusion of others, thereby biasing appraisals of the various moral dilemmas. In this 
case, task performance can be explained, not by appealing to a singular, innate, tacit 
The Wealth of the Moral Stimulus 
 
 
64
moral principle, but by understanding the observed phenomena as an artefact of our 
more domain-general processes of causal reasoning. (See Box 2.0 for more detailed 
explanation.) 
 
Both of these explanations are plausible and have some evidential support. I hazard a 
guess that the results in the trolley bus problems are due to a combination of both 
accounts above, as well as various other factors (see for example Greene, Sommerville et 
al. 2001). The importance of these models is that they show plausible non-nativist 
explanations of moral phenomena, weakening the argument that we need to posit 
complex, innate tacit moral principles to explain phenomena such as the doctrine of 
double effect.    
Box 2.1 Causal psychology, moral problems and the doctrine of double 
effect  
It is claimed that the tacit moral intuitions we have in various moral dilemmas provide 
evidence for an innate underlying structure of moral cognition (see for example Mikhail 
2002; Hauser 2006b; Dwyer 2009). One example of evidence used in support of these 
claims is people’s responses to the famous trolley bus moral thought experiment. 
Subjects are asked to imagine a scenario in which a trolley bus is travelling towards a 
group of five people on a track, all of whom will be killed if the trolley continues on its 
path. The death of these five people can be averted if the trolley is diverted on to a side-
track but there is a one person on the side-track who will be killed. When presented this 
moral dilemma, people will typically judge that it is morally acceptable to divert the 
trolley and kill one person to save the lives of five. In contrast to these judgements are 
those in the spare-parts surgeon moral thought experiment. In this scenario, a surgeon 
has five patients who will all die if they do not receive organ transplants. Unfortunately, 
there are no donated organs available. The doctor has an opportunity to take the life of a 
healthy individual, without anyone knowing, and use his organs to save the lives of the 
five people who require organ transplants. In this thought experiment, it is typically 
deemed impermissible to kill one patient to harvest their organs to save the lives of five 
other patients. In these cases, the outcomes are identical, but the causal paths are 
different. What then, could generate the different permissibility judgements in scenarios 
like these? 
One hypothesis is that all normal people have an innate set of moral principles 
which generate the various judgements that we make. John Mikhail, for example, claims 
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that “the moral intuitions generated… can be best explained by postulating intuitive 
knowledge of specific moral principles, including the prohibition of intentional battery 
and the principle of double effect” (2002:11). The doctrine of double effect (DDE) states that 
it is sometimes permissible to cause merely foreseen harm if that harm is a side-effect of 
bringing about a good, but it is impermissible to cause that harm if it was intended as a 
means to bring about that good. Although almost all people, including children, will 
often act in ways which are consistent with the DDE, very few are aware of the principle, 
let alone able to articulate it, and children are neither explicitly nor implicitly taught it. 
Therefore, it is claimed, the DDE is likely to be innate. An innate, distinctly moral reason 
explains why these cases are treated differently.  
Research by Waldmann and Dieterich gives us good evidential reasons to question 
this claim. Drawing upon models from causal psychology, they looked at whether 
“domain-general features such as the structure of causal models in reasoning and learning 
… affect moral judgment” (2007:248). These permissibility judgements are not due to 
any specifically moral feature of human cognition but are an artefact of more domain-
general causal reasoning which focus attention on particular causal paths. 
The authors make a distinction between agent-interventions and patient-
interventions: agents are those that cause harm, whereas patients are those who are the 
recipients of harm. What they found is that the type of causal intervention is a primary 
factor which influences many of the moral permissibility judgements that we make by 
focusing attention on specific causal paths within the dilemma. Throwing a bomb out of 
a restaurant to save nine lives but killing one person outside standing on a patio is an 
example of agent-intervention. In this case, people’s focus of attention is on the agent of 
harm (i.e., the bomb) and therefore the evaluations that we make focus on the causal 
effects between throwing the bomb or not throwing the bomb. In contrast, throwing a 
person onto a bomb to save nine lives is an example of patient-intervention, whereby the 
patient subject to harm is the person thrown on the bomb. The evaluative focus is on the 
consequences for the patient to the exclusion of background effects, such as the 
consequences for other people in the room. The authors dub this attentional focus on 
the act of intervention as intervention myopia.  
The authors then tested whether the observations above were actually due to 
people’s reluctance to use people as a means, as in the case of the DDE. They found that 
this was not the case and concluded that “the point of intervention, rather than whether 
or not people were used as means, seems to have been responsible for the effect” 
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(2007:251). Their explanations do not rely on innate moral principles such as DDE, but 
instead on the more general features of domain-general causal reasoning. These types of 
models show that there are plausible alternative explanations of the evidence that the 
moral nativists appeal to in support of their position. These explanations do not rely on 
an innate moral faculty.  
 
Before moving on it is worth recapping what has been shown above. In support of the 
POMS, moral nativists have claimed that the task of moral acquisition is an especially 
difficult one which cannot be explained by moral learning, and morality must therefore 
be innate. I have argued that moral learning is in many cases either not particularly 
complex (in the case of early moral learning), or the complexity of the task is not specific 
to morality. Furthermore, moral nativists have claimed that much of our moral 
knowledge is tacit. People cannot express the underlying principles involved in their 
moral judgements, nor are people explicitly taught these principles. Because it is not 
obvious how they can be learned, or acquired by reason, they must be innate. However, I 
have demonstrated that there are many analogous cases where tacit knowledge is learned 
without explicit instruction; we therefore have some reason to believe that the same 
could occur in the moral case. I have also presented examples of how one can explain 
apparently tacit, innate moral knowledge without appealing to innate moral principles. 
We have good reasons to doubt the moral nativists’ claims about both the complexity of 
the learning task and tacit moral principles in support of moral nativism. The gap 
between input and output in the POMS argument is not as the moral nativists claim.  
 
2.5 Authority independence and the moral learner  
 
So far we have seen a number of arguments against the moral nativist POMS argument. 
Much of the focus has been on the resources that enable the learning child to 
differentiate moral from conventional transgressions. Very little has been said about the 
specific dimensions with which children and adults make these distinctions. I will now 
look at how children make what are called criterion judgements, focusing in particular on the 
dependence relation between moral and conventional transgressions and authority. Some 
moral nativists have claimed that drawing the authority-dependence relation is especially 
complex and that competence in drawing this dimension is evidence of innate moral 
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structures (see for example, Joyce (2006)).    
 
Adults and children identify both moral and conventional transgressions as wrong, and, 
at a finer grain of analysis, distinguish them as wrong along several dimensions. Moral 
norms, as compared to conventional norms, are typically judged to be more serious, 
more generalisable, less dependent on authority, and differ in the justifications that are 
given for compliance (Turiel 1983; Turiel 1998). The fact that judgements are made along 
these criteria has been cited by some as evidence in support of the POMS argument as 
there is insufficient evidence and the task is too complex for the learning child to make 
such distinctions. Hence, the information required to master the distinction must be 
innate. What we will see is the resources that allow children to identify the moral as 
distinct from the conventional, also impart the various properties of the criterion 
judgements (See Nichols 2004, 2005; Prinz 2008b). I will briefly address the dimensions 
of seriousness, generalisability, and justifiability before focusing on authority-dependence. 
 
2.5.1 Seriousness, generalisability and justification 
 
When we make moral appraisals we typically classify them as being more serious than 
conventional appraisals. We can account for this classification in terms of the negative 
emotional responses that canonical moral transgressions (such as those pertaining to 
harm and welfare) elicit in the child. We also saw above that parental response to moral 
transgressions exhibit more negative emotions. Emotional responses from both parent 
and child are more serious in the moral domain (Smetana 1999; Nichols 2002a; Prinz 
2008b). Moral transgressions that are judged to be wrong are classified as generalisable if 
they are judged to be wrong across different social contexts, be that in another home, 
school, cultural group or country. One relevant factor is that affective consequences 
remain, irrespective of the context in which the transgression occurs. To the young child, 
hitting causes suffering in all instances, irrespective of its context. Conventional 
transgressions on the other hand do not involve an obvious victim or suffering that can 
be generalised. Children also view authority as context dependent and not generalisable 
(see below), and give domain-specific justifications as to why transgressions are prohibited. 
Moral justifications involve appeals to the prevention of harm and the promotion of 
people’s welfare, fairness and rights (Turiel 1998). They typically do not involve appeals 
to authority. Again, we can account for this because the emotional consequences of 
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moral violations are different to those of conventional violations (Nichols 2004; Prinz 
2008b). The justifications for appraising a conventional transgression are typically in 
terms of consequences to social acceptability and organisation, directives from authority 
and customs, because those are what conventional norm violations transgress (Turiel 
1998).  
 
Still, although children can justify the transgressions as being dependent or independent 
of authority, this does not address the issue of how children can learn the relevant 
dependence relations. In the case of moral transgressions, for example, they may be 
emotionally salient, but they are also typically prohibited by authority. How then can one 
learn that moral norms are authority-independent without witnessing this independence? 
(Joyce 2006).   
 
2.5.2 Domain specific relations with authority 
 
One of the more peculiar features of the moral/conventional distinction is each domain’s 
particular relation with authority. Moral prohibitions are typically seen as being 
independent of authority.11 Research shows that children will reject an adult’s authority if 
that adult makes immoral requests (Smetana 2006). In contrast, whether or not a 
conventional transgression is viewed as wrong is typically seen as being more dependent 
on authority figures. For example, although it is typically judged wrong for a boy to wear 
a dress to school, it ceases to be wrong if a teacher sanctions the act.  
 
Richard Joyce has claimed that the capacity to draw the dependence relation within each 
domain is evidence in support of innate moral knowledge. He argues that in order to 
understand that conventional norms are dependent on authority “one would have to 
observe a correlation between the relevant authority changing its mind to permit the boy 
to wear a dress and that action no longer counting as a transgression.” And in the case of 
moral norms, “in order to infer an independence relation one would have either to (A) 
observe the relevant authority change its opinion about an act of harming while one 
                                                 
11. This is a different claim than saying that moral judgements have moral authority – the claim that 
moral judgements have authority over an agent irrespective of their interests. Authority independence 
means only that an action’s moral status will hold irrespective of whether or not an authority figure 
sanctions it, which is still consistent with the claim that moral judgements are subject to one’s own 
preferences.  
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notes that the act nevertheless continues to count as a transgression or (B) observe a 
previously condemned act of harming cease to count as a transgression while one notes 
that the relevant authority’s opinion on the matter has not altered” (2006:138-139). The 
observational evidence required to draw the domain relevant dependence relations are 
complex and difficult, if not impossible, to come by (especially for a three year old child). 
The information required is therefore likely to be innate.  
 
This picture misdescribes the learning situation, however. For the young moral learner, 
drawing the dependence relation is not a case of rule extraction from the environment 
followed by determining the relevant dependence relation with authority. Moral norms 
are not norms that also happen to be authority-independent; they are moral norms because 
they are instantiated by authority-independent events such as harming. They are 
prohibitions because of the consequences their violations have, not because an authority 
figure tells the child they are prohibited. Similarly, conventional transgressions are not 
norms that happen to also be authority-dependent; they are conventional norms because 
they are instantiated by features of the world that are determined by authority, such as 
social regularities. They are prohibited because authority prohibits them. (Note that the 
authority need not be a single authority figure, authority can also come from groups.) We 
can demonstrate this by looking at what information is available to the learning child and 
how that information contributes to making the distinction between authority-dependent 
and authority-independent norms. Although it may be authority figures who are involved 
in teaching both types of transgressions, the informational differences available to the 
child are sufficient to make the distinction. I will look at four aspects relevant to 
explaining the relationship between norms and authority: the contribution of emotions, 
the contribution of caregiver instruction, the frequency of transgression, and the young 
child’s conception of authority.  
 
Emotions 
 
As we have seen above, the emotional consequences of moral transgressions allow the 
learning child to see them as distinct from conventional transgressions. In canonical 
moral transgressions, these emotional consequences will occur irrespective of directives 
from authority (Nichols 2005; Prinz 2008b). The child can therefore determine the 
wrongness of the act independent of authority. This explains why when young children 
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witness events that are neither clearly moral or conventional, such as a bystander crying, 
the young child will typically judge the events as moral because they infer that the 
bystander was somehow harmed by the event (Smetana 1989). We also find that 
authority-independence is a property of other, non-moral emotional responses. Research 
by Shaun Nichols shows that non-moral disgust transgressions were ranked by children 
as less authority-dependent (and more generalisable) than conventional type 
transgressions. Disgusting acts are therefore perceived to be disgusting regardless of what 
anyone else says (Nichols 2002a, 2004).  
 
In cases where an authority sanctions the harming of others, for the child the more 
emotionally salient consequence (harming others) will trump the other consequence such 
as the violation of the authority’s proscriptions, thereby causing the child to appraise the 
action as wrong. This is not to say that considerations of harm and welfare are the only 
relevant factors enabling the child to determine what is morally wrong. What it does 
show, however, is that affect contributes significantly to the establishment of authority-
independence as a property of moral norms. (I will address the issue of the authority-
dependent nature of conventional norms below.) 
 
Parental transgression responses  
 
As we saw earlier, parents and caregivers specifically appeal to victim orientated 
consequences in the case of moral norms, and social regularity and authority in relation 
to conventional transgressions. Again, how the victim feels is typically independent of 
authority; children are being directed to identify those transgressions that cause harm as 
wrong because, first and foremost, they cause harm (Smetana 1997; Prinz 2008b). The 
young child may be taught this fact by an authority figure, but it is not authority that 
determines whether and event causes harm.  
 
Frequency of transgression 
 
Research shows that children experience the majority of moral transgressions with peers 
and siblings (Smetana 1989). Children compete with each other, hurt each other, take 
each other’s possessions and have playground arguments. These interactions are 
reciprocal, involving both transgressor and victim, and are often resolved in the absence 
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of authority. In contrast, it was found that conventional transgression occurred evenly 
between peers and siblings, and caregivers. Importantly, then, the frequency of the child’s 
experience with relations to authority in each domain is asymmetrical – a higher 
frequency of moral transgressions and their resolution is experienced independent of 
authority figures. Combined with the domain-specific responses to transgressions 
detailed above, we have clear differentiation between the domains in terms of their 
relations with authority. 
 
So far, we have a story about how and why moral norms are perceived as authority-
independent due to authority-independent emotional content, parenting practices 
directing them towards this content, and the frequency of transgression. Because 
emotional responses trump directives from authority, authority makes a diminished 
contribution when assessing emotionally salient moral transgressions. Young children 
need not infer any relationship between harm and authority to determine that an act is 
morally wrong. The dependence relation is not as complex as Joyce makes it to be. Still, 
this does not address Joyce’s issue with respect to learning the authority-dependent 
nature of conventional norms, as it fails to explain how children can infer this relation 
without seeing the relevant authority change the norm. How do children know that if 
teachers change their mind about dress wearing that it is ok for boys to wear a dress to 
school, without actually witnessing this change of mind? To understand the classification 
of conventional norms as authority-dependent we need to look at the child’s concept of 
authority and its relationship to social regularity.   
 
Conceptions of authority 
 
In many cases, the determinant of social regularities, such as conventional norms, will be 
authority, and, importantly, children view the legitimacy of authority as being dependent 
on context. Research shows that young children see authority figures as having specific 
jurisdictions. For example, 4-6 year olds see a school principal’s authority as largely 
limited to the context of the school (Laupa 1994; Laupa and Turiel 1986), and there is 
plenty of evidence from the child’s environment to establish this fact. In the case of 
schooling, children have ample evidence that teachers and school principals determine 
the social regularities of the school: they are told when they can and cannot talk, when 
they can eat, when they can play, and when they can go to the toilet; they get in trouble 
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when they do not obey the teacher; parents tell children to “do as you teacher tells you at 
school”. Additionally, teachers will tell a child “you will have to ask your parents that” if 
it falls outside their jurisdiction. Children experience teacher authority as context 
dependent and, in the child’s eye, teachers and school principles determine the social 
regularities of the school. This is true of other areas of life in which authority determines 
the rules, and children experience context dependent authority from a very young age. 
 
Children therefore have specific ideas about which authority is relevant to which social 
regularities: “The findings show that preschoolers have understandings of the social 
context in which authority relations are embedded, conceptualising authorities not solely 
with respect to their adult status, but to their role within the social context of the school” 
(Laupa 1994:1). The child (tacitly) knows that the consequences of wearing a dress to 
school violates a social regularity (all children know that boys do not wear dresses to 
school!), and they know the relevant authority who determines social regularities at 
school. When the relevant authority changes the social regularity, then children will 
change their appraisal in relation to that new social regularity. Wearing a dress to school 
is a transgression because it violates the social regularity as determined by the authority at 
school, and it is not a transgression when it does not. Children do not need to observe 
specific instantiations of the particular authority-dependence relations of specific norms 
to draw this inference; they need only a general conception of the relationship between 
the relevant authority and the jurisdiction of that authority with respect to social 
regularities. We can conclude therefore, that the dependence relation in the case of 
conventional norms is not as complex as Joyce proposes.  
 
Re-characterising the dependence relation 
 
We can now re-characterise the relationship between transgression and authority. 
Children’s judgements of the dependence relation are not a case of rule extraction from 
the environment, followed by determining the relevant dependence relation with 
authority. Moral norms are not norms that also happen to be authority-independent; 
typically they are moral norms because they are instantiated by authority-independent 
events (such as harming). Similarly, conventional transgressions are not norms that 
happen to also be authority-dependent; they are conventional norms because they are 
instantiated by authority-dependent features (such as teachers’ dictates). In the moral 
The Wealth of the Moral Stimulus 
 
 
73
case, the young child’s sensibilities to harm trump considerations of authority and, in the 
conventional case, there simply are no relevant authority-independent consequences to 
trump authority. I propose that we ought to see this in the justification that children 
provide for making such judgments. In the case of moral transgressions they will appeal 
to the harm and welfare of the victim, “it is wrong because it hurts them”, not “it is wrong 
and it hurts them” (where ‘hurting’ is identified via an authority-independent emotional 
response). In the case of conventional transgressions, children will appeal to social 
regularity and authority: “It is wrong because the teacher told you not to do it”, not “it is 
wrong and the teacher told you not to do it.”   
 
We can see these ideas more clearly when we consider the case of a young child learning 
that hitting is wrong. Children can quickly learn that harming events—being hit or 
scraping one’s knee, for example—hurt irrespective of what people say. They also learn 
that the events that cause harms are wrong – they are told by their caregivers that hitting 
is wrong because it hurts others; they experience and witness the negative effects of 
being hit. They are sensitive to the harmful consequences of hitting and cannot conceive 
of harmless hitting occurring. When asked if it is ok to hit someone when an authority 
figure tells them it is, the child will still conceive of the hitting event harming, and 
therefore judge it as wrong. It is the harmful consequences of hitting that have been 
moralised by the learning child, not the norms from authority forbidding hitting. 
Although authority figures may teach a child that hitting is wrong because it harms, they 
do not determine whether hitting causes harm. In the case of conventional 
transgressions, there simply are not the relevant authority-independent consequences to 
over-ride the dictates of authority because the consequences are determined solely in 
relation to authority. It is wrong to wear a dress to school because an authority 
determines the rules about dress wearing at schools, no other reason. Therefore, children 
can conceive of the relevant authority telling them it is ok to where a dress to school and 
it no longer being wrong to do so. Children witness, and are involved in, conventional 
norm negotiations all the time, such as when playing games. Harming events, however, 
are non-negotiable. 
 
Through development the child will learn the many subtle aspects of moral and 
conventional characterisations. Such a picture does not mean that authority has no 
influence or can alter moral behaviour or moral judgements; Nazi concentration camp 
officers and the Milgram Experiments in the 60’s show people can, under certain 
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circumstances, obey authority in ways that contradict their normal moral beliefs and 
behaviours. Nor does it mean that authority does not play an essential role in moral 
learning. Authority figures guide moral learning, giving children the tools to make more 
nuanced judgements (Prinz 2008b). In the very early years, harm is sufficient for moral 
categorisation. As children develop, they can be taught relevant concepts such as 
“victim” and “intention” to supplement notions of harm. These more nuanced concepts 
then become relevant in establishing moral violations and their exceptions. For example, 
contact sports such as rugby, boxing, and gridiron are, by and large, excluded from moral 
appraisal because, although there is harm, there is no victim. In cases where a player 
harms another by breaking the rules, there is a victim and hence it is deemed morally 
wrong. Learning that some harm is not immoral is a case of learning exceptions to the 
early default position of categorising all harms as wrong. Although moral learning will 
often be complex, we can see that the internal and external resources available to the 
child allow him to identify the criteria that differentiate prototypical moral transgressions 
from conventional transgressions.   
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have seen that moral nativists make specific claims about the innate 
structure of the moral mind and the role that the environment plays in moral 
development. One argument in support of their view is that empiricist accounts of moral 
learning are inadequate to explain the move from informational exposure to mature 
moral competence, because the child’s environment is impoverished with respect to the 
information required for moral learning. This POMS argument combines a 
developmental claim and a task analysis claim. We have seen that the trajectory of moral 
developmental is consistent with a domain-general learning account. With respect to task 
analysis, I have shown that the (non-moral) internal and external resources available to 
the moral learning child radically narrow the gap between informational input and 
performance output. I have also argued that moral acquisition is not as complex as 
proponents of the POMS maintain.  Finally, we looked at, and rejected, one specific 
argument in defence of the POMS – that criterion judgements (in particular the 
authority-dependence relation) can be accounted for without innate moral information. 
We have good reason, therefore, to doubt the poverty of the moral stimulus argument 
and the moral nativist’s positing of an innate moral faculty.  
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In chapter 1, I detailed the argument that morality is an adaptation. Yet in this chapter I 
have argued against an innate, domain-specific moral faculty. This raises questions as to 
how morality can be an evolutionary adaptation. In the following chapters I will argue 
that our moral cognitive systems are not bound to the head of the moral thinker nor 
even the boundaries of their body. Moral cognition is embodied and extended. This is 
important from an evolutionary point of view because it enables us to establish the 
proper parts of the moral cognitive system and hence the target of selection. In the final 
chapter I will detail how this non-nativist adaptationist picture fits within an evolutionary 
framework, namely a gene-culture dual inheritance model of the evolution of moral 
cognition. 
   
2.7 Summary 
 
In the previous chapter we saw that morality has a plausible evolutionary history; it is an 
adaptation. Being an adaptation does not necessarily mean that morality is innate, 
however. In this chapter I have argued against one particular argument in support of the 
claim that morality is innate. The main points are as follows:  
 
• Poverty of the stimulus arguments have recently been applied to the moral 
domain in support of an innate moral faculty.  
 
• The poverty of the moral stimulus (POMS) argument rests on two claims: a 
developmental claim and a task analysis claim. 
 
• Against the POMS argument, I have argued that: 
 
– the development of moral cognition is consistent with an empiricist account 
of moral cognition;  
 
– both the internal and external resources available to the moral learner are 
sufficient for a domain-general account of moral learning; 
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– the moral learning task is either not an explicitly moral problem, or when it is, 
is not that complex; and 
 
– we can account for children’s grasp of the moral/conventional distinction 
without appealing to an innate moral faculty.  
 
Having outlined why we have good reason to doubt that morality is underwritten by an 
innate, domain-specific moral faculty, I will now lay out the terrain for subsequent 
chapters, detailing traditional individualistic approaches to cognition and how some 
prominent nativist accounts of moral cognition are individualistic. I will then propose 
that moral cognition is best seen as incorporating bodily and highly structured external 
resources as part of the moral cognitive system. This has implications for the type of 
evolutionary account I will give in chapter 6.  
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3 
3. Cognition: Embodied and Extended 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the object of study for a true cognitive science is cognitive systems, then of central 
explanatory importance is what we shall include as proper parts, and the locational 
bounds, of those systems. Is one’s cognitive system confined to the head, or does the 
cognitive system extend beyond the bounds of the brain and associated neural structures? 
Further, what is the architecture of the cognitive system? Traditional approaches to 
cognition in the cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind have typically seen cognitive 
states as being realised by internal states of the agent – more generally “in the head” of 
the cogniser. The architecture of cognition has generally involved computational 
processes operating over amodal representational structures. Such a view relegates the 
role of perception and motor action to being peripheral inputs and outputs to the 
cognitive system.  
 
There is a growing body of empirical and theoretical work questioning this traditionalist 
account, which raises questions as to how wide we should cast our explanatory net. Does 
a complete account of the inner complexities and structure of the agent’s inner workings 
provide us with a complete account of cognition? What are the constituent parts of 
cognition? To understand cognition we must establish the scope of what we ought to 
include in our explanation. If our target is moral cognition, then we must establish the 
supervenience base of that cognition. There are two reasons why this is important for the 
larger evolutionary project. Firstly, establishing the proper parts of the moral cognitive 
system provides us with the explanatory framework within which to understand the 
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mechanisms of moral cognition. Secondly, it enables us to establish, from an 
evolutionary point of view, the mechanisms that were subject to natural selection.   
 
In this chapter I will outline one traditional account of cognition and the particular 
commitments it makes with regards to the locational bounds and internal architecture of 
cognition. I will then outline how two recent approaches to cognition, which are relevant 
to our larger explanatory project, make the same commitments as the traditional account. 
Finally I will explain why we have reason to doubt this approach to cognition. This will 
set up the next few chapters, which will describe how moral cognition, contrary to the 
traditional approach, is both embodied and extended.   
 
3.1 Traditional accounts of cognition 
 
Most recent accounts of moral cognition have, explicitly or implicitly, been individualist 
theories of some kind. They fit with traditional approaches to cognitive science and 
psychology that place cognition firmly inside the head. The dominant methodological 
and metaphysical approach to studying cognition has been, and still is, individualism.1 
Individualism is a methodological doctrine: cognition is explained through the study of 
the internal states of individuals. It is a metaphysical doctrine in that the individualist 
approach views cognitive phenomena as instantiated by the internal structure of 
individual agents, and by this internal structure alone. Thus the structure of the mind is 
an internal structure, and mental states and their structures are characterised and 
individuated independently of that which is external to those structures.  
 
Individualism about psychology is the thesis that psychological states should be 
construed without reference to anything beyond the boundary of the individual who 
has those states. Put loosely, it is the view that for the purposes of scientifically 
understanding the mind, the individual is the boundary of cognition. (Wilson 
2004:398)  
 
Drawing the boundary of cognition in terms of the individual raises obvious issues with 
                                                 
1. Not to be confused with the individualism/anti-individualism debate over whether or not intentional 
mental states are individuated solely by the intrinsic properties of an individual or whether those states are 
individuated in terms of intrinsic properties and their relations to the external world. (Putnam 1975; Burge 
1979). 
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respect to what constitutes the “individual”, and therefore where exactly the boundaries 
of cognition lie. Following the methodology of much of traditional cognitive science, I 
will take the bounds of cognition as typically posited by individualism in the cognitive 
sciences to be confined within the brain, or what Andy Clark refers to as being 
“brainbound” (2008).2 Here we see an important contrast between the brain (and certain 
associated neural systems) and the non-neural body and external world. In more general 
terms, the human cognitive system is “confined to the head of the thinker” (Chemero 
and Silberstein 2008:3). Confining the cognitive system in this way means that the (non-
neural) body and everything beyond is excluded from the cognitive system. This is not, 
of course, to claim that traditional accounts of cognition deny that one’s body and 
environment play important roles in, or that they are irrelevant to, the processes of 
cognition. But as we will see, these approaches attribute a very specific role to both the 
body and world, and the ways in which they interact with the mind – namely, they 
function as the inputs and outputs to the cognitive system but are not constitutive parts 
of high-level cognitive processes. For what is central to the individualist’s claim is that 
the actual processes of cognition itself (i.e. the proper parts of the cognitive system) are 
divorced from both the body and the environment: 
 
The world is (just) a source of inputs and arena for outputs; the body is just an 
organ for receiving inputs and effecting outputs (actions); the task of early 
processing is to render the inputs as an inner world-model of sufficient thickness to 
allow the bulk of problem-solving activity to be defined over the inner model alone. 
(Clark 2004:35)   
 
To study cognition is to study what goes on in the head.  
 
The dominant individualist views of cognition, since the advent of modern cognitive 
science, have been computational theories of mind, according to which cognition takes 
place via the inner manipulations of internal mental representations.3 There have been 
                                                 
2. Brainbound refers to the entire central nervous system (brain and spinal chord). 
3. Note that not all individualist accounts of cognition are computational. For example, some have 
proposed that cognition is individualistic and best explained “in terms of large scale neural dynamics” as 
opposed to computation (see Chemero and Silberstein (2008) for a brief discussion). Nor are all 
computational accounts of cognition individualistic. But paradigmatic cases of computational theories of 
cognition typically are individualistic and vice versa. The point I will be pursuing in the following chapters 
is that what counts as a moral cognitive system (computational or otherwise) cannot be confined to an 
individualistic methodology nor metaphysics.   
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numerous accounts of how this computational architecture of the mind is actualised. 
They include, but are in no way exhausted by, formal logical approaches, rule based 
systems, concept based systems, image based systems and various connectionist systems 
to name but a few (for a brief overview see Thagard 2008). Each proposes different 
accounts of what constitute representations and/or the systematic processes which act 
upon those representations. What they have in common is that they all converge on a 
particular explanation of how the mind works, namely through computational procedures 
operating upon internal representational structures: “thinking is essentially having and 
manipulating representations” (Bem and Looren de Jong 2006:280).  
 
Take, for example, the two prominent individualistic accounts of cognition: the 
Computational Theory of Mind (most prominently associated with Jerry Fodor4 and 
associates (Fodor 1975; Pylyshyn 1984)) and connectionism (see for example Rumelhart 
and McClelland (1986)). Both approaches are computational. Cognition is best 
understood as computational algorithms acting upon representational structures 
(although some connectionist approaches claim to be neither computational nor 
representational). One of the main points of difference between these two accounts is 
what constitute the representational structures upon which the computations occur. 
(Chemero and Silberstein 2008; Thagard 2005; Bem and Looren de Jong 2006).  
 
The Fodorian style computationalist, for example, takes representations to be symbolic, 
formal language-like structures where cognising involves the manipulation of these 
structures. The claims of the Fodorian are heavily influenced by Chomskyian linguistics’ 
picture of an innate, species universal, generative grammar. Fodor, for example, holds 
that the mind has an innate, species universal, language-like mental architecture that 
accounts for the systematic structure and productivity of thought – the language of 
thought hypothesis (1975). (For similarities with the Principles and Parameters account 
of moral cognition, see section 3.2.1 below). Connectionism on the other hand views 
representations as activation patterns in neural networks. By applying particular rules of 
learning, the connectionist network is able to acquire exemplar or prototype based 
                                                 
4. To be fair to Fodor, he is at pains to explain that he does not think that a Computational Theory of 
Mind (CMT) accounts for all, or even most of our cognitive processes: “I certainly don’t suppose that it 
could comprise more than a fragment of a full and satisfactory cognitive psychology” (2000). This cannot 
be said for many other proponents of CTM, (especially those with an evolutionary psychological bent) 
whom Fodor targets in his book The Mind Doesn’t Work that Way: The Scope and Limits of 
Computational Psychology (2000).   
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conceptual representations. Cognitions (such as those involved in reasoning and 
inference making) operate by way of pattern completion processes acting over these 
representations.  (See Churchland (1996) for suggestions as to how this type of approach 
might work in the moral domain.)  
 
In each case, cognition consists in the computational processing (algorithmic 
manipulations or pattern activation) of representations (symbols or sub-symbolic 
activation patterns).5 What typifies these perspectives is that the mind possesses rich, 
internal (symbolic or sub-symbolic) structure, and the essence of cognition involves the 
manipulation of this structure. The model of the mind is that of an inner mental world 
populated by representations upon which the problem-solving activity is enacted. 
Problems present in the environment are represented in the head. Cognition then solves 
the problem via the representational manipulations in the head, and produces the 
relevant output to which the body acts.  
 
The computationalist theories of mind typically view the representational structures over 
which cognitions operate as being amodal – that is, separate from perception and motor 
systems which interface with the world. Perceptual inputs are transduced to amodal 
symbols over which cognitions occur, the output of which is transduced to motor 
response. In this way, modal sensory-motor systems (involving representational 
structures or otherwise) are seen as separate from high-level cognising, whereby the 
perceptual and motor systems provide the inputs and receive outputs from that cognitive 
process. Sensory-motor operations are peripheral to cognition proper. (See for example 
Pylyshyn 1984).  
 
The above discussion has identified a number of positions (brainbound individualism, 
computationalism, and amodality), which need not be taken as a package deal. Where one 
draws the bounds of cognition need not commit one to any particular mental 
architecture nor to any particular view of the structure of representations. Moreover, how 
one views mental architecture need not commit one to any specific position on the 
bounds of cognition nor the modal nature of representations (if there are even any 
                                                 
5. There are debates in philosophy of mind as whether cognition is identical to computational 
processes, or whether cognition is realised by computational processes. For present purposes, I am neutral 
on these matters.  
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representations at all!). Taking all three together, however, does establish the traditional 
view of cognition: realised in the brain and involving computational processes acting 
over amodal representations. This tripartite account is what I will thus refer to as 
individualism.   
 
3.1.1 A mental world of inner complexity 
 
Individualistic accounts of cognition focus on representations and processes acting over 
those representations rather than physical interaction, and in doing so make a specific 
commitment to inner complexity. As I have outlined above, the individualist’s approach 
to understanding the human cognitive system is to look “inside”, for the cognitive system 
is bound within the brain and nervous system. Of central importance to individualistic 
explanations is internal structure and organisation. The most prominent individualistic 
accounts of cognition posit mental representations to account for this structure.  
 
Mental representations are theoretical entities; they are posited by the sciences of the 
mind because they have rich explanatory value in that they account for the relationship 
between mind and world. They do this by doing what their name suggests, namely 
representing. Although accounts differ as to how representations actually go about 
representing the world, they are minimally construed as “causal surrogates for distal 
features of the environment” (Chemero and Silberstein 2008). In this sense, they bring 
aspects of the world inside, and in doing so allow cognitive processing about the world to 
occur in a manner that is independent or isolated from the world.6 Yet if this picture of the 
mind is correct, and our cognitive system is instantiated by the brain and neural systems, 
then it is not just the environment for which mental representations can be causal 
surrogates; they can also be causal surrogates for the non-neural body, its configurations 
and its movements.   
 
As explained above, for computationalists such as the Fodorian and the connectionist 
this internal complexity is typically implemented by way of either symbolic or sub-
symbolic structures. They often differ as to whether or not, and to what degree, these 
internal structures are innate or acquired. Fodor once famously (if not notoriously) held 
                                                 
6. Hence Clark dubs this form of inner world problem solving “isolationism” (Clark 2004). 
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the view that most of our concepts are innate (1975; 1981). On the other hand, 
connectionists working with neural networks often place much emphasis on the 
powerful associationist learning abilities of such networks. Although they differ 
somewhat as to the exact nature of the computational processes that act upon those 
structures, both accounts of the mind understand cognition as abstracting away from the 
physical and social environments in which cognitive processes are taking place (Wilson 
forthcoming; Marr 1982). If cognition is the proximate cause of behaviour, then this 
behaviour is due in part to the internal complexity of the cognitive system – be that 
complexity learned or otherwise.  
 
What is explanatorily important from the individualist's perspective is that adaptive 
problems encountered in the world become problems to be solved inside the head. 
External complexity of the problem domain becomes brainbound internal complexity. 
We build complex inner models of complex outer worlds. To explain cognition and 
resultant behaviour is to look inwards. 
 
3.1.2 The body and world 
 
Since the individualist believes the cognitive system resides in the head, any explanations 
of cognition proper are themselves going to be confined to the head. Such reliance on 
internal models or representations in explanation reduces the importance and role of the 
body and environment (Haugeland 1998b). Not only does this make a specific 
commitment to the internal complexity of the mind, but in doing so these individualistic 
accounts relegate the environment and body as being external to the cognitive system. 
The role of the body and world is to operate as the inputs and outputs to cognitive 
process, with the environment providing the adaptive problems to be solved and 
information for their solution (i.e., the inputs to the cognitive process). The body 
mediates those informational inputs (via perceptual apparatus), and enacts the action 
orientated outputs (via motor structures) to the environment. The environment is 
typically viewed as the problem domain and our perceptual apparatus as a “peripheral 
channel through which the problem is initially posed, and incidental facts are supplied” 
(Haugeland 1998b:220).  
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Although the individualistic perspective does not deny that the environment and body 
both play important roles in cognition, it is clear that they do make a particular 
commitment to the nature of their role. The environment populates the contents of our 
minds over multiple timescales: the environment to which aspects of our minds are 
adapted, and those life-time environments within which cognition takes place. In each 
case, the individualist’s mind is furnished via some well defined, stable channels; be that 
through genetic channels such as inherited innate representational content (such as our 
ability to focus on faces soon after birth), or over one’s life history via perceptual inputs 
from the world around us. The body in this case provides a stable structure through 
which the mind can receive inputs from and interact with a variable world. The 
computational algorithms are constructed and operate with certain assumptions about 
the structure of the body and its properties that enable those algorithms and heuristics of 
the cognitive system to work reliably and successfully. In sum, we have environmental 
inputs via stable perceptual channels, cognition operating on representations of those 
inputs, and output through stable bodily structures with which to interact with the world.  
 
So far we have seen that traditional accounts of cognition make specific commitments 
relating to the bounds and architecture of cognition. This view also makes specific 
commitments to the internal complexity of internal cognitive structures and the roles 
attributed to body and world. We will now look at the ways in which two prominent 
accounts of cognition are individualistic. Both have relevance to our larger explanatory 
project, the evolution of moral cognition.   
 
3.2 Traditional cognition and the moral mind  
 
Individualism is pervasive. It is inherently assumed in many, if not most, of our 
psychological and biological sciences (Wilson 2004). Moral cognition is not immune from 
this dogma. I will briefly look at how two accounts of cognition are either explicitly, or 
tacitly, individualistic in nature. The first is a recent approach to moral cognition; namely 
the principles and parameters account of moral cognition recently presented by Marc 
Hauser (2006a, 2006b) and John Mikhail (2007, 2008a). The second is a more general 
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account of cognition proposed by modular evolutionary psychology7 (Barkow, Cosmides 
et al. 1992; Wright 1994; Pinker 1997; Buss 1999). Both approaches make specific 
individualistic commitments. Cognition is internal and the driver of complex behaviour is 
internal. These approaches ignore, or at least tacitly relegate, the role of the body and 
world and the dynamic interplay between brain, body and world as being external to 
one’s cognitive system. Both also involve computations operating over representational 
structures. I will look at the two approaches in turn.  
 
3.2.1 Individualism I: the Hauser-Mikhail model of the moral mind  
 
Marc Hauser (2006a, 2006b) John Mikhail (2007, 2008a) Susan Dwyer (1999, 2006, 2009) 
and Gilbert Harman (2000, 2008) have proposed accounts of moral cognition that are 
explicitly influenced by Chomskyian accounts of linguistics and the computational theory 
of mind (as seen in chapter 2).8 The internal structure of the moral mind, like 
Chomskyian accounts of language cognition and Fodorian accounts of cognition in 
general, relies on formal internal structures representing external states of affairs which 
are acted upon by computational manipulations. The Hauser-Mikhail9 model of the 
moral mind posits internal complexity in the form of a moral grammar, the structure of 
which is universal, abstract, and context independent.  
 
Moral grammar is universal in that it is claimed that all normal human beings have this 
innately (genetically) encoded moral grammar which is required for moral acquisition, 
normal moral development and moral competence. The underlying principles of the 
moral grammar determine the space of possible moral variation and which variations take 
shape will depend on the various moral parameters in our developmental environments. 
Moral grammar is abstract in that the underlying principles are abstract structural 
descriptions of moral states of affairs that include such parameters as intention, harm, 
ends, means and side-effects to name but a few (see for example Mikhail (2002, 2008a) 
                                                 
7. As I am using the term here, I will understand ‘evolutionary psychology’ to be the research 
programme that makes specific commitment to innate cognitive modules selected for in the Environment 
of Evolutionary Adaptedness (see for example Barkow, Cosmides et al. 1992; Pinker 1997; Buss 1999). I 
am not referring to other psychology research programmes that are evolutionary in nature.  
8. Mikhail, for example, has a recent paper entitled Moral Cognition and Computational Theory (Mikhail 
2008a). 
9. I will exclude Dwyer and Harman from the name of this model for brevity’s sake. 
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and Dwyer (2006), for detailed exposition of this structure). And it is context independent in 
that the underlying structure of the innately specified principles are themselves invariant 
to situational effects.  
 
The moral grammarians also claim that our internal universal moral grammar explains the 
structure and production of our society-wide moral systems: “[t]he universal moral 
grammar is a theory about the principles that enable children to build a large but finite 
range of distinctive moral system” (Hauser 2006b:421). Although the underlying 
structural principles of moral grammar are fixed, the systematic differences between 
cultures are due to the various parametric variations as set by the culture. Moral grammar 
can explain both the systematicity and productivity of our moral systems. In this way the 
“universal moral grammar provides a toolkit for building possible moral systems” 
(Hauser 2006a:215). 
 
According to the Hauser-Mikhail account, what is centrally relevant to understanding 
moral cognition (and moral systems) is explicating the internal structure of the mind by 
cashing out the underlying moral grammar through the analysis of the relevant input 
conditions and resulting output responses (for detailed application of this methodology 
see Mikhail (2008a)). This model of cognition is explicitly computational. Take for 
example the following passages from Mikhail, which make clear references to a 
computational account of cognition:  
 
the human brain contains a computationally complex “moral grammar”… 
analogous in certain respects to the mental grammars operative in other domains, 
such as language, vision, music, and face recognition. (2007:l) 
 
the problem of descriptive adequacy in the theory of moral cognition may be 
divided into at least three parts: (1) the problem of describing the computational 
principles (“deontic rules”) operative in the exercise of moral judgment, (2) the 
problem of describing the unconscious mental representations (“structural 
descriptions”) over which those computational operations are defined, and (3) the 
problem of describing the chain of inferences (“conversion rules”) by which the 
stimulus is converted into an appropriate structural description. (2007:4) 
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The role of the body in each of these accounts is that as described in one of Andy Clark’s 
critiques of traditional cognitive science, whereby “the body is just an organ for receiving 
inputs and effecting outputs (actions)” (Clark 1998:36). Hauser claims, for example, that 
emotions occur after the moral computational process (i.e., the making of a moral 
judgement) has been engaged by making the distinction between “emotions playing a role 
in our moral judgements and emotions playing a role in our moral behaviour, or what we 
actually do” (2006b:195). Hauser claims that, by and large, the latter exemplifies the role 
of emotion in moral cognition such that emotion plays no causal role with respect to the 
permissibility of moral judgements.10 One of the centrally important differences between 
the moral grammarians’ model of moral cognition and other emotionally grounded 
accounts is that emotions typically follow from the judgement-making process rather 
than having an essential causal role. Hauser hypothesises that “[e]motions may only 
function to modulate what we actually do as distinct from what we comprehended or 
perceive as morally permissible” (2006b:46) … and “our emotions are not part of the 
dedicated and specialized components of the moral faculty” (2006b:53). Emotional 
engagement occurs after the moral computations have been made and operate as a way 
of controlling and directing our subsequent moral behaviour. Here our moral 
computational system (i.e., the moral faculty) is employed before our bodily (emotional) 11 
processes are enacted – the role of emotion is to (when required) enact the outputs of 
the moral faculty in the environment. Under such a view emotions may be central to 
moral performance but not moral competence. I will later argue that emotional 
information processing involves the body, and that moral cognition involves emotions, 
hence the body is part of moral cognition (see chapter 4).  
 
The role that the Hauser-Mikhail model ascribes to the environment and body is that of 
the problem domain and effectors. The environment presents us with a problem, such as 
in the case of a moral violation. The information from the environment is in turn 
presented to our moral mind through our perceptual apparatus. This triggers an analysis 
                                                 
10. It should be noted that Hauser does not necessarily think that this is always the case. He concedes 
that it is possible that emotions may play a causal role in particular classes of moral judgements such as 
“personal/high conflict/other-serving dilemmas” (Hauser 2006a:218). Hence Hauser has recently 
entertained the possibility of a plurality of moral psychological processes that include emotion driven ones 
(Hauser, Young et al. 2008b). More recently, Hauser and colleagues suggest that emotion could provide 
input to the moral circuits, rather than modulate the operation of those circuits (Huebner, Dwyer et al. 
2009) – cf. the role of the body in traditional cognition.  
11. The assumption I am making is that emotional processes include bodily effects or that their 
processing involves bodily effects. See chapter 4 for discussion.   
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of the information with respect to the causes and consequences of the action or event, 
from which a moral judgement is made. This judgement itself produces outputs which 
are (often) enacted through our bodies. This is clearly what Clark describes as a “linear 
processing cycle: perceive, compute and act” (Clark 1999:346). The appropriate moral 
behaviour is caused from the inside; we are moral in the ways that we are because we have 
algorithms that specify our moral judgements and behaviours.  
 
The moral grammarians, akin to traditional views of cognition, can also be read as taking 
the relevant representational structures of the universal moral grammar as being amodal. 
For example, Hauser writes that “the principles of [moral grammar] operate on 
experiences that are independent of their sensory origins, including imagined or 
perceived visual scenes, auditory events, and all forms of language—spoken, signed, and 
written” (Hauser 2006b:53). And Mikhail states that “[t]hese concepts and principles 
which underlie [our unconscious moral knowledge] are as far removed from experience 
as the hierarchical tree structures and recursive rules of linguistic grammars” (2008b:355). 
Amodality is central to their version of the poverty of the moral stimulus argument and 
hence a core feature of their model. Somatosensory and sensory-motor systems are quite 
separate from the abstract structures of the universal moral grammar.  
 
Whilst the above is only a brief overview of the moral grammarians’ position, the central 
themes are clear: The central causal determinants of our moral cognitions are internal 
brainbound cognitive mechanisms that are realised independently of body and external 
environment; bodily and environmental resources are not considered part of the moral 
faculty (qua moral cognitive system); the structure of our moral systems and the scope of 
cultural moral variation are constrained by the underlying principles of our innate moral 
grammar (see discussion of evolutionary psychology below); the moral cognitive system 
is firmly in the head. As we will see, this position does not capture the full gamut of 
moral cognitive processes and hence does not adequately explain moral cognition. An 
individualist moral cognition fails to account for the indispensable role that body and 
environment play in providing solutions to adaptive moral problems.   
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3.2.2 Individualism II: evolutionary psychology 
 
The Hauser-Mikhail model of the moral mind is a special case of a second, more general 
type of individualism, evolutionary psychology.  The human mind, according to 
evolutionary psychologists, consists of a collection of genetically endowed, species-
universal, specialised cognitive mechanisms, or Darwinian algorithms. Those mechanisms 
are computational in nature. The way that natural selection accordingly shaped our 
species’ psychology was by selecting those Darwinian algorithms that solved specific 
problems in our evolutionary history. The architecture of the mind according to the 
evolutionary psychologist is computational, innate (genetically encoded), almost entirely 
modular, and encapsulated (Barkow, Cosmides et al. 1992; Buss 1999). Evolutionary 
psychology is, by and large, individualistic (Wilson 2004). 
 
The main aim of evolutionary psychology as a scientific enterprise is to explain these 
algorithmic mechanisms (i.e., the proximate causes of our behaviour) in terms of the 
selective pressures (ultimate causes) that hominin encountered in the Pleistocene. As 
Cosmides et al. explain:  
 
By understanding the selection pressures that our hominid ancestors faced—by 
understanding what kind of adaptive problems they had to solve—one should be 
able to gain some insight into the design of the information-processing mechanisms 
that evolved to solve these problems. (1992:9).  
  
The important explanatory consequence of this methodology was that “[e]volutionary 
psychology “went inside,” shifting the explanatory focus from behavioural patterns to 
psychological mechanisms” (Sterelny 2003:234). For example, it is often claimed by 
evolutionary psychologists that we have evolved specialised cognitive mechanisms for 
cheater detection. In our evolutionary environments, where cooperative interactions were 
central to survival, the threat of partner defection posed a real risk. Being able to identify 
trustworthy partners and cooperating conditionally has obvious fitness advantages over 
being an unconditional cooperator. Evolutionary psychology proposes that we have 
accordingly adapted cognitive mechanisms to enable specific reasoning in the social 
domain. Evidence for this, it is claimed, can be found in our superior ability to reason in 
this domain (as opposed to the domain of logical reasoning) as shown by the Wason 
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selection task (Cosmides and Tooby 1992).    
 
In the moral sphere, many evolutionary psychologists claim, among other things, that 
evidence suggests we have cognitive adaptations for many moral behaviours12 such as 
those that regulate sexual behaviours towards family members (Lieberman, Tooby et al. 
2003; Lieberman, Tooby et al. 2007; Lieberman 2008), a social contract mechanism 
(Cosmides and Tooby 1992)13, and moral emotions such as guilt (for a populist take see 
Wright 1994). Our particular behaviours in response to different moral dilemmas occur 
because we evolved computational algorithms designed specifically to respond to such 
dilemmas. Internal cognitive complexity gives rise to the external complex moral action.  
 
The evolutionary psychologist’s individualism moves beyond explaining individual 
behaviours, to explaining the generation of culture as well (Wilson 2004). Two of the 
leading proponents of evolutionary psychology, Cosmides and Tooby (1992:115-116) 
claim for example that much of human culture is “evoked culture”, not transmitted from 
generation to generation but instead evoked from our universal human psychology. 
Similar environments provide similar informational-inputs to our universal cognitive 
mechanisms and therefore produce similar behavioural outputs which manifest at a 
group level as culture. Similarities between cultures occur due to the manifestation of 
those behaviours produced in similar environments. Much of the cultural variation that 
we see occurs because the cognitive information processing mechanisms receive different 
informational inputs when in different environments, thereby evoking “different 
representational and behavioural outputs”, and hence different culture. Cosmides and 
Tooby liken this to a juke box that will play different songs depending on local 
preferences. (See Tooby and Cosmides 1989; Cosmides and Tooby 1992; Boyd and 
Richerson 2004.) Internal psychology determines the structure and shape of culture:  
 
Group-level cultural and social phenomena, while they have some emergent 
properties, are the consequence of the operation of evolved psychological (and morphological) 
                                                 
12. I read the moral grammarians as being a special case of evolutionary psychology. Hauser, for one, 
makes direct appeals to the evolutionary origins of the universal moral grammar (2006b). 
13. Cosmides and Tooby write that many of the computational requirements are “so particular to 
adaptive problems that arise in social exchange that they could only be implemented by a computational 
system whose design was functionally specialized for this function” (1992:53). 
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mechanisms functioning in individuals who evolved to live in groups. (Tooby and 
Cosmides 1989:45, italics added)  
 
Evolutionary psychology views cultural phenomena as the aggregation of individual 
Darwinian algorithms giving rise to individual social level behaviours (Wilson 2000, 
2004). Culture operates as the cause (setting the various parameters14) and effects 
(aggregation of behaviours) of an internal psychology, but they are in no way constitutive 
of that psychology. Again, we see the input → computation → output model of 
cognition and its aggregative generation of culture.   
 
Hence, the explanation for both individual behaviours and the cultural manifestation of 
those behaviours is individualistic: “The cognitive machinery is organism bounded, and 
the properties of organism important for the evolution of both cognition and culture 
supervene on what is inside those organisms” (Wilson 2004:416). Again, cognition is in 
the head and those brainbound psychological mechanisms are the central determinants 
that “create, shape, and maintain culture” (Tooby and Cosmides 1989:45). 
 
Having explained the traditional view of cognition in the cognitive sciences, and outlined 
how one recent account of moral cognition and how evolutionary psychology is 
consistent with this view, I will now look at alternative accounts of cognition which do 
not adhere to the traditional picture. These alternative views emphasise the role of both 
the body and the world as part of our cognitive systems. In the following chapters I will 
argue that moral cognition, contra to both the Hauser-Mikhail model and evolutionary 
psychology, is best captured by these alternative views. 
 
3.3 Explanations beyond the brain 
 
There is no doubt that cognition is a complex phenomena and that the cognitive 
machinery inside the head is very complex indeed. It is not the aim here to question that 
much of cognition is confined to the brain and neural systems. What is at question, 
                                                 
14. “By feeding modern conditions (economic, cultural, social, etc.) as parameters into these algorithms, 
modern behavior can then be both predicted and understood – not simply as adaptive or maladaptive, but 
as a consequence of the structure of the mechanisms that regulate behavior and the modern conditions 
that are their input” (Tooby and Cosmides 1989:37).  
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however, is whether or not the human (and especially in this case the moral) cognitive 
system can (always) be viewed as a distinct subsystem within the greater brain-body-world 
(whole) system (Clark 1997; Haugeland 1998b). Can we make a principled distinction by 
which we draw the boundary of cognition at our neural structures? Or, does cognition 
“leak into the body and world” (Clark 2008).  
 
There are several ways in which physically external resources can become part of our 
cognitive system. Often these will run together. Firstly, external informational resources 
can play a similar role to inner informational resources such that there is no cognitively 
significant distinction that can be can drawn between the two (this is the ‘parity thesis’ 
which we will encounter below.) The second is the idea of a dynamic interplay between 
brainbound processes, body and world. This is in contrast to the traditional picture of a 
linear flow of perception → cognition → action. Finally, external resources can become 
part of our cognitive system when the cognitive representational complexity that suffices 
to explain adaptive responses to a complex world is not wholly brainbound. That is, 
there is not enough in the head to explain intelligence.  
 
In contrast to the moral individualism discussed above, I argue that we cannot confine 
our studies of moral cognition to the head. Explaining moral cognition will involve the 
application of one or more of these three means of cognitive extension. In other words, 
much of moral cognition is best explained by paying attention to the role of external 
information structures and our interactions with those structures, rather than from the 
“inside”. Very often the body and world are not mere inputs and outputs to the moral 
cognitive system but play an active role in the adaptive problem solving routines we 
employ to navigate our moral worlds. We cannot have a complete explanation of moral 
cognition, its acquisition, deployment and evolution without accounting for the dynamic 
interplay between brain, body, and world.  
 
3.3.1 Cognition beyond the head 
 
The temptation to give internalised explanations of cognition is understandable, if only 
because our phenomenological experience appears to be from the “inside”. But, the brain 
centred view, to use Andy Clark’s phrase, is “not true to the natural facts” because it fails 
to appropriately account for the role of external resources in our cognitive systems. Such 
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views have “an unmistakable tendency to marginalise such factors: to dwell on inner 
complexity whilst simplifying or ignoring the complex inner-outer interplays that 
characterize the bulk of basic biological problem-solving” (Clark 1998:35). Additionally, 
there is often an assumption within the science of the mind that behavioural complexity 
is to be causally related to internal cognitive complexity (Haugeland 1998b; Barrett, 
Henzi et al. 2008). As above, moral cognising (such as the making of moral judgements, 
tracking of other agents’ moral behaviours, having moral beliefs, taking moral action etc) 
is often considered to be essentially linked to the complex internal make-up of the moral 
mind. Yet not all complex behaviours are necessarily internally driven. John Haugeland 
draws on an example from Herbert Simon to bring attention to this type of bodily and 
environmental marginalisation, while at the same time highlight the role of agent-
environment interplay and the importance of external factors. He asks us to imagine an 
ant walking across a “wind- and wave- moulded beach” (Simon as quoted in Haugeland 
1998a:209). The movement of the ant will be in “response” to the contours of the sand 
and pebbles which make up the beach surface, weaving and winding over and around 
obstacles as they come to pass. The trajectory will be “irregular, complex, and hard to 
describe” (Simon as quoted in Haugeland 1998a:209). 
 
If we take the explanatory target to be the ant’s behaviour as it walks across the beach, 
there are two explanations that we can proffer. One is by way of an individualistic 
account, remembering that the methodology of an individualistic explanation is to 
explicate internal structure because cognitive systems are “confined to the head of the 
thinker”. The internalist picture of the ant’s complex behaviour is that it is determined by 
the computational algorithms acting over internal representations (i.e., the causal 
surrogate for distal features in the environment, in this case the contours of the sand, the 
size, shape and placement of the pebbles etc). What guides the complex behaviour in this 
case is the mechanisms of the internal (brainbound) cognitive system.15 
 
In contrast to the internalist’s brain centred account of cognition is one in which the 
cognitive system includes not only the brain, but the body and world and their tripartite 
interaction. The complexity of the behaviour is explained in terms of this interaction, not 
                                                 
15. It is worth noting the strong parallels with many current accounts of moral cognition, in that what 
guides the agent’s moral response is an internal set of predefined rules, principles, or responses – 
behavioural complexity is essentially determined from the inside.   
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solely by the internal states of the agent’s brain. In the case of the ant walking on the 
beach, the complexity of the behaviour is due to the real-time interaction (close coupling) 
between ant and beach; the complexity of the beach surface matters for our explanation 
(Haugeland 1998b). The explanation cannot involve solely the ant, but requires an 
account of the dynamic, real-time interaction between both ant and environment. “If ... 
there is constant close coupling between the ant and the details of the beach surface, and 
if this coupling is crucial in determining the actual path, then, for purposes of understanding 
that path, the ant and the beach must be regarded more as an integrated unit than as a pair 
of distinct components” (Haugeland 1998b:217, italics added). In this way we treat the 
details of the body and world and their interaction as part of the explanation for the 
system. Note also, by shifting the focus onto real-time agent-environment interaction we 
reduce the heavy reliance on internal representational structures. The ant need not have a 
full representation of the beach because the real-time interaction uses the world as its own 
best model with problems to be solved in real-time as they arise (Brooks 1991). We see 
more pronounced examples of cognitive integration in the real-time, adaptively complex 
skilled use of tools explained below. 
 
By treating the body and world as the inputs and outputs of the cognitive system, the 
individualist explanation fails to capture an important facet of cognition, namely that 
much of the complexity of our cognitive system resides not in the internal make-up of 
the brainbound system but in the dynamic and contingent interplay between brain, body, 
and world. Complexity is often external to our neurological structures, and importantly, 
this complexity is often part of our cognitive system. This is not to say that all and every 
cognitive process involves such dynamic interplay. One of the trends in evolution has 
been to internalise cognitive resources in a manner which allows adaptive cognitive 
behaviours to operate in multiple, varying environments – internalised cognitive 
processes can be both portable and adaptive. Kim Sterelny suggests that one factor 
driving the move to an internalised cognition is that external resources are disruptable 
and exploitable. By internalising those resources we protect them from corruption (2003, 
2004 #401; Clark responds in 2008). Humans, most notably, can decouple their cognitive 
processes from their environments. Cognising of this kind involves decoupled 
representations, which are “registrations of the environment that are relevant to many 
possible aspects of the environment but functionally specific [i.e., tightly coupled] to 
none” (Sterelny 2003:50). So unlike the beach travelling ant, human cognising about 
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beaches and beach associated behaviours can occur independently from real-time 
interaction of the beach. Some cognitions and the states that realise them are therefore 
going to be more internalist in flavour than others. (See Clark’s (1997) discussion on 
‘representation-hungry problems’.) There are some cases in which our explanation is not 
enhanced by “beyond the brain” explanations. But the important point is that sometimes 
more complete explanations will involve recourse to the interplay and close coupling 
between mutually influencing internal and external resources. Much of moral cognition, I 
will later claim, falls into this category.  
 
It is worth looking at a few examples of extended cognition to put this into a human 
context. Take, for example, the oft cited example of the traditional way in which people 
use a pen and paper when engaging in such activities as calculating long division or 
multiplication (Clark 1997, 2008; Giere and Moffatt 2003; Wilson and Clark 2009). When 
trying to work out long divisions that are too complex to solve purely in the head, we 
often rely on pen and paper to complete the process. In doing so, we are using written 
symbols (numbers) as external representations. Through the use of the pen and paper we 
can manipulate these representations. The process by which we complete the calculation 
involves the coordinated integration of brain, body, and world. It is the entire system that 
completes the cognitive task in this manner, not the isolated brain, and in this way 
cognition is distributed over all three interacting components.  
 
Kirsh and Maglio (1994; see also Maglio, Matlock et al. 1999; Clark and Chalmers 1998; 
Clark 2008) present compelling accounts of how we offload computation processing to 
external artefacts to facilitate cognitive tasks. One of their key studies is the computer 
game Tetris. Playing the computer game Tetris involves the manipulation of falling 
geometric shapes. The aim of the game is to manipulate them in such a way that they can 
be arranged to form complete patterns (rows) across the bottom of the screen. This is 
done by rotating and moving the shapes across the screen as they fall. The game is often 
played at high speed and involves real-time, fast perceptual and cognitive performance. 
One would expect that as players gained experienced they would be more precise in their 
play, that is, they ought to make fewer moves to complete the tasks required. But, 
contrary to expectations, Kirsh and Maglio found that the more experienced players 
actually rotate the shapes more than inexperienced players do; they do not always make 
the least number of moves to complete the task. The use of extra rotations actually 
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increases with skill level. They use, what Kirsh and Maglio call, “extra extraneous 
actions” to achieve the task.  
 
Kirsh and Maglio conclude that these extra rotations alter the player’s epistemic 
environment. Rotations on the screen change the information available to the player and 
help the skilled player make decisions about where is best to place the shapes to 
complete the patterns. Rather than work out the required rotations in the head, the more 
experienced players manipulate the shapes on screen, simplifying perceptual 
computations. By incorporating the manipulation of external artefacts into their cognitive 
problem solving routines, skilled Tetris players offload perceptual computation onto their 
environment. Kirsh and Maglio call this type of utilisation of the external environment 
‘epistemic actions’. They improve cognition by reducing memory load, the number of 
steps in the computational task, and the probability of error. They contrast this with 
‘pragmatic’ actions which aim to bring agents closer with their physical goals. The use of 
epistemic actions reduces internal cognitive load by altering the information 
environment, ensuring we can access information as and when we need it. In this way, 
physical manipulations of the environment allow cognitive processing to be offloaded on 
to our environments. As Kirsh and Maglio tell us, “better players use the world better” 
(1994:513).     
 
The individualist may respond that although the agent organises her workspace to 
simplify problems and enhance performance, the internal structures of the human agent 
are still the central organising structures. Human brains have explanatory primacy 
because they are the active ingredient. It is no doubt true that, in such cases, the human 
brain is the central organising structure. Yet, the complete explanation necessarily 
includes the constant but dynamic, mutually influencing information feedback loops 
between agent and Tetris console. The cognitive load is spread over the agent–
environment structure. As Clark and Chalmers (1998) explain, if this extended cognitive 
task were performed within the brain of the agent, we would rightly define it as a 
cognitive task (see also chapter 5). The problem solving itself cannot be readily 
apportioned to computations operating on inner representational structures alone (for 
detailed discussion see Clark 2008). The cognitive system extends into the environment 
and in this way is said to be extended cognition.  
 
Cognition: Embodied and Extended 
 
 
  
97
 
Maglio and Kirsh and colleagues (1999) explore similar uses of external resources as 
integrated cognitive tools in their studies of people playing the game of scrabble. 
Scrabble players typically reorganise the sequence of their letters to more easily identify 
potential words hidden amongst their scrabble tiles. In doing so, the players perform a 
cognitive task by altering their environments. People reorganise physical space to alter 
their epistemic access to information. Players do not have to reorganise the scrabble 
letters in their head because they can physically reorganise them in the world. They 
therefore reduce the demands of internal cognitive processing and increase successful 
task accomplishment by offloading some of the work to the environment. The nature of 
the task is changed from a cognitively demanding internal process into a perceptual one, 
reducing memory demands and allowing the agent to focus on real-time perceptual based 
pattern completion processes. In this way, we incorporate the physical world into our 
adaptive problem-solving routines such that the cognitive system involves the interaction 
of brain, body and world. It is the entire system that achieves the cognitive task, not the 
isolated brain and associated neural system. We often use external resources in similar 
ways to transform the nature of the computational problems we encounter (Clark 1997, 
2001, 2008).   
 
In each of the cases above, focusing on the internal workings of the head will not 
provide the best explanation for the phenomena to be explained. The best explanation is 
that the physical manipulations of the Tetris shapes and the scrabble tiles, and the 
coupling between agent, pen, and paper when doing long division, are integrated 
cognitive resources. Similarly, the best explanation of the path travelled and behaviour of 
the ant involves the close, real-time coupling of the ant and the beach. The claim then, is 
that the traditional theoretical frameworks in which the cognitive sciences operate are 
insufficient to explain the cognitive system as the individualist perspective excludes 
explanatorily significant cognitive elements which are external to the neurobiological 
system. (Clark 1997; Wilson 2000; Chemero and Silberstein 2008).  
 
In the following chapters I will demonstrate that moral cognition is a prime instance of 
this beyond the brain model as it is partly constituted by both bodily and environmental 
resources. The question that will be addressed is “how wide is the locational scope of our 
explanation and what do we include in that explanation?” In the moral case, I believe that 
Cognition: Embodied and Extended 
 
 
  
98
there is a very compelling argument that most of our moral cognition is body based – we 
use our bodies as part of our moral cognitive system (moral cognition is embodied). 
There is also a strong case that some of our moral cognition is extended beyond our 
bodily boundaries (moral cognition is extended). Our explanations of moral cognition 
will therefore involve the integration of factors external to the brain and associated 
neural system. The understanding of moral cognition requires attention to body and 
environment structures, for they are as important to the system as brainbound internal 
structures.  
 
3.4 Cognition is embodied and extended 
 
The theses of embodied and extended cognition are in contrast to the brainbound 
individualism presented earlier. Central to these approaches is the idea that the cognitive 
system is not bound by the spatial limits of the brain and neural system, and the body 
and world play a more intimate role in the processes of cognition (Haugeland 1998b). 
Properties associated with the physical structures through which problem solving is 
implemented are coopted to undertake much of the problem solving itself. Embodiment 
focuses on the way that the body (and its interaction with the world) shapes and 
structures cognition and how the body can be said to be a constituent part of cognition. 
Extended cognition on the other hand focuses on the ways in which environmental 
resources (such as artefacts and representations) shape and structure cognition, and 
therefore how cognition is extended into the world.  
 
Embodied and extended theories of cognition come under the broad theoretical and 
empirical research programme most commonly referred to as Embodied Cognition. The 
Embodied Cognition programme itself is young and diverse, and as yet there is no 
cohesive or unified position on what constitutes embodied cognition (Wilson 2002; 
Ziemke 2003). As such the terminology itself is often used in different ways to signify 
different things. Margaret Wilson (2002) for example has identified six different notions 
of “embodiment”, from those that place specific emphasis on interactions with the 
environment such as “cognition being situated in the world”, through to those that focus 
on the role of bodily experience such as “off-line cognition being body based”. What is 
clear though is that according to embodied cognitive science, it is not enough to ‘look 
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inside’ solely at the mechanisms of the brain and associated neural system to fully 
understand what is going on in cognition. For the mechanisms of the brain are (often) 
deeply causally integrated with what is taking place in the body and environment, to the 
extent that they are an integral part of the problem-solving (i.e., cognitive) system. 
Adaptive success is achieved through the dynamic and reciprocal influences of the 
interactions between mind, body, and world, not (solely) the internal manipulations of 
brainbound processes. In Figure 3.1 we can see the changing understanding of the 
interactions between the nervous system, body and environment. Early understanding is 
clearly individualist, with the focus on the nervous system as the generator of adaptive 
behaviours and the sensory-motor systems acting as inputs and outputs. We move away 
from the individualist/internalist view towards one that involves more dynamic and 
reciprocal feedback from body and world. Finally, we see a fully coupled and integrated, 
dynamic brain-body-world system.   
 
 
A) Focus on the nervous system 
as the generator of adaptive 
behaviours. 
B) Sensory and motor inputs 
are processed and transformed 
by the body. 
C) Nervous system and the 
body seen as complementary 
providing constraints and 
opportunities for action. 
D) The functioning of the 
nervous system is affected by 
feedback from both motor 
inputs and environment. 
E) Nervous system embedded 
in the body which is embedded 
in the world. The relations 
between each are closely 
coupled and dynamic. Adaptive 
behaviours emerge from the 
interaction of all three, mutually 
influencing components. (Chiel 
and Beer 1997:554, image as in 
original, text abbreviated from 
original). 
 
Figure 3.1 Changing understanding of the interactions between the nervous 
system, the body, and the environment  
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Both embodied and extended cognitive research programmes take the physical context 
within which cognition occurs to be central to the structures and workings of cognitive 
systems. To be sure, the two programmes are not unrelated. For it is clearly the case that 
that the ways in which our bodies interact with the world depends on the structure of 
that world, and the ways in which we utilise environmental resources depends heavily on 
the nature of our bodily engagement with the world. Brain, body, and world are 
intimately integrated and cognition emerges from this intimacy (Haugeland 1998b). In 
the next two chapters I will look at these issues in more detail and address the ways in 
which moral cognition is both embodied and extended, paying particular attention to 
how a) moral cognition is (often) directed and constrained by the nature of our bodies; 
our bodies structure cognition and do cognitive work, and b) moral cognition is (often) 
distributed throughout our physical and social environments: cognition is extended 
beyond our bodies.   
 
We saw earlier in the chapter that traditional individualistic accounts of cognition 
emphasise the manipulations of symbolic structures that are context-independent, as well 
as action-independent (Clark 2004). In contrast, one of the central themes of the 
Embodied Cognition research programme is that (much of) cognition emerges from the 
physical interaction between agents and their environments such that “the way people 
represent and understand the world around them is directly linked to perception and 
action” (Pecher and Zwaan 2005:3). But this emphasis on perception and action does not 
mean we deny the existence of inner representational structures (although see Thelen and 
Smith 1994). Cognition is not just the appropriate perception-action links. As such, an 
embodied cognitive science need not reject a computational / representational theory of 
the mind (see for example Clark 1997, 2008; Wilson and Clark 2009). However, it does 
transform the nature of many of those representational structures and their role in 
adaptive processes (Smith and Semin 2004). In embodied cognition, the role and nature 
of many representations changes from being abstract and decontextualised to being 
action orientated and situated. Representational structures are seen as action determining 
(Clark 1997). In support of this idea is the growing body of evidence from psychology 
and cognitive science detailing the ways in which sensory-motor systems are involved in 
mental representations (Barsalou 2008; Pecher and Zwaan 2005). Much of this literature 
focuses on the ways in which cognition is partly (or wholly) constituted by sensory-motor 
states and in which active bodily engagement with the world structures and alters our 
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cognitive processes. Cognition is action orientated. We will see in the following chapter 
how moral cognition is embodied in this way.  
 
With this in mind, it is worth highlighting more generally how moral cognition is 
specifically action orientated:     
 
• Morality is normative: morality guides actions. It guides one’s own behaviours as 
well as guiding others’ behaviours. Morality in this way prescribes action. 
 
• Morality is motivational: It is not merely normative, but has a particular motivational 
oomph. There is an intimate (be that either necessary or contingent) connection 
between morality and motivation. Morality motivates us to perform actions.  
 
• The subject matter of morality is action: Moral judgements are made typically about the 
actions of agents or their intention for action. Moral violations are typically 
actions of some kind or another.  
 
• We learn morality through active engagement in the world: We commit moral violations 
and are punished for them, we witness others being punished, and we learn to 
punish others and ourselves. Much of moral learning is through action.  
 
Action is clearly central to moral cognition, which provides reason to believe that it is a 
fitting subject for study under the embodied cognitive research paradigm.  
 
3.5 Embodiment, extension and evolution 
 
It is worth emphasising why this is important with respect to our larger explanatory 
project, the evolution of moral cognition. If moral cognition is an evolutionary 
adaptation then we need to establish where the bounds of moral cognitive systems lie 
and the role of the components within the system in order to establish the targets of 
selection. The evolutionary psychologist has specified that the central determinants of 
cognitive phenotypes are computational processes residing specifically in the head. 
Selection is for internal computation mechanisms (i.e., Darwinian algorithms) that give 
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rise to individual moralities and group moral systems. Phenotypes are brainbound 
psychological processes (e.g., the moral faculty). But, if moral cognition is not 
individualistic, then we have to understand how wide the system is to know what 
structures natural selection is acting upon. As Dawkins makes clear in his book, The 
Extended Phenotype, the spider’s web is in a “very real sense … a temporary functional 
extension of her body” (1982:198), and should rightly be considered part of the 
phenotypic expression of the spider’s genes. In the same way, if cognition is the target of 
selection and is both bodily and environmentally extended, then these mechanisms of 
extension are part of one’s cognitive phenotype. They too will be targets of selection. 
Furthermore, understanding the relationship between internal and external resources is 
important for the relationship between cognition and culture. If the relationship is 
bidirectional and mutually influencing then the aggregative view of culture from the 
individualist’s perspective is mistaken (Wilson 2000). I will address these issues in the 
following chapters.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have looked at how traditional approaches to cognition are typically 
individualistic in nature. The structure of the mind is internal and typically seen as 
independent of the external non-neural body and world. I also detailed how one very 
recent and prominent account of moral cognition and the research paradigm of 
evolutionary psychology are both inherently individualistic. In contrast to individualism, I 
examined the idea that resources external to the brain and organisms can become part of 
our wider cognitive systems. In this way cognition extends beyond the bounds of our 
brain and neural systems. In the following two chapters we will look at how, in the case 
of moral cognition, the body and world play problem solving roles, becoming constituent 
parts of our problem-solving apparatus, and hence part of our moral cognitive system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cognition: Embodied and Extended 
 
 
  
103
3.7 Summary 
 
The previous chapter provided evidence to suggest that moral cognition is not 
underwritten by an innate moral faculty. In this chapter we have looked both at 
traditional accounts of cognition (of which the nativist account in chapter 2 is an 
example) and an alternative account. The main points of interest are as follows:      
 
Traditional accounts of cognition are individualistic, involving brainbound computations 
operating over rich, symbolic or sub-symbolic (amodal) representational structures.  
 
• Individualism makes specific commitments to inner complexity and the roles of 
body and world in cognition. 
 
• The Hauser-Mikhail model of moral cognition and evolutionary psychology are 
individualistic.  
 
• Some recent accounts of cognition maintain that cognitive systems extend into 
both the body and the world. 
 
• Embodied cognition claims that our body and its interaction with the world 
shape, constrain and are part of cognition.  
 
• Extended cognition claims that environmental resources in the world are often 
constituent of our cognitive systems.  
 
The following chapters will demonstrate how moral cognition fits into this alternative 
account of embodied and extended cognition, outlining concrete examples of both 
embodied and extended moral cognition. We will subsequently see, in chapter 6, how this 
has important consequences for an evolutionary account of non-nativist moral cognition.  
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4 
4. The Embodiment of Moral Cognition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Embodied and extended views of cognition challenge many of the traditional notions of 
cognition, including its locational bounds and the structures over which cognitive 
processes operate. In this chapter I will focus on embodied cognition. After presenting 
examples of how cognition can be embodied, I will look at evidence for the embodiment 
of emotional processing and other processes central to moral cognition. We will see that 
our modality-specific neural systems and body structures are constituent parts of moral 
cognition. 
  
4.1 The role of the body in cognition 
 
We experience the world through our bodies and, importantly, also affect the world 
around us through our bodies. In this sense, the body mediates our brain’s interactions 
with the world, and the world’s with our brain. As uncontroversial as these interactions 
may seem, their role in cognition is not. We saw above how traditional accounts of 
cognition view the body as providing the inputs about the world to the computational 
process as well as acting as the effector for our cognitive systems to engage action in the 
world. Cognition is seen as the mechanism(s) that operate between perception and action 
(Clark 1997).  
 
The embodied cognition view is that perception and action are central to, and very often 
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part of, cognition (Clark 1997, 1998, 1999; Wilson 2000; Wilson and Clark 2009; Barsalou 
2008). Our bodily states play important and often essential roles in the operations of our 
cognitive systems, as much of that cognition is partly constituted by our sensory-motor 
systems, body structures and bodily action. There is a growing body of empirical 
evidence detailing how the body plays centrally important roles in cognitive systems, in 
domains as diverse as religious knowledge (Barsalou, Barbey et al. 2005), language 
comprehension (Zwaan, Stanfield et al. 2002), metaphor and folk metaphysics (Lakoff 
and Johnson 1980, 1999), theory of mind (Gallagher 2005; Gallese 2008), and social 
cognition (Semin and Smith 2002; Smith and Semin 2007).   
 
The term embodiment is ambiguous and has been used in numerous different way within 
the embodiment literature (Wilson 2002; Ziemke 2003). I will focus on two prominent 
interpretations. The first is that body structures and states are constituent parts of our 
adaptive problem-solving routines. The second is that neural based modality-specific 
systems play important roles in cognition. (When referring to ‘embodiment’ I will be 
referring to these two types of embodiment.) Whilst these two understandings of 
embodiment are intimately related, their explanatory focus is different: the former 
emphasises the role that the body plays in processing information and transforming 
brain-body-world interactions, the latter on the modality-specific sensory-motor systems 
that mediate much of these interactions and how they are involved in both on-line 
(coupled) and off-line (decoupled) cognitive processes. In both cases, and what is central 
to an embodiment perspective, the role of the body is paramount. Most, if not all, of 
cognition is either partly or wholly constituted by the body’s physical characteristics, 
abilities, and its activities, as well as associated body-based sensory-motor and affective 
systems.  
 
I will now look at some examples of embodiment with specific emphasis on each of 
these two types. With these examples in mind, I will then examine the ways in which the 
body is used in the processing of emotional information. This is centrally important to 
moral cognition because emotional information is a core element of moral cognition.  
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4.2 The embodiment of cognition 
 
There is an increasingly strong case to believe that our bodily structures are deeply 
integrated parts of cognition. In contrast to the linear processing cycle (perception–
cognition–action) of more traditional approaches to cognition, embodied explanations 
emphasise the ways in which output in turn affects inputs. This process is bidirectional 
and dynamic, operating as a form of reciprocal causation (Clark 1997). The role of the 
body and associated sensory-motor structures become central components in the 
cognitive system: “action generates perceptual feedback that, in turn, generates further 
action, so that outward behaviour becomes an important co-contributor to the process, 
including neural processes, that generate further behavioural response” (Barrett, Henzi et 
al. 2008:139). As such, the ways in which our bodies interact with the world and the 
various represented and non-represented properties of our bodies and our sensory-motor 
systems become explanatorily important in understanding cognitive processes.  
 
4.2.1 The body is part of cognition 
 
A useful example of the first type of embodiment is the case of auditory cognition, where 
the dynamic interplay between brain and body is seen as essential to performing the 
cognitive task. Furthermore, we also see the inclusion of non-representational 
components as part of cognition. Larry Shapiro explains:  
 
Generally, larger distances between ears provide greater auditory acuity. But also 
important is the density of the matter between the ears because sounds of varying 
frequencies will behave differently when travelling through a given medium. The 
auditory system incorporates facts about ear distance and head density in its 
processing, but not in a way that requires their symbolic representation. There is no 
need to represent the distance between ears because it is the distance itself – not its 
representations – that creates the opportunity for greater auditory acuity. By 
analogy, a spring scale needn’t represent the compression of the spring in order to 
determine the weight of an object. The compression of the spring tells us directly 
the weight of the object. (2007:340-341) 
 
Deeper analysis gives us an understanding of just how auditory cognising is embodied. 
The role of the auditory system is twofold: to help identify ‘what’ the acoustic stimulus is, 
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and to locate ‘where’ the stimulus came from in the external environment. ‘Where’ 
information processing involves the use of the torso, head and the physical structure of 
the ear (pinna) to filter sound signals (Recanzone 2002). Differences in the amplitudes 
between different frequencies are generated depending on where the sound is located in 
relation to the agent. These interaural differences between auditory inputs via the ears 
(and other bodily structures) provide essential cues in normal sound location processing. 
Many owl species, for example, have asymmetrically placed ears with one ear higher than 
the other to enable greater locational acuity for sounds above or below them. Sounds 
emanating from locations below eye level are louder in the left ear than the right, and the 
opposite is true for sound emanating from locations above eye level. At eye level the 
volume will be the same. This allows greater auditory locational ability in the darkness 
when visibility is very poor and even in cases of complete darkness (Volman and Konishi 
1990; Knudsen and Konishi 1979), a clear example of body structures structuring 
cognitive processing.  
 
Interaural differences, however, are not the only factors important for an explanation of 
auditory localisation, and any explanatory model of auditory cognition that focuses on 
interaural differences alone will be incomplete (Aytekin, Moss et al. 2008). Auditory 
locational cognition also involves incorporating the consequences of motor actions and 
sensory information coordinated with the sampling of auditory space. Voluntary motor 
changes have sensory consequences. If one moves in a particular way relative to the 
sound source, auditory input will change. Through voluntary sensory-motor exploration 
of the spatial and auditory environment, the brain and nervous system can learn the 
contingent relations between spatial and auditory sensory inputs (O'Regan and Noë 
2001). Once these contingencies are acquired, they can be used in auditory localization. 
We can see the necessity of this type of cross-modal sensory-motor coordination when 
we think of the way in which bodily movements need to be coordinated with acoustic 
cues as one walks past a stereo speaker. Any model of auditory locational cognition that 
relies solely on acoustic cues alone will not be able to differentiate between an agent 
walking past the speaker from the speaker moving past the agent. In addition to 
processing interaural differences, navigating auditory space involves integrating and 
coordinating the movements of head and body, as well as feedback from other sensory 
modalities. (For a computational model of this type of sensory-motor integration in the 
learning of sound localisation, see Aytekin and Moss et al. (2008).)  
The Embodiment of Moral Cognition 
 
108
 
We see evidence that auditory locational cognising involves these kind of cross-modal 
feedback loops from the fact that audition is subject to cross-modal illusions. One of the 
most famous is the 'ventriloquist effect', whereby one experiences the illusory location of 
a sound when there is an apparent visible source of that sound, as in the case of the 
ventriloquist’s puppet (Casey 2008). We navigate much of auditory space by integrating 
cross-modal information sources. Under normal circumstances they will synchronise with 
one another (because they typically have the same source), enabling successful location of 
the sound source. But when the input relations between the sound and vision are 
inconsistent, we experience an illusion. After a period of exposure, agents will actually 
recalibrate their integration of the sensory inputs to adopt the new pattern between the 
different modalities (De Gelder and Bertelson 2003). Information in one modality affects 
our perceptions in another. Cross-modal integration of this sort involves brain-body-
world feedback cycles constantly sampling auditory and visual space and adjusting our 
perceptions in those modalities accordingly. 
 
The properties of our bodily structures and associated actions are very much a part of the 
auditory cognitive system and are necessary for successful navigation of the auditory 
domain. Bodily structure and movement constrain auditory cognition as well as provide 
affordances (opportunities for action, i.e., sampling auditory space). This ability arises 
from the entire coordinated system, not from any one specific or isolatable component. 
As such, a complete explanation of the auditory cognitive system necessarily involves an 
account of between-ear distances, head densities, and the like, as well as the coordinated 
effects of head and body movements and the role of other sensory modalities. Auditory 
spatial knowledge and auditory information processing is therefore grounded in our 
bodily interactions with the world: auditory cognition is embodied. 
 
One important point to be taken from the Shapiro passage cited earlier is the way in 
which non-representational components are part of the explanation of the wider 
cognitive system – it is not the case that the physical structures (head density, pinna 
structure etc) are necessarily represented internally. They are non-representational 
components of the cognitive system that play important information processing roles. 
Importantly, they reduce the internal computational load placed on a brainbound 
neurological system by changing the nature of the brain-body-environment interface and 
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therefore the routines required to sample acoustic space. This is not to deny that 
computational processing occurs. What is important, in considering them part of the 
cognitive system, is that these non-representational, non-represented resources are 
appropriately situated in what Wilson and Clark describe as an “ongoing web of 
computational activity” (2009). In the case of auditory cognition, those body structures 
are suitably located within the dynamic information processing feedback loops between 
brain, body and world. This kind of adaptive problem-solving is not a case of ‘input → 
cognition → output’, but one of integrated, dynamic, reciprocally influencing feedback 
cycles between brain, body, and world, involving representational and non-
representational structures, across multiple modalities. Bodily structures are a central and 
integrated part of our problem-solving routines to the extent that those bodily structures 
are part of the cognitive system. 
 
The second interpretation of embodiment focuses on the ways in which modality-
specific neural systems are a central part of the representational architecture of much 
(some claim all) of our cognitive processing. As we will see, this is relevant to embodied 
moral cognition. We saw earlier how traditional accounts view higher-cognition as 
algorithmic processes operating on amodal representational structures. In contrast to this 
is the view that many representational structures involved in these processes are modal-
specific.1 Embodied cognition claims that our conceptual systems are not functionally 
separate from our sensory-motor systems.  
 
Some recent accounts of embodied cognition claim that when we experience situations, 
the sensory-motor states elicited by that situation are captured in modality-specific 
representational systems (for an overview see Barsalou 2008). When we experience a cat 
for example, the (online) sensory-motor experience is captured and stored in neural 
regions as patterns across multiple modalities (such as the visual, olfactory, auditory, 
proprioceptive, and affective). Later, conceptual processing involves the partial re-
enactment of those states in the representation of categories. Subsequent (offline) 
thinking about cats involves the partial reactivation of those patterns, “in a sense partially 
“reliving” experience in its sensory, motor, and introspective modalities” (Winkielman, 
Niedenthal et al. 2008:265). This is what Barsalou and colleagues call ‘simulations’ 
                                                 
1. See for example, Zwan (1999), Prinz (2002), Barsalou (2003), Pecher (2005), Gallagher (2005), 
Niedenthal (2007) and Gallese (2008).  
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(Barsalou 2008; Niedenthal, Barsalou et al. 2005b), or ‘situated models’ (Zwaan 1999). 
Simulations, I will claim below, play an important role in moral cognition and moral 
learning.  
 
Neurological and behavioural studies have provided increasing evidential support for this 
view. Evidence from lesion studies shows that selective damage to particular sensory-
motor regions of the brain has adverse effects in individual categories. For example, 
damage to the neural regions involved in spatial processing afflicts locational knowledge 
abilities. Damage to motor areas often produces corresponding deficits in knowledge of 
manipulable objects such as tools, because manipulable object categories rely on motor 
areas of the brain for processing information. Damage to the somatosensory cortex 
corresponds with difficulties in facial expression recognition, as we use those brain 
regions to simulate facial expressions in others. Damage to somatosensory regions also 
corresponds to an inability to identify others’ emotional states. Adolphs and Damasio 
conclude that the “findings are consistent with the idea that we recognize another 
individual's emotional state by internally generating somatosensory representations that 
simulate how the other individual would feel when displaying a certain facial expression” 
(2000:1). The somatosensory and sensory-motor brain regions are heavily implicated in 
retrieval of category-specific information, strongly suggesting that modality specific 
systems are integral aspects of conceptual processing. (For a review of the above findings 
and discussion see Barsalou 2008). 
 
In conjunction with the neurological evidence, there is a growing body of behavioural 
evidence implicating modality specific systems in our representations of category 
membership. When subjects are asked to verify the properties of concepts, for example, a 
switching cost is observed if those properties are from different modalities. Peecher et al. 
(2003) studied property verification times for various conceptual categories. They found 
that when asked to verify a conceptual property in one modality (such as loud being a 
property of BLENDER) subjects were quicker in making that identification if, in the 
preceding property verification task, they had been asked to identify a conceptual 
property belonging to the same modality (such as rustling being a property of LEAVES). 
They exhibited slower identification times when the preceding conceptual property 
belonged to another modality (such as tart being a property of CRANBERRIES). In 
other words, there is a cost to switching between different modality specific properties of 
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concepts. If different modalities were not involved in conceptual representation (i.e., if 
concepts were represented amodally) then one would not expect to observe any 
switching costs (Pecher, Zeelenberg et al. 2003). This is evidence for the claim that 
modality specific systems are involved in category knowledge (for review see Barsalou 
2003; 2008).    
 
Brain scanning techniques such as fMRI support these conclusions, showing that regions 
of the brain involved in perceptual experience of, and physical interactions with, a 
particular category become active during subsequent processing of category information 
independent of actual experience of the category. Thinking about food activates 
gustatory regions of the brain that are activated when actually experiencing food; thinking 
about tools and sports activates motor centres of the brain; thinking about emotions 
activates limbic regions associated with emotional experience. This is suggestive evidence 
that areas of the brain used in perception and action are also used in the representation 
of conceptual knowledge in off-line (decoupled) processing (Zwaan 1999; Barsalou 
2008). Category representations are (at least partially) encoded in modality specific neural 
regions. Importantly, this means that high-level cognition is not divorced from those 
systems involved in our active engagement with the world: “The way people represent 
and understand the world is directly linked to perception and action” (Pecher and Zwaan 
2005:3). 
 
This kind of explanation is important for the purposes of understanding moral cognition. 
It suggests that when we engage in off-line moral thinking we simulate situations, thereby 
engaging sensory-motor systems. When we think about moral dilemmas such as trolley 
bus problems, spare part surgeons, or the moral betrayal of a friend, we are partially 
reactivating those regions of the brain that we would employ as if we were actually there, 
in a sense, vicariously simulating the experience. Of course, simulation does not mean 
that we necessarily consciously visualise or re-create the experience (although in most 
moral dilemmas I suggest we do), any more than simulation theory in folk psychology 
necessitates that we consciously recreate other people’s first person experiences. There is 
a difference between simulation and imagination, but in both cases we employ cognitive 
resources that we normally use on-line, in off-line cognitive tasks.  
 
 
The Embodiment of Moral Cognition 
 
112
 
There is some debate as to the extent of embodiment and whether embodied conceptual 
systems can characterise all conceptual knowledge and conceptual processing (see for 
example Machery 2007, 2006). However, this need not concern us here. I claim only that 
much of our moral cognition is embodied. Some of our more abstract thought processes 
may not involve sensory-motor systems.2  
 
In the following pages we will see that embodiment has some important consequences 
for moral cognition. But first I will focus on emotional embodiment. There are two 
reasons for this. Firstly, emotions are an excellent study of embodiment. Our emotional 
systems (typically) involve bodily effects (see Box 4.1). The perception and use of 
emotional information involves body states and associated neural structures. There is a 
rapidly growing body of empirical work detailing the role of body-based effects in 
emotional processing, but comparatively little specifically addressing the various roles of 
the body in moral cognising. There is, however, research detailing the effects of emotions 
on moral cognising. This brings us to the second reason: emotions are central to much (if 
not all) of moral cognition. In chapter 2 we saw that emotions were a central tool in early 
moral learning. There is also strong support for the view that emotions are heavily 
involved in many aspects of moral cognition.3 If processing emotional information 
involves body states, and if moral cognition involves processing emotional information, 
then we have good reason to think that moral cognition also involves the use of body 
states and associated neural mechanisms.4 The embodiment of emotion therefore has 
particular relevance to embodied moral cognition. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2. See Barsalou (2005) for ways in which abstract concepts (such as mathematical concepts) might be 
constituted by modality-specific systems. 
3. See for example: Greene et al. (2001; 2002), Haidt et al. (2001, 2003; 2005), Nichols (2002a, 2004), 
Joyce (2006), Prinz (2006, 2007) and Moll et al. (2008) 
4. One recent example of a body-based (embodied) account of moral cognition specifically focusing on 
the role of emotions is that from Jesse Prinz (2005, 2006; 2007). Prinz has detailed an account of how 
moral concepts such as “good” and “bad” are grounded in bodily based emotional states. Prinz argues that 
emotions are perceptions of ones own bodily changes in relation to our perceptions of the world. Moral 
concepts are dispositions to experience differing emotions in different situations. What unifies moral 
concepts across various situations are the emotions that they elicit in us.  
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Box 4.1 Theories of emotion and embodiment  
There is by no means a consensus on what exactly emotions are. There are numerous 
theories and much of the debate has centred on whether emotions are “cognitive-
appraisals”, “body-based”, or some hybrid of the two. Cognitive-appraisal accounts hold 
that what is central to emotions is that they involve particular types of cognitions, 
namely propositional attitudes (de Sousa 2008). While various cognitive-appraisal 
theories differ as to whether somatic components are necessary parts of emotions, they 
share the view that cognitive aspects of emotions are distinguishable from somatic or 
bodily aspects – what Prinz (2004) calls the disembodiment hypothesis. Emotions are 
disembodied and our bodily reactions typically occur after the cognitive-appraisal 
emotional system has been engaged. When we judge that a situation is fearful, the 
cognitive judgement itself is central to the emotion, and any bodily reactions 
contingently follow from that appraisal.  
In contrast, body-based accounts emphasise the role of body states as constituent 
parts of emotions. Emotions are perceptions of changes in our body states (see for 
example Damasio 1994 (2005)). Hybrid theories of emotions bring together various 
aspects of the two theories (see for example Morris (2002), Thagard (2005; 2008) and 
Prinz (2004)).  
On the face of it, body-based and hybrid accounts of emotions appear to be more 
amenable to embodied accounts of cognition because they view the body as being 
(partly) constitutive of emotions. If this is true, and if emotions are part of our cognitive 
system, then the body is also part of our cognitive system. Cognitive-appraisal theories 
of emotion on the other hand do not obviously lend themselves to embodied theories 
of cognition. Yet we can make the claim that cognitive-appraisal theories of emotions 
are consistent with embodied accounts of cognition. The connection between cognitive-
appraisal and bodily effects may be a contingent one, but the fact is that when we 
experience emotion we typically exhibit bodily effects, such as increased heart rate and 
heightened sensory awareness. In other words, emotions (typically) have bodily effects 
whether or not those effects are in some way or other constituent of the emotion (as in 
body-based accounts) or derivative effects of the emotions (as in cognitive-appraisal 
accounts). From an embodiment perspective, what is important is the role these body-
based effects play in the brain, body, world feedback loops. So, even from the cognitive-
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appraisal account of emotions where body states are not necessarily constituent of 
emotion, what is important is that those body states are involved in the brain-body 
feedback loops. The bodily effects of emotions play an essential element in the normal 
functioning of emotions in organising our lives. Those bodily effects, whether part of 
the emotion proper or not, are part of our wider cognitive systems. We look for this 
evidence in the influences the body has in both the processing of emotional information 
and in our wider cognitive systems (Niedenthal, Barsalou et al. 2005b).  
 
4.3 Emotional embodiment 
 
There are two aspects of emotional embodiment that I would like to look at. The first is 
evidence that emotional processing (i.e., the perception and use of emotional 
information) involves the use of the body (see Niedenthal, Barsalou et al. 2005b). Here 
we see that body states and associated modality-specific neural systems are intimately 
related to the perception and use of emotional information. The second is the way in 
which those body-based effects are integrated into our wider cognitive, and in particular 
moral, systems. If cognition involves reciprocal feedback from the body, then those 
bodily manifestations associated with emotional processing will have cognitively 
significant causal effects. Note that it is not enough that they have causal effects on one’s 
cognitive system, but they have the right kind of causal effects. Seeing my cat may cause me 
to think of cats in general, or to consider the last time I fed him, but that does not mean 
that my cat is part of my cognitive system. The right kind of causal effects are those in 
which the processing of information is deeply integrated into our problem solving 
routines. Emotions elicited both in oneself and our sensitivity to the emotional displays 
of others directly change the way in which we perceive, interact with, and ultimately 
understand many of the adaptive problems that confront us.  
 
4.3.1 Emotional processing involves body states 
 
We are all familiar with many of the bodily accompaniments of emotional activity. When 
we experience anger we may clench our fists, raise our voice, and our face becomes 
flushed with blood. We may even be compelled to exact violence. When we experience 
disgust, we will often react by screwing up our face and turning away from the offending 
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medium; we may sometimes experience an involuntary gag reflex and on occasion vomit. 
It would appear that emotional episodes often involve body states, although it is not 
always the case that bodily manifestations of emotional episodes are themselves 
externally observable. Sometimes we manage to suppress or inhibit those bodily 
expressions, such as in the case of culturally specific "display rules" which can override 
the pattern of emotional expression. For example, when Japanese subjects were shown 
unpleasant film footage they were found to mask their previously displayed facial 
expressions of negative emotions when in the presence of authority figures, whereas 
American subjects did not mask their expressions (Ekman, Liebert et al. 1972). In the 
case of self referential emotional episodes, such as guilt and shame we may not have 
observable bodily manifestations at all.5 But it is certainly the case that there is something 
quite distinctive about what it feels like to have guilt or shame. Believing that you have 
done something wrong will, for normal people, elicit states quite distinctive from having 
say, the belief that ‘a square is a polygon that has four equal sides’. Much of this 
distinction is body-based. Emotional episodes are associated with typical body effects, 
even if those effects are non-observable. The question is whether those bodily effects are 
part of the processing of emotional information.  
 
Body states are resources with which we can understand others. Witnessing someone 
stub their toe elicits strong motor responses in the observer, to the effect that it is near 
impossible not to wince or react in some bodily way. This ‘vicarious experiencing’ 
suggests that much of our representational knowledge is stored in our modality-specific 
systems, such as our sensory-motor systems. Our body-based systems also enable the 
interpretation of emotional states of others. When we experience emotional events 
ourselves, our “sensory-motor and affective states that are triggered during the encounter 
with an emotion-eliciting stimulus… are captured and stored in modality-specific 
association areas” (Winkielman, Niedenthal et al. 2008:265). Those modality-specific 
association areas are reactivated on encountering similar states in ourselves or others. 
Witnessing someone stubbing their toe activates those sensory-motor systems and 
                                                 
5. Although Robert Frank (1988), for one, thinks that there are externally observable bodily 
manifestations of guilt: diverting ones eyes from another’s gaze and blushing (pp.126-127). Frank thinks 
that these are signalling mechanisms, they signal that one is moral because moral people feel guilt, whereas 
immoral and amoral people don’t. Therefore it is better to deal with someone who shows they have the 
capacity to feel guilt (and hence more likely a moral person) than with someone who doesn’t: “being 
known to have the capacity to feel guilt would make someone an attractive partner for ventures that 
require trust.” (1988:132). For an argument against the claim that guilt has observable bodily expressions 
see Prinz  (2004). (See also Keltner 1996.) 
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thereby the toe stubbing knowledge stored in those association areas. Thinking about 
emotions and interpreting others emotional episodes similarly involves the partial 
reactivation of those modality-specific, sensory-motor systems (Niedenthal, Barsalou et 
al. 2005a; Winkielman, Niedenthal et al. 2008). In this way our own experiences of 
emotional stimuli help to construct the relevant knowledge structures used in the future 
understanding of the emotional states of other agents.  
 
There is evidence for a close link between others’ body states and our understanding of 
their emotional states (Niedenthal, Barsalou et al. 2005a; Niedenthal, Barsalou et al. 
2005b; Niedenthal 2007; Winkielman, Niedenthal et al. 2008). Charles Darwin's (1872) 
famous cross-cultural research on the facial expressions of emotions provides evidence 
for the connection between bodily states and emotional processing. Darwin collated the 
results of questionnaires sent to Englishmen located throughout the world, asking them 
to report on the emotional expressions of the indigenous people. From the results, he 
concluded that “the same states of mind is expressed throughout the world with 
remarkable uniformity …” (Darwin 1872; as reported in Ekman 1999:302, see also 
Ekman for discussion). People, according to Darwin’s results, can reliably identify 
emotions from facial (bodily) displays. Although the scientific methodology of Darwin's 
experiment was questionable, the results strongly suggest that we use the bodily states of 
others to process emotional information. In more recent times and with more scientific 
rigour, Paul Ekman and many others have conducted numerous experiments further 
investigating the relationships between emotions and facial expression. In what has 
become a rather famous experiment, Ekman and colleagues presented the preliterate 
Fore people from Papua New Guinea with emotion-inducing vignettes. He then 
presented them with a series of pictures displaying facial expressions associated with 
different emotions. The subjects consistently picked the same facial expressions 
corresponding to emotional states in the vignettes as those picked by Western subjects 
(Ekman and Friesen 1971; Ekman 1999; Keltner and Ekman 2000). Ekman also asked 
the Fore people to display how their own faces would look should what happened in the 
vignettes also happen to them. He filmed their facial expressions and showed them to 
American university students who correctly identified their facial expression with the 
emotion that was intended (Ekman and Friesen 1971). Here we have prima facie 
evidence that we use perception of the body states of others to process emotional 
information about them.  
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But visually recognising someone’s emotional state from their body state is not enough 
to establish that one’s own body states are used in processing emotional information. All 
it tells us is that we have knowledge of what facial expressions (body states) match which 
emotion. Further research does however show our own body states are used to interpret 
the emotional states of others. When we witness the body states of others, we often 
unconsciously mimic those states and in doing so vicariously experience those same 
states ourselves. (Often referred to as the Chameleon Effect (Chartrand and Bargh 
1999)). Seeing happy people smiling, for example, induces positive feelings, whereas 
seeing people frowning induces negative feelings. In this way, mimicking others’ facial 
expressions plays a role in the processing of emotional stimuli and our responses to 
them. When asked to identify the emotional expressions displayed in photographs of 
other people, it has been found that subjects not only mimic the facial expressions that 
they are asked to identify, but that the more they mimic them the more accurate they 
were at identifying the expression (Wallbott 1991; Niedenthal, Barsalou et al. 2005a). 
Furthermore, when mimicking is inhibited, rapid identification of emotional states is 
often diminished (Stel and Knippenberg 2008).6 This strongly suggests that physical body 
states (in this case, facial muscles) play a role in the identification of the emotional states 
of others. Like in the case of hearing, it is the smile-routine, not its amodal 
representation, that plays a role. It is not a straightforward ‘perception → cognition → 
action’ sequence involving computations over amodal representations, but is best seen as 
involving a brain-body feedback loop: when we witness facial expressions we 
automatically and unconsciously mimic those facial expressions, and in doing so we get 
information feedback from our motor and somatosensory systems about the other 
person’s emotional state. Our bodies are involved in processing information in the 
perception and understanding of others’ emotional states. (Niedenthal, Barsalou et al. 
2005a; Niedenthal, Barsalou et al. 2005b; Niedenthal 2007; Winkielman, Niedenthal et al. 
2008).  
 
Further evidence from neuroscience that the inhibition of somatosensory structures 
influences the perception and understanding of emotional stimuli supports this view 
(Winkielman, Niedenthal et al. 2008). Research shows that damage to the somatosensory 
                                                 
6. Interestingly this effect is noticed in women and not men. The authors suggest this is because 
women have been shown to be more facially expressive than men and therefore facial feedback plays a 
more significant role in emotional information processing in women (Stel and Knippenberg 2008).   
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systems produces deficits in the processing of emotional information (Damasio, 
Grabowski et al. 2000; Adolphs 2002; Niedenthal, Barsalou et al. 2005b). Patients who 
had suffered lesions to the somatosensory-related cortices displayed impaired abilities in 
identifying typical facial expressions of six basic emotions: happiness, surprise, fear, 
anger, disgust, and sadness (Adolphs, Damasio et al. 2000; Adolphs 2002). From their 
studies Ralph Adolphs, Hannah Damasio and colleagues conclude that “recognizing 
emotion in another person engages somatosensory representations that may simulate 
how one would feel if making the facial expression shown in the stimulus” (2000:2683). 
Emotional knowledge is (in part) stored via somatosensory representational structures, 
i.e., modal representations as opposed to amodal representations. It is the reactivation of 
these structures that delivers the requisite knowledge to interpret the emotional states of 
others. As was described earlier, during perception, action and introspection the brain 
captures modality specific states. When required the brain recalls that knowledge through 
the partial reactivation of those states (see Niedenthal 2007). 
 
The evidence outlined above indicates that both actual body states and somatosensory 
and motor states are used in the processing of emotional information – the cognitive 
system involves feedback from these states in our interactions with the social world.7 
(For more evidence and discussion see Niedenthal, Barsalou et al. 2005a; Niedenthal, 
Barsalou et al. 2005b; Niedenthal 2007; Winkielman, Niedenthal et al. 2008). The many 
ways in which bodily structures and modality-specific systems are part of cognition 
undermines the traditional account of cognition presented earlier. I will now look at the 
claim that emotional processing is integrated into cognitive systems, notably moral 
cognition.  
 
4.3.2 Emotional processing is integrated into our wider cognitive 
systems  
 
The perception and understanding of emotional stimuli involves active engagement of 
bodily and modal-specific resources that play an important role in providing information 
about the stimulus. Furthermore, embodied emotional processing is integrated into the 
adaptive problem-solving routines involved in the navigation of our physical and social 
                                                 
7. Whether or not amodal representations are involved is an open question, but this evidence strongly 
indicates that modal specific structures are used in the processing of emotional information. 
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environments. These body-based mechanisms do this by altering our perceptions of the 
world, providing information about stimulus and motivating action. 
 
Antonio Damasio presents compelling evidence that emotions play critical roles in our 
judgements and decision-making processes (Damasio 1994 (2005); see also 
Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1998). When particular emotional capacities are absent or 
inhibited, decision-making abilities are correspondingly compromised. Damasio’s famous 
case study is that of Phineas Gage, a railroad worker who suffered a traumatic brain 
injury to his frontal lobes. Gage was transformed from what was, by all accounts, a 
normal, likeable individual to one with “nefarious personality traits … he no longer 
showed respect for social convention; ethics in the broad sense of the term, were 
violated; the decisions he made did not take into account his best interest … he was 
given to invent tales … [and there] was no evidence of concern about his future, no sign 
of forethought” (Damasio 1994 (2005):11). Damage to the language and motor areas of 
the brain were spared in the accident, allowing Gage to maintain many other aspects of 
normal neuropsychological function. The damage was mainly confined to the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortices, which are involved in emotional processing and control. 
Emotions are required, concluded Damasio and colleagues, for normal reasoning, 
rational decision-making and behaviour (Damasio 1994 (2005); Damasio, Tranel et al. 
1990). “The action of biological drives, body states, and emotions may be an 
indispensable foundation for rationality…. Rationality is probably shaped and modulated 
by body signals, even as it performs the most sublime distinctions and acts accordingly” 
(Damasio 1994 (2005):200). Here we have evidence that emotions are deeply integrated 
cognitive resources providing adaptive problem-solving opportunities that are not clearly 
available through other, non-emotionally driven, means.  
 
We can see more evidence of this from the situational manipulation of emotions in 
normal patients and how they influence and alter the judgements we make about the 
world. Lerner and Keltner (2001) detailed some of the ways in which emotions can alter 
evaluative judgements. Looking at the impact fear and anger have on risk perception, 
they found that they have the opposite effect on some of the evaluations we make. 
Experimentally induced fear caused subjects to make pessimistic judgements and choices 
with respect to risk perception, appraisals of certainty, and appraisals of control. In the 
case of experimentally induced anger, subjects made relatively optimistic judgements and 
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choices. Evidence that specific emotions shape our judgements and the choices we make, 
again suggests that emotions are integrated into our cognitive processes. To reach this 
conclusion, however, we need further evidence that the bodily aspects of emotions are 
causally efficacious in our cognitions, rather than mere action-inducing outputs (cf. the 
‘post-moral faculty’ role of emotions in the Hauser-Mikhail model of moral cognition). 
In other words, it is not enough to show that emotions matter; they must matter because 
they are embodied. 
 
One way that bodily aspects do matter is by imparting an “affective tonality” (Gallagher 
2005:201) to situations or stimuli.8 In this way emotions impart a particular ‘what it is 
likeness’ to experience.9 Emotional experience has a phenomenology, and this 
phenomenology plays a causal role in our problem-solving routines by changing our 
experience of the world and thereby our actions within the world. The absence or 
disruption of this tonality changes the way in which we think about, and act within, the 
world. Sufferers of Capgras’ syndrome, for example, display a reduced emotional 
response to a specific category, faces, while still maintaining a normal emotional life in 
most other respects. For the majority of Capgras sufferers, the syndrome manifests in 
regarding those who are close to them as impostors. Neuroscientist V.M. Ramachandran 
describes the response of a patient with Capgras’ syndrome when asked about the 
patient’s father: “No, no, doctor. That guy isn’t my father. He just looks like him. He’s—
what do you call it?—an impostor, I guess. But I don’t think he means any harm” 
(1998:159). One way to interpret these results is that, as Ramachandran argues, Capgras’ 
syndrome delusions are caused by a disconnection between the areas of the brain 
associated with facial recognition and emotional processing. Capgras patients fail to 
experience “the “glow” or sense of familiarity associated with a known face and set of 
memories”, even though their visual recognition system is in tact. Sufferers show lower 
sympathetic nervous system activation (as shown by the Skin Conductance Response test 
(Ellis, Young et al. 1997)) in these familiarity tests – their body-based systems do not 
respond to the stimulus. However, Capgras patients can make normal emotional 
                                                 
8. Similarly, Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis maintains that bodily feelings are connected 
representations of situations or stimuli (1994 (2005)). 
9. There is some debate as to whether or not one can have unconscious emotions. I am only arguing 
though, that the phenomenology of emotions is one of the many ways in which emotions alter our cognitions.  
It may be the case that some emotions are indeed unconscious, but I think it is fair to claim that ‘most’ of 
our emotional reactions typically have a phenomenology and that this phenomenology influences the way 
we perceive and interact with the world – especially in the moral case. 
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categorisations in non-visual domains. They do, for example, get the emotional “glow” 
and correctly identify familiar people on the telephone. Sufferers identify the impostor as 
looking identical to the person they know; they recognise the person. But they do not feel 
familiar, so they reason that the person must be an impostor (Ramachandran and 
Blakeslee 1998:170). It appears that Capgras sufferers fail to make the connection 
between visual stimulus and bodily response. 
 
Cases such as this indicate that when we do not have access to the correct body-based 
feedback there is a change in our problem-solving abilities. Here we see bodily states and 
somatosensory regions providing information about stimuli or situations. Feeling fear, 
for example, typically makes people judge events as being more “uncertain”. Feeling 
sadness at the death of a friend provides us with information about the value of the 
relationship between oneself and the friend and subsequent loss. Feeling sorrow at 
someone crying informs us of the emotional state of another. Jesse Prinz furthers this 
argument by claiming that the primary role of emotions is to carry information about 
relations to one’s well-being, or “core relational themes”. Emotions in this sense provide 
us with information about our relations with the world (Prinz 2004). Viewing emotions 
through this lens, we can see that in the case of the Capgras sufferers, the disconnect 
with embodied responses results in a failure to provide important information about the 
relationship between the sufferer and those close to him. The body-based ‘feel’ of 
emotions provide us with information about our relationships with the world, 
information that is central to our wider cognitive processing required for successful 
navigation of our social world (Damasio 1994 (2005)). Body-based aspects of emotional 
processing are integrated into our adaptive problem-solving routines.  
 
So far we have seen that processing emotional information involves body states and 
modality-specific systems. We can also expand this to moral cognition. If the processing 
of emotional information is used in moral cognising, we have reason to believe that body 
states play some role in moral cognition. I will now outline some evidence that emotional 
states and the processing of emotional information is used in moral cognitions. Changes 
in motor and somatosensory resources alter our moral perception, judgements, and 
behaviours. As with the embodiment of emotional processing above, behavioural, 
neuroimaging and lesion studies indicate that bodily states and sensory-motor systems are 
(partly) constitutive of moral cognition.  
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Wheatley and Haidt (2005), for example, show evidence that inducing emotion alters the 
moral judgements that people make. Research participants were hypnotised to experience 
feelings of disgust in response to particular emotionally neural words such as “often” and 
“take”. After being presented with fictional stories (both moral and non-moral) which 
contained the emotionally associated words, the participants were asked to rate the 
behaviours of individuals in the stories along the lines of moral wrongness and disgust. The 
results showed that participants who had been hypnotised to feel negative emotional 
response with respect to the particular words were more likely to rank events as 
“disgusting” or “morally wrong” than non-hypnotised subjects. These results show that 
manipulations of people’s affective states can alter the severity of the moral judgements 
people make. Similar evidence is also found in studies that do not involve hypnosis. In 
these cases, people who are induced to feel disgust (such as sitting in a dirty room) will 
subsequently judge morally ambiguous actions as immoral ones. (S. Schnall et al., 
unpublished, reported in Clore and Huntsinger 2007:394). (For more examples and 
discussion see Schnall and Haidt et al. (2008), Levin (1975), also discussion in Joyce 
(2006) and Prinz (2006).) 
 
This is evidence that disgust responses (and hence embodiment effects) are involved in 
processing moral information (disgust is one of the facial patterns that people mimic). 
But these kinds of results are not confined to the emotion of disgust. Recent work by 
psychologists Piercarlo Valdesolo and David DeSteno (2006), involved inducing positive 
affect in participants by showing them a five minute comedy clip. A control group was 
shown an affectively neutral five minute documentary about a small Spanish village. The 
participants were then asked to judge the appropriateness of the protagonist’s actions in 
both the footbridge (personal) and trolley bus (impersonal) moral dilemmas.10 Subjects 
who had viewed the positive affect film clip were more likely to judge pushing an agent 
off a footbridge (and thereby killing him) to save the lives of five others to be morally 
permissible than the control group who had watched the neutral film clip. There were no 
differences in performance between the two groups in the less emotional impersonal 
dilemma. The authors conclude that these “findings demonstrate that the causal efficacy 
of emotion in guiding moral judgement does not reside solely in responses evoked by the 
                                                 
10. For the original footbridge and trolley dilemma thought experiments upon which Valdesolo and 
DeSteno’s experiments are based, see Judith Thomson (1986). 
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considered dilemma, but also resides in the affective characteristics of the environment” 
(2006:477).  
 
Affective/emotional states causally affect the moral judgements that we make. As in the 
case studies on emotional cognition above, the causal pathway is from induced affective state 
to judgement, not the other way round. In each case, the emotional inducement affected 
judgment as well as behaviour, strongly suggesting that emotional processing is involved 
in the moral cognitive process itself, not solely the behaviour motivating output of the 
process. There is also a growing body of evidence from neuroscience detailing the 
contribution of emotion to moral cognition (Greene, Sommerville et al. 2001; Moll, Zahn 
et al. 2005; Moll, De Oliveira-Souza et al. 2008). Lesion studies support this view. As in 
the case of Phineas Gage, modern day patients who have selective deficits in the 
ventromedial cortex (associated with emotional processing) show deficits in particular 
types of moral cognition, such as an inability to draw the same moral judgements on 
emotionally salient moral dilemmas as normal patients do (Ciaramelli, Muccioli et al. 
2007) (See section 4.5 below).  
 
Recalling the information-bearing role that body states of affect/emotion play in brain-
body feedback loops, we can now see how affect changes the way in which we perceive 
moral stimulus by altering the information that we process about that stimulus (as we saw 
earlier). This occurs even when the affective state is elicited independently of the moral 
stimulus. Recall also the ventriloquist effect observed in auditory locational processing, 
whereby we falsely attribute the sound source because of information from the visual 
perception. It is quite possible that something similar is happening in the cases of 
induced disgust above, whereby we attribute the source of affective inducement to a 
mistaken stimulus.  
 
What is clear is that moral cognition often involves body-based emotional processing and 
when that processing is altered, disrupted or absent, we see corresponding alterations in 
moral cognition. The processing of emotional information involves the use of body 
states. Emotions elicited in ourselves and others are intimately linked to moral cognition 
– our motivations, the judgements we make, the types of morally relevant information we 
attend to; moral cognising involves the processing of emotional information about 
ourselves and others. We can conclude therefore, that moral cognition is embodied. In 
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addition to emotional processing there are many other processes involved in moral 
cognising which are also embodied. I will detail some of those processes now.     
 
4.4 Embodying more than emotions 
 
Body-based effects play a role in non-emotion related cognition. Apparently innocuous 
body movements can affect the evaluations we make. When people hold a pencil in 
between their teeth, thereby forcing them to exhibit a facial pattern similar to that of 
smiling, they report finding cartoons funnier than those whose smile is blocked by 
holding a pencil between their lips (Niedenthal 2007). The furrowing of the brow brings 
about feelings of mental effort. When subjects shake their head they show a higher 
recognition of negative words. Conversely, when subjects nod their heads they show 
higher recognition of positive words (Wells and Petty 1980). Something as simple as the 
type of arm movement that people make when they are shown neutral images (such as 
Chinese ideograms) effects the evaluations that they make about those images (Cacioppo, 
Priester et al. 1993; Priester, Cacioppo et al. 1996). (See also discussion in Smith 2008) 
Often subtle body movements alter our cognising about the world. Even if these effects 
are small, as we will see in chapter 6.5, they can also have important bearing on moral 
evolution.   
 
There is also a wealth of evidence from studies on priming effects. The incidental 
activation of knowledge structures show how many of those structures are based in our 
sensory-motor systems. In one experiment by Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996) subjects 
were presented with groups of randomly ordered words and were asked to construct 
sentences out of them. Some of the groups contained words that were associated with 
elderly stereotypes (such as “wrinkled”, “retired”, “lonely”, “grey”, and “forgetful”) but 
excluded references to slowness. Participants who were subject to the elderly priming 
condition exhibited a slower walking speed after the experiment ‘ended’ than those who 
were subject to the neutral condition. Unconscious activation of the elderly stereotype 
produced embodiment effects associated with that stereotype, showing the embodiment 
effects of social information processing, even in cases where the social stimuli were 
absent. Results like this are very suggestive that the activation of knowledge structures 
involves the activation of motor regions associated with particular knowledge – 
knowledge structures for particular categories are grounded in motor systems and are not 
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purely amodal representational structures. 
 
This is relevant from a moral point of view because many of these embodiment effects 
are important for understanding others. From a very early age we are attuned to the 
bodily actions of other agents. Bodily engagement, such as intention-signalling via hands, 
eyes, and gaze, as well as processes such as emotional contagion, provide a ready source 
of inter-subjective understanding. Shaun Gallagher presents evidence that we undertake 
perception-based understanding of others, in what he calls “body reading” (as opposed 
to “mind reading”) (2005:227). From a very early age infants imitate, they practice and 
improve their matching between their own body states and those they perceive in others. 
As Gallagher explains, the actions of the infant and the perceived actions of others are 
encoded in the same multimodal system. Our sensory-motor systems match those of 
others when we witness the actions of others (Chartrand and Bargh 1999; Barrett, Henzi 
et al. 2008). This matching forms the basis of inter-subjective understanding from the 
level of perceptual and motor systems, diminishing the need for a mentalistic 
“understanding of the intentions and dispositions of other persons” (Gallagher 
2005:227). At this primitive level of understanding, we don’t need to infer the mental 
states behind the actions, because we derive meaning from our perceptions of the actions 
themselves.  
 
The idea of using our own body states to understand others has some strong parallels 
with ‘simulation theory’ found in the theory of mind literature. Simulation theory 
maintains that some of our mindreading tasks can be achieved through the use of our 
cognitive system to simulate the activity of the target agent whose mind we are reading 
(Nichols and Stich 2003). Since our minds are relevantly similar to others, we can use the 
mechanisms of our own minds to understand the minds of others. One of the suggested 
advantages of such an approach is that it reduces the need to have an internally 
represented, rich body of knowledge about the mind, such as that posited by other 
theories of mind reading. The informational requirements are reduced by utilising 
machinery already available for other cognising. This is not to claim that ‘theory of mind’ 
is itself just simulation; many think the evidence points towards some hybrid meld 
between theory-theory and simulation theory (Nichols and Stich 2003; for a slightly 
different take see Gallagher 2005). But, both the evidence that children mimic others 
from a very early age, and the roles that embodiment effects play in cognitive processing, 
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suggest that body-based and sensory-motor mirroring have some role to play in the 
development of intersubjective understanding. (See also Gallese 2008.) 
 
There is also an important role for gesture in communication and thought. Susan Goldin-
Meadow details how gesture operates as a form of communication by providing a 
secondary representational format with which the listener can understand the 
communicator. She suggests that the mimetic and analog nature of gesture allows the 
representation of different types of information from the discrete nature of language. 
Embodied communication allows the communication of different types of information 
to that which can be conveyed in speech. Furthermore, Goldin-Meadow details empirical 
work on ways in which gesture functions as a means to facilitate thought and reduce 
brainbound cognitive load. When gesture is inhibited, for example, people perform more 
slowly on cognitive tasks (Goldin-Meadow 1999; Gallagher 2005). Think of the way that 
pointing at an object reduces the cognitive demands of spoken language, reducing the 
need to articulate to another to look in a certain direction and which object to look at 
and so forth. Gesture is a body-based cognitive tool to convey meaning, draw attention, 
and facilitate thought. Much of communication and thought (including that of moral 
knowledge – see below) is embodied in this way.  
 
Although I have outlined just a small portion of the evidence detailing how many of our 
cognitive functions intimately involve body states, we can start to get a picture of how 
these processes function in the construction of embodied moral knowledge. Much of our 
moral development and execution of moral cognitive processes will involve body-based 
resources. When we moralise acts of harming, for example, we process emotional 
information pertaining to the victims’, as well as our own, responses. The body-based 
displays of victim and caregivers are resources for the communication and understanding 
of the negative consequences of inflicting harm and the motivation to avoid such actions. 
The learning child uses their body-based processes and sensory-motor mirroring systems 
to interpret the intentions of perpetrator and victim, constructing moral knowledge by 
linking actions, consequences, agent responses, and the prohibited nature of certain acts. 
This knowledge is stored, in part, across affective and sensory-motor systems. Although 
the learning process may be slow, the construction of this knowledge can start early, 
prior to even to a command of language, as those various capacities come online. The 
application of this knowledge to moral states of affairs will involve the partial reactivation 
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of those cross-modal knowledge structures. Moral cognition is embodied cognition. 
Below I will examine why these body-based views are important for moral cognition, and 
the relevance of this thesis to the larger project – the evolution of moral cognition. But 
before doing so, I would like to address an important implication of the embodied view, 
namely the ways in which we reason through embodied simulations. 
 
4.5 Moral simulations of moral situations 
 
One feature of embodied cognition is that our modality-specific neural structures are 
central parts of our representational architecture and cognitions. This is in contrast with 
more traditional approaches which view representations as amodal and their associated 
cognitions as functionally separate from the modality-specific systems. The embodied 
approach presented earlier also claims that on-line experiences are captured in modality-
specific states and are re-activated during off-line processing – what proponents of 
embodied cognition call “simulations” (Barsalou 2008) or “situation-models” (Zwaan 
1999). This has important consequences for reasoning about moral dilemmas. Much of 
the time when we engage in off-line moral reasoning or moral-problem solving, we 
engage in the simulation of situations.  
 
The idea of simulating moral scenarios in moral reasoning is intuitively plausible. Ethics 
text books are full of hypothetical moral scenarios and counter scenarios through which 
we can simulate the different sides of various debates. When Peter Singer (1993) asks us 
whether we would ruin an expensive suit to save a drowning boy we can picture 
ourselves in exactly that situation: coming across a small boy drowning in a pond while 
walking along in an expensive suit. In this way the abstract moral dilemmas are presented 
as a quasi-perceptually based problem to be solved, allowing our pattern-completing 
brains to operate independently of real-world stimulus.  
 
Take for example the popular trolley bus problems. Thinking about pushing a fat man 
off a bridge into the path of an oncoming trolley bus will involve simulating that 
situation: a fat man, a bridge, a trolley bus, and the five people that may be saved. It will 
also involve simulating our actions over time and the consequences of our actions. We 
will simulate what it is like to push a fat man off a bridge, or at least imagine approaching 
the fat man to do so. When we think of the spare parts surgeon case, we imagine being a 
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surgeon, or at least observing one, in a room with a patient and a scalpel in the hand 
ready to take the life of the innocent patient to save the lives of others. And importantly 
in these cases, we imagine what it feels like. There is a strong link between imagination 
and affective/emotional states. Imagining dangerous events can induce fear (Vrana, 
Cuthbert et al. 1989), and imagining sexual acts can induce sexual arousal. Our 
evaluations and decisions will therefore depend on, and be influenced by, the various 
sensory-motor knowledge structures and processes that we use in our simulations, such 
as those associated with visual and other perceptual regions, causal reasoning systems, 
belief attribution systems, and limbic systems. Neuroscience lends some support to this 
idea. Disparate and functionally different brain regions are involved when we reason 
about moral dilemmas (Greene and Haidt 2002; Moll, De Oliveira-Souza et al. 2008; 
Moll, Zahn et al. 2005; Young, Cushman et al. 2007). By engaging these different regions 
and associated knowledge structures we simulate “being there”, and it is through this 
embodied simulation we can reason about the moral dilemma. Simulation solves the 
problem by using many of the same resources we would employ “as if” we were actually 
experiencing the situation (Gallese 2008). 
 
 
There are a number of reasons this view is important from a moral perspective: 
  
1) Simulations reduce need for complex, abstract, principles by offloading much of 
the computational work to our sensory-motor systems and body structures.11  
 
2) Simulations explain contextual influences.  
 
3) Simulations have implications for moral learning.  
 
I will look at each of these in turn.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11.  It should be noted that simulations are contested idea. This includes debate over the 
representational resources required for simulations and the types of processes that operate over them.   
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Simulations reduce the need for complex abstract moral principles 
 
Simulations reduce the need for complex, abstract, schematically structured, disembodied 
"moral grammars" that determine the judgements we make. Instead, we reason about 
moral dilemmas by simulating and solving the problems in real-time, as they arise. Think, 
for example, how one reasons about novel hypothetical situations such as the following: 
"While out on a walk in a safari park in Africa you come across a herd of rhino. As you 
move in for a closer look to take some photographs, inexplicably the rhino start to 
charge. Do you a) climb the large tree next to you, b) run away and hope they don't catch 
you, or c) stand still"? Although this is a scenario that (like trolley bus problems and 
spare parts surgeons) is foreign to almost all, I conjecture that we would almost all come 
to the same solution to the problem, without the need for any "when being chased by a 
large angry animal, climb a tree" principle to guide our actions. We can simulate the 
scenario and solve the problem in real time. This will involve bringing together various 
knowledge sources such as a ‘what rhinos look like’, ‘what trees look like’, ‘fear of large, 
fast moving objects’, ‘a desire to not be hurt’, ‘knowledge of rhinos’ tree climbing 
abilities’, ‘causal and consequential reasoning’ and ‘past experiences’. Simulating 
dilemmas transforms the problem into a quasi-perceptual one by offloading some work 
onto sensory-motor systems.  
 
Simulations will involve contextual influences 
 
When people simulate they adopt a particular perspective in the simulation. People tend 
to look up when thinking about skyscrapers and birds and look down when thinking 
about the bottom of a canyon, and they describe the relevant properties from that 
perspective (Barsalou 2003). One feature that research found is that when people 
simulate “being there” they also “infer introspective states likely to arise during these 
interactions” (2003:542). This means that our judgements will depend on the ways in 
which the scenarios are simulated, the ways they are presented, the knowledge we have 
available and how that knowledge is incorporated in those simulations. Particular aspects 
of a situation are made salient through simulation. This helps explain why moral 
judgements are subject to some context dependent effects. We see the influence on our 
moral cognitions of such factors as emotions and mood (Haidt 2001; Greene, Nystrom 
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et al. 2004; Valdesolo and DeSteno 2006), proximity to action (Prinz 2006, 2007), causal 
reasoning (Waldmann and Dieterich 2007), anticipation of consequences (Ciaramelli, 
Muccioli et al. 2007), conflicting moral principles (Nichols 2005; Prinz 2008c), framing 
effects (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008; Nadelhoffer and Feltz 2008), the actor-observer bias 
(Nadelhoffer and Feltz 2008) and group membership (Wohl and Reeder 2004). When we 
simulate what it is like to "be there", the various knowledge structures and reasoning 
processes that we employ will bias and alter the simulations we make. Angry and sad 
people are known to process social information differently and this effects the social 
judgements they make (Bodenhausen et. al. 1994). In heightened states of happiness we 
pay less consideration to the harm of an immoral act (Valdesolo and DeSteno 2006). 
Nadelhoffer and Feltz (2008) show that our moral judgements differ according to 
whether we imagine (simulate) ourselves as the protagonist or an observer. We can see 
these type of effects in how books and movies manipulate sympathy in this way; point of 
view is crucial to where one’s induced sympathies lie. In some cases, knowledge 
structures will override others because they are more salient or motivating (recall Prinz’ 
explanation for the doctrine of double effect and the fact that some acts of killing are 
more prototypical instances of killing than others). Research by Valdesolo (2006) and 
Haidt et al. (2005), presented earlier, shows triggered emotional states (incidental to the 
moral stimulus) bias moral judgement. From a simulation perspective, we can see that 
these states are included in the simulations that one makes, thereby directly biasing the 
simulated experience and hence the judgement made. To understand the judgements we 
make, and the moral reasoning we employ, we must understand the effects embodied 
knowledge has on our reasoning and decision making, the setup and framing effects of 
the dilemma, the perspectives we take and other biases. Our judgements are not (solely) 
due to context independent, abstract moral operatives. 
 
Research by Ciaramelli et al. (2007) gives credence to this view. They compared patients 
with ventromedial damage (a region associated with social and emotional processing 
(Damasio 1994 (2005); Greene, Sommerville et al. 2001; Moll, Zahn et al. 2005)) to 
healthy subjects across a range of moral dilemmas. These included personal moral, 
impersonal moral, and non-moral dilemmas. The difference between the two groups was 
not in the non-moral dilemmas (suggesting no deficits in normal decision making) nor in 
impersonal moral dilemmas. But patients who had suffered damage to their ventromedial 
prefrontal (VM) cortex have a higher than normal tendency to approve emotive personal 
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moral violations. The authors claim this is because the VM patients’ deficit means they 
fail to “anticipate the emotional, self-focused, long-term consequences of their choices” 
(2007:90). Because they cannot predict particular consequences of their actions, they fail 
to see how they will feel about their actions in the future (such as pushing a man to his 
death). Impersonal actions don’t elicit emotional involvement to the same degree (pulling 
a switch in the impersonal case rather than pushing a man to his death in the personal 
case). In contrast, for normal people the emotional consequences of each act will be 
different. Hence the VM patients tend to treat personal moral dilemmas more like 
impersonal moral dilemmas.  
 
Interpreting these results from the perspective of simulation, we can see how, without 
the appropriate emotional processing capacities the, VM patients fail to simulate the 
problem in the manner that normal subjects do. Certain emotional knowledge structures 
are absent form their simulations and therefore their predictions lack normal emotional 
components (such as empathy, regret and guilt). The lack of these emotional knowledge 
structures inhibits sensitivity to the differences between the simulation of personal and 
impersonal moral violations. Jesse Prinz (2007) argues similarly that psychopaths fail to 
differentiate between moral and non-moral violations because they do not have the same 
moral concepts as normal people. According to Prinz, moral concepts are essentially 
emotionally-laden (embodied), and because psychopaths have emotional deficits, they fail 
to have normal moral concepts. The amoral psychopath fails to have access to the 
relevant modality-specific brain regions (i.e., those associated with certain types of 
emotional processing) required to make the conceptual distinction between the moral 
and non-moral norms. Such emotional blindness, according to Prinz, results in moral 
blindness. Recall also that autistic children have difficulty in identifying moral 
transgressions involving lying. In such cases, the inability to simulate the relevant beliefs 
of other agents ‘blinds’ autistic children from making normal moral appraisals in these 
instances.   
 
Simulations in moral learning 
 
It is plausible that many of the non-moral knowledge and capacities that contribute to 
moral cognising are innate. But, as we have seen in chapter 2, we have reason to believe 
that moral knowledge is not innate. This places special importance on moral learning 
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environments in constructing those moral knowledge structures (see chapters 5 and 6). 
The simulation aspect of moral cognising has important implications for moral learning, 
because when we learn, we often simulate. This is especially true when we think of the 
ways in which we can gain knowledge from others, independent of actually experiencing 
an event. A clear example of this is through story telling. When we hear or read a story 
we construct a simulated world involving the characters and relevant details. We may be 
first person participants or third person observers to these simulated events. Through 
simulations (or situated models) we can experience the story and the events that take 
place (Zwaan 1999). Via simulations, children use their own sensory-motor and affective 
systems to experience the narrative as if they were there (Gallese 2008). The relevance to 
moral learning is clear when we consider that children’s fairytales and nursery rhymes are 
full of moral events. These provide exemplars of moral narratives, detailing the causes 
and effects of moral actions as well as the consequences upon the transgressors. By 
creating a simulated world we can experience or witness the events that lead to moral 
violations, learning the various causal narratives of moral transgressions and their 
consequences. This plays an important role in passing on moral knowledge by 
establishing the relevant relations between, for example, sensory-motor and affective 
knowledge, belief attribution and intention that we can recruit later in our interactions 
with the moral world.   
 
4.6 Implications for moral cognition 
 
In the previous chapter we saw one account of moral cognition (that of the moral 
grammarians) that proposes an abstract (amodal), complex, internally represented, 
computational component of moral cognition. This component is autonomous (modular 
and encapsulated) and its operations do not regularly depend on interactions with, and 
feedback from, embodied resources. Further, this functionally autonomous component 
supposedly plays the driving role in moral judgement. In contrast, in this chapter I have 
developed an embodied view of (moral) cognition. The body and modality-specific 
structures are constituent, and functional, parts of cognition. Body-based systems shape 
both online as well as decoupled cognitive processes. Moral cognition (often) involves 
modality-specific structures and body states.  
 
Embodiment effects can be seen in operation from two different perspectives: 1) agent 
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oriented approaches that focus on the roles that the body and sensory-motor structures 
play in an individual agent’s cognitive system and mental life, and 2) at the social level 
where the focus is on how embodied effects and cues contribute to relational functioning 
between agents. Embodiment effects couple agents to each other and their normative 
world, influencing a social relations through emotional attachment, group coordination 
and prosocial behaviours (Smith 2008).  
 
From the perspective of the individual, information processing roles are offloaded onto 
body-based structures, reducing the dependence on internal bodies of rich, complex, 
symbolic, amodal representational knowledge. Our bodies, according to the embodied 
view, do some aspects of moral cognising for us. Body-based responses also focus 
attention towards emotionally salient stimuli, filtering out unnecessary information, 
changing the priority of information processing and overriding other thought processes 
(Lerner and Keltner 2000).12 In this way embodiment effects fundamentally alter our 
individual mental engagements with the world and our evaluations of that world. They 
couple us to features of the environment that are important to us, such as the harm and 
welfare of others that, as we saw in chapter 1, promote adaptive success. We can, for 
example, use our bodies from an early age to help us understand what harm feels like and 
what it must feel like for others to experience it. Our body-based experiences provide 
opportunity for individual understanding and generation of moral knowledge by 
structuring our experiences of the world.  
 
Individual embodiment effects also predispose individuals to respond in particular ways 
to stimuli they encounter. Fear does not just focus attention on big lion-like creatures 
and prioritise cognitions about such creatures; it also motivates us to run or hide from 
them. In the moral domain, empathetic responses not only allow us to detect and focus 
on the suffering of others, but also motivate us to relieve that suffering. Here we see how 
embodiment provides the basis for moral cognitive processes to become collaborative 
through the development of joint goals and norms of behaviour. Embodiment effects 
play a central role in the establishment of social functioning (Barrett, Henzi et al. 2008; 
Barsalou 2008; Smith 2008). This is important from the moral point of view, because 
                                                 
12. By thinking of emotions in this way we can see how the feedback from the body operates as an 
interesting case of ‘epistemic action’ that reduces the processing demands on internal computational 
mechanisms. Recalling that Kirsh and Maglio define epistemic actions as physical actions which extract 
information and alter our information processing routines, making them “easier, faster, or more reliable” 
(Kirsh and Maglio 1994:3). 
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morality is inherently a social enterprise, and navigating the moral world is central to 
one’s adaptive success. The mechanisms that operate upon the individual and the 
relational functioning between individuals are therefore of central importance in any 
explanation of human moral adaptive success. (I will discuss this further in chapter 5.3.)  
 
We see an example of social-level influence in the ways in which we use the body to 
convey morally relevant knowledge and teach children to coordinate their behaviours 
with social-wide moral norms. We use our bodies in the learning and teaching of moral 
concepts, norms, and behaviours. We have already seen in chapter 2 the way that 
emotions and parenting practices bridge the gap between informational input and 
behavioural output in the moral domain. This seriously undermines poverty of the 
stimulus type arguments in favour of moral nativism. (Indeed, embodied approaches to 
cognition in general should force a reconsideration of all poverty of the stimulus type 
arguments about the mind.) An embodied approach to cognition transforms the ways in 
which the learning task should be conceived, from that of a disembodied observer, to 
one of an active and motivated participant in the learning process involving the 
engagement of systems across multiple modalities. Consider the case of childhood moral 
punishment. ‘Telling off’ will often involve the use of emotional displays of victim and 
admonisher, prosodic variations such as raised volume and pitch of voice, gestural 
actions such as finger wagging and pointing to the consequences of actions, hands on 
hips to signal authority, and sometimes physical restraint and or/violence. Consequential 
explanations generate simulations of the causes and consequences of transgressions. 
These embodied communicative tools operate across different modalities to convey 
morally relevant information. It is through our active bodily experiences of our social 
worlds that we learn and construct the moral cognitive abilities and problem-solving 
routines required to navigate the moral world.  
 
Moral culture plays a central role in providing structured environments from which 
children learn. But importantly our embodied dispositions also structure those moral 
environments. By immersing ourselves in moral environments that are themselves largely 
structured about our bodily reactions (Nichols 2002b, 2004), our embodied engagement 
with those environments promotes a reciprocal causation: moral culture exists because 
we have the embodied experiences that we do, but in turn we have the moral capacities 
that we do because we have the moral cultures in which we are immersed. There is an 
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intimate and reciprocal relationship between the development of our moral selves and 
our moral worlds. Embodiment takes on a central role in extending the moral mind, not 
only through the body, but beyond the body, by actively coupling agents to their external 
world.  
 
Clearly this is important form a Darwinian point of view. Moral cognition evolved as a 
solution to adaptive problems of cooperation and social coordination – it is the product 
of natural selection. Yet, in contrast to the evolutionary psychologists’ picture of 
encapsulated, domain-specific, algorithm containing modules that resided in the neural 
architecture of the head, we instead have a picture of dynamic, reciprocally influencing 
processes that are spread over brain, body, and as I will argue in the following chapter, 
world. The target of selection is the patterned and coordinated interactions between 
these three components. Selection is for the entire system, not just the neural system. 
And, as we will see in the following chapter, many components of the moral cognitive 
system reside beyond the organismic bounds of the agent.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
The account of auditory cognition we saw earlier emphasised the way in which it involves 
reciprocal feedback loops between brain, body and world. The structures involved in this 
feedback process do some of the work and are part of the cognitive system. We should 
think of the embodiment of moral cognition in the same way. We are not disembodied 
and dispassionate moralisers who think about morality in a way that is divorced from our 
bodies, nor the effects upon our bodies. The feedback loops between brain, body and 
world are central to the navigation of the moral world. Even moral reasoning is 
embodied, for it uses the very same somatosensory and sensory-motor structures that we 
use in real-world moral action.  
 
The fact that moral cognition is embodied means that many of the central determinants 
and complexity of moral cognition reside beyond the head. Body and environment 
change and shape our interactions with the problem domain, and hence shape the 
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adaptive routines that we employ to solve problems in that domain.13 Moral problem 
solving does not depend solely on the neural system. Furthermore, off-line moral 
problem solving is also embodied. Much of folk moral deliberation, debate and learning 
involve the simulation of moral situations far removed from real-world moral events. In 
simulating we bringing together disparate knowledge structures stored across perceptual, 
affective, motor and introspective states. Simulations transform abstract moral dilemmas 
into quasi-perceptual problems. Embodiment also facilitates the establishment of society-
wide moral systems through the generation of joint goals and norms of behaviour, and 
plays an important role in coupling agents to their moral worlds (I will further explore 
these social roles of embodiment in the next chapter). As I have demonstrated, many of 
the drivers of complex moral behaviours reside outside the brain and neural system (and 
more specifically amodal representational systems). Through the integration and 
offloading of cognitive processing to our body-based structures, those structures become 
constituent parts of that system. The moral cognitive system includes our body.  
 
4.8 Summary 
 
In this chapter we have looked at embodied cognition and the idea that moral cognition 
is embodied – body-based systems are constituent of moral cognition. This has 
important ramifications for the way we view moral cognition and evolutionary accounts 
of cognition.  
 
The main points are as follows:  
 
• Moral cognition involves the use of multi-modal representational structures as 
well as body structures.  
 
• Offloading of moral cognition onto body-based structures reduces the 
computational requirements of a brainbound cognitive system. 
 
                                                 
13. Chiel et al. state we should adopt such a position because the “most important evidence suggesting 
that the nervous system cannot be the exclusive focus for understanding adaptive behaviour is that it 
continuously receives and responds to feedback both from the movements that it induces in its own 
periphery and from the surrounding environment.” (1997:555).  
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• Off-line (decoupled) moral cognitions are also embodied. When we think morally 
in the absence of moral stimulus we make use of modality-specific 
representational structures by way of simulations. 
 
• Embodied moral cognition is situationally dependent. 
 
• Embodiment effects are used in the understanding of others and the formation 
of joint goals of action.  
 
• We have reason to be sceptical of individualist accounts of moral cognition such 
as those proposed by the Hauser-Mikhail model of the moral mind.  
 
In the next chapter we will look at ways in which the moral cognition extends beyond the 
bounds of the body.  
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5 
5. Extending Moral Cognition  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
… there is nothing sacred about skull and skin. 
 
(Clark and Chalmers 1998) 
 
 
In the previous chapter I outlined the ways in which moral cognition is partly constituted 
by the body, concluding that the moral cognitive system is not confined to the head of 
the moral cognisor. I will now explore the various ways in which resources external to the 
body become part of our moral cognitive system and how this cognitive extension 
creates an extended moral space within which we operate. This will provide an 
understanding of how cognitively-extended moral agents are embedded within moral 
worlds and how the structure of those worlds enables the extension of moral cognition. 
This demonstrates the ineliminable role that the environment plays in the realisation of 
much of moral cognition.  
 
5.1 Beyond the organism 
 
Richard Dawkins (1982) famously ‘extended the phenotype’, arguing that genes have 
adaptive phenotypic effects that extend beyond the organism boundary. The spider’s 
web, the beaver’s dam, and the termite’s mound are all examples of phenotypic effects 
that are targets of selection beyond the physical boundaries of the organism. In these 
cases it is not the organism that is the ‘bearer of adaptation’, but the gene’s “adaptive 
effect is outside of the body they inhabit” (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999:75). The 
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explanation for why the spider has genes that code for the making of webs is that the web 
and its fly catching effects are an adaptation for the benefit of the spider’s genes, even 
though the web is physically external to the organism. To restrict the gene’s expression to 
those traits bounded by the physical limits of the organism is, Dawkins argues, arbitrary. 
The organism-bound view of trait expression is inadequate to explain the selection of 
many gene lineages. By recognising that some genetic traits have adaptive effects outside 
of the organism, we have a better explanation for the selection of those genes. The 
positing of extended phenotypes figure in our best explanation of the selection of some 
traits.   
 
Proponents of the extended mind thesis take the notion of extension beyond the organism and 
apply it to cognition.1 Cognition often depends on and incorporates resources external to 
the physical bounds of the agent. For example, Clark and Chalmers (1998) argue that 
external storage devices such as notebooks can, under the right conditions, be integrated 
into an extended memory system. In such cases, the notebook constitutes part of the 
agent’s mind; the mind literally crosses the physical boundaries between organism and 
world.  
 
In the previous chapter, we saw how organism-bound moral cognition incorporates the 
beyond-the-brain body. Body structures are constituent parts of moral cognition. Taking 
this a step further, we will now see how moral cognition is extended cognition through 
the inclusion of external environmental/social structures. These operate to enhance and, 
in some cases, give rise to new, moral cognitive abilities. This is a more substantial claim 
than saying our moral cognitive processes are supported by external structures or that 
those external structures trigger moral cognitive processes. The claim is that moral 
cognition is (sometimes) partly constituted by those physically external structures.  
 
There are two important aspects to this view of the agent-world relationship. The first is 
the way in which moral cognition is extended through the incorporation of physically 
external structures. As with the reciprocally influencing brain-body dynamic of embodied 
cognition, moral cognition often involves a reciprocally influencing agent-world dynamic. 
As moral agents, we are deeply embedded in a world that tracks and controls our moral 
                                                 
1. See for example Clark and Chalmers (1998), Clark (2008), Wilson (2000) and Menary (forthcoming-
a). 
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actions. This world also provides resources with which we can track, control and 
remember the moral behaviours of other agents. Moral cognition is extended through the 
integration of these resources into our moral cognitive processes. We are the moral 
agents we are because we stand in particular relations with our moral worlds.    
 
The second is the creation and nature of the external structure itself. Our moral worlds 
exist because we, as members of that world, are moral agents. The collective behaviours 
of moral agents create our moral worlds by establishing and maintaining social-wide 
moral systems which in turn scaffold both the development and real-time execution of 
extended moral cognitive processes. Here, the collectively created moral world is a 
resource which becomes partly constitutive of individually extended cognition. A useful 
analogy to help understand the relationship between the individual moral agent and their 
moral group is that of the individual termite and the termite colony. Each individual 
termite is able to undertake colony-directed behaviours because the colony itself provides 
the environment and resources required to instantiate those behaviours. Individual 
nutritional needs, for example, are met through the group cultivation of mycelium. In 
turn, the colony exists because of the collective behaviours of the individual termites that 
create the various structures that sustain the colony. In the case of the extended moral 
agent, their extended moral cognition is manifested because of the existence of an 
external moral world that supports the cognitive integration of aspects of that moral 
world. Our moral groups provide the various external resources which we incorporate 
into our extended moral cognition. In turn, that moral world exists and has the various 
dynamics and properties because of the interactive behaviours of agents within those 
groups.2 This view places particular importance on the role of our moral worlds in the 
development and execution of moral cognition. As we will see in the latter stages of this 
chapter, and again in chapter 6, this has implications for an evolutionary point of view 
because of the particular importance of the organism-environment relationship. This 
view is in contrast with evolutionary psychologists and various moral nativists, who claim 
that over long periods of evolutionary time, external environments populate the internal 
psychological mechanisms (modules) – moral cognition is ‘on the inside’. Instead, we will 
see the coevolution of individuals and their moral environments, and the mutually 
                                                 
2. Note, the claim here is not that moral groups are themselves moral cognitive agents, although it is an 
interesting and important issue, especially with respect to such things as individual and group moral 
responsibility, I am, for present purposes, agnostic on this point. The claim that I am making is that certain 
individual moral cognitions are realised in the presence of groups of moral individuals. 
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sustaining dynamic between them.  
 
I will now look at a number of aspects of moral cognitive extension. The first involves 
the ways in which embodiment effects couple agents to other agents as well as to their 
normatively structured world. We live in a mutually coordinating moral community 
structured around our embodied responses. These embodied responses allow agents to 
make use of that world as part of their moral cognitions. The second is the ways in which 
many moral cognitive tasks such as identifying, tracking and remembering others’ moral 
behaviours and reputations are distributed amongst groups. By accessing these external 
moral knowledge structures, much of our moral cognitive work is offloaded to, and 
distributed across, our moral community. The third is how moral norms operate in 
extended moral cognitive systems. Moral norms are public artefacts that we incorporate 
into our moral cognitive processes. And finally, I will examine how moral debate and 
group problem solving creates an adaptive ‘moral space’ within which we operate as 
extended moral agents. I will address each of these in turn, discussing some sceptical 
responses along the way.  
 
Before exploring the idea of moral cognitive extension it is worth highlighting the fact 
that moral cognition requires the use of external resources. As we saw in chapter 1, this 
often involves the tracking and controlling of other agents and, as such, moral cognition 
can be said to be outward looking. As we will see later, we include external structures to 
achieve these outward looking cognitive tasks. 
 
5.2 Moral cognition is also outward looking 
 
Much of moral cognition is to do with self-regulation. Self-referential moral judgements 
such as shame and guilt, for example, are mechanisms that enforce individual moral 
adherence and play a central role in much of morality (Joyce 2006). But, it is also typically 
in one’s interests that other group members adhere to moral standards and a very large 
part of morality deals with other-person moral adherence. For this we have a suite of 
mechanisms by which we track and control the moral behaviour of other agents. These 
additional mechanisms are other directed. Moral cognition is, in this way, often outward 
looking.  
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Anecdotally it seems obvious that we monitor and attempt to control the moral 
behaviours of others and punish them for their moral infractions. We often, for example, 
get angry at people who violate moral norms and we feel they deserve to be punished. 
Think of those who line up outside courthouses to hurl abuse at child murderers. Many 
of those people have never known the victims, nor perhaps were they even part of the 
victim’s immediate community. Such cases illustrate the fact that people will go out of 
their way to punish others at a cost to themselves, even when they are not directly 
affected by the violation itself. There is strong empirical evidence supporting this, and 
that people acting in this way are not doing so for obviously selfish reasons. Fehr and 
Fischbacher et al. (2002) studied the behaviours of people in public goods games. They 
found a significantly large percentage of people reliably punished others for violating 
norms of cooperation, even when punishing the transgressor incurred additional costs. 
Further, subsequent studies by Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) found that people reliably 
punished violations of fair distribution and cooperation norms when they were merely 
observers of the norm violation, and in no way directly affected (in terms of costs or 
benefits) by the violation. People punish others, even at a substantial cost to themselves, 
suggesting they are not acting out of obviously self-interested reasons (see also Bowles 
and Gintis 2003; Sripada and Stich 2005). Attitudes that motivate punishment, revenge, 
and retribution are deeply powerful action generators.  
 
What is clear is that as well as being motivated as individuals to adhere to moral norms, 
we are motivated to ensure that other agents adhere to those same moral norms; we 
think others ought to be moral and we punish those who are not.3 The monitoring and 
controlling of others is therefore centrally important to us as moral agents, both 
psychologically and, as we saw in chapter 1, adaptively. Many of the structures and 
processes that enable the tracking and controlling of other agents are external to the 
physical bounds of the moral agent. We incorporate these external structures into our 
moral cognitions. 
 
Before moving to a more detailed analysis of moral cognitive extension, I will first look 
at the role of embodiment in establishing the close coupling between agents and their 
environments.  
                                                 
3. As we saw in chapter 1, punishment need not be physical. Non-cooperation strategies such as 
ostracism and the threat of ostracism are effective enforcement strategies, placing central importance on 
reputation and gossip as effective mechanisms of cooperative adherence.  
Extending Moral Cognition 
 
143
 
5.3 Embodiment and moral cognitive extension 
 
Extended cognitive systems exist when structures physically external to an organism 
become coupled to the organism. But, it is not enough that they are merely causally 
connected to the organism, they must be “coupled” in the appropriate way. Cognitively 
coupled systems involve mutually influencing causal relations between the components 
of the system. This “continuous reciprocal causation” (Clark 1997) between components 
of the system produces the cognitive behaviour in question. Isolated analysis of singular 
components within the system will fail to adequately explain the behaviour, which 
depends on the coupled system as a whole. When there is appropriate coupling, the 
coupled system provides the supervenience base for the cognitive capacities in question. 
Embodied moral cognition helps to establish the appropriate organism-moral world 
coupling in a number of ways. Firstly, it plays an epistemic role by focusing attention on 
morally relevant aspects of the environment. Secondly, it couples agents with other 
agents. And thirdly, it couples agents with their normative worlds. I will look at each of 
these in turn. 
 
The body-based information processing described in the previous chapter plays an 
epistemic role by focusing attention on morally relevant information in our 
environments. Our embodied information processing and the embodied responses of 
others direct our attention towards the behaviours and responses of other agents and our 
moral worlds. We see this in our responses and attitudes towards moral norms, the moral 
behaviours of other agents, moral reputations and the consequences of actions upon 
others. This epistemic aid is important for picking out the relevant features of our moral 
environments. We care, for example, about moral norms. We not only act in accordance 
with those norms, we try to bring others in line with them – behaviours which are 
underwritten by embodied responses. I will argue below that moral norms operate as 
moral cognitive extensions to track and control other agents. When we couple with 
external normative structures they become resources for cognitive extension. This allows 
the exploitation of, and cognitive offloading onto, that social structure. 
 
Embodiment effects also help to couple individual agents with other moral agents. 
Through this agent-agent coupling we see the establishment of joint intention and 
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coordinated action. In everyday interactions we use our bodies not just to signal to 
others, but to coordinate with others’ actions. We use gesturing as a means of 
communicating information (Goldin-Meadow 1999; Gallagher 2005). We also use our 
bodily actions and cues to manipulate others’ behaviours and cognitive states. We may 
gaze at an object both to signal to another that we are looking at the object, and with the 
intention of getting them to also look at the object. Importantly then, embodied actions 
do not merely alter our own cognitive processes; they also alter other agents’ cognitive 
processes and behaviours (Smith 2008). Our embodied responses become tools by which 
we can (consciously or unconsciously) manipulate others.  
 
An example of this type of manipulation can be seen in the interactions of mother-infant 
dyads (Spurrett and Cowley 2004). Children cry for want of attention, or perhaps to 
signal fear or pain. They cry in order to satisfy their needs and desires. Embodied 
displays such as those associated with crying and the corresponding sensitivities of 
mothers act to link the child and mother, thereby coordinating the mother’s actions with 
the child’s needs and desires, and vice versa. The affective and other embodied actions of 
mother and child are used to alter the cognitive states of each other. This process is 
bidirectional and reciprocal. Mothers respond to the actions and vocalisations of the 
child by augmenting their responses to that of the child, imposing their own normative 
structure and meaning which the child comes to understand and reciprocate. To illustrate 
this embodied reciprocal manipulation, Spurrett and Cowley detail how a four-month-old 
child learns to signals to his mother that he wishes to be picked up:  
 
an infant repeatedly vocalises in ways which to its mother, at least, are suggestive 
of its saying ‘up’. Each time she says ‘up?’, or ‘you want to go up?’ and after a few 
repetitions she lifts the child. Prior to the lifting, there is little evidence that the 
child actually wants to be lifted, or that it has its attention focussed on anything 
in particular, except perhaps its own experiments in vocal control. When it is 
lifted, though, it beams widely. Whatever it did want, if anything, it is now, we 
suggest, one step closer to figuring out how to behave in ways that lead to its 
being lifted up. (2004:456-457) 
 
The mother provides regularity and structure to the child’s environment. As a result, the 
child can learn to exploit that external structure. As the child develops, she learns to use 
the embodied actions involved in lifting as gesturing signals for caregivers to pick them 
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up. Children “raise and flap” their arms – not gestures that adults commonly use – to 
signal their desire to be picked up. The raising of the arms is a “common posture of 
infants while they are in fact being held up” and is interpreted by the mother as being an 
invitation to be lifted (Spurrett and Cowley 2004).  Embodied actions such as these alter 
both the child’s and the mother’s cognitive states. These types of caregiver-child 
interactions are embodied and reciprocal, each imparting physical and emotional 
regularity to obtain joint goals.  
 
This example illustrates how coordinated action arises from the joint attuning of the 
brain-body-world components of dyadic interactions. Importantly, the child is learning 
the norms of interaction and how those norms can be used to support the achievement of 
one’s goals and desires – in this case the goal of being picked up by a caregiver. 
Furthermore, Spurrett and Cowley point out that infants are, “in virtue of affective co-
ordination, able to function as a kind of cognitive extension of their own caregivers, who 
focus their attention, regulate their levels of arousal, reinforce and retard patterns in their 
behaviour, and provide all manner of sources of environmental regularity amenable for 
infant exploitation” (2004:463). Bodily effects are not just communicative resources; they 
are also resources by which we can couple with, manipulate and exploit other agent’s 
cognitions and actions. 
 
In the moral case our embodied interactions work to link actor with perceiver to 
coordinate other agents’ responses: embodied responses elicit patterns of behaviour in 
others. We use our own bodily actions to draw attention, align intentions, and invoke 
joint action towards moral events. Embodied reactions exploit the emotional sensitivities 
of others, so that the responses of others become part of a coordinated response. When 
someone is morally slighted they typically react emotionally and bodily. Moral argument 
is emotionally heated. In such cases our embodied responses can be used to elicit 
embodied responses in others. 
 
From this, we can see that embodied reactions have effects beyond those of the victim of 
the moral violation. We saw in chapter 2 the role that embodiment plays in moral 
categorisation. But the effects of embodiment are involved in more than moral 
categorisation tasks. In terms of the punishment of norm violators, for example, it is not 
that people are solely motivated by the intrinsic normative motivations to punish norm 
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violators (Sripada and Stich 2005), they are also motivated because of the direct emotional 
(embodied) consequences of such norm violations upon the victim of the violation. 
People do not like to see others in pain, sadness, or distress and are motivated to 
respond. The consequences of a moral infraction are not isolated to the victim of the 
infraction; perpetrators may be subject to self-referential guilt and shame, in part, because 
of the responses of the victim. Additionally, third-party observers are upset and they too 
are motivated to act (think of the courthouse protestors mentioned earlier). My distress 
at having my bicycle stolen is transferred to other agents within my immediate group, 
thereby transferring moral upset to others in my community. In turn this motivates 
action not only in me but also in others. Should I be indifferent, my community are 
unlikely to be upset. My suffering begets others’ moral anger and upset in ways that 
coordinate our moral response. Moral information is transferred through embodiment: 
displays of moral indignation, anger and disgust act as signals to the agent committing the 
moral infraction, as well as signals to my group.4 Via this information spread, my 
embodied actions have causal consequences for other agents. In turn, these consequences are 
patterns of action that we can reliably exploit and manipulate as moral agents (see below). These 
response chains allow the establishment of group-wide systems of collective behaviours 
and in this way embodiment facilitates the construction of a moral community of 
embodied agents. 
 
But it is also the case that our moral environments exploit our embodied dispositions. 
Shaun Nichols, for one, has detailed how moral norms, such as those prohibiting harm, 
“gain greater cultural fitness when they prohibit actions that are likely to elicit negative 
affect” (Nichols 2004:138, 2002b). According to Nichols, our emotional sensitivities help 
explain why particular norms are culturally successful because they ‘resonate’ with our 
emotions and therefore have an advantage in cultural evolution. The embodied nature of 
our interactions connects us to moral norms enabling us to use that social world, and the 
social world exploits the embodied nature of those interactions. The relationship 
between moral agent and their world is therefore dynamic and reciprocal: embodied 
agents create and structure the moral world, and in turn we have the moral norms, 
practices, and moral judgments that we do, (in part) because we are embedded within 
                                                 
4. These effects are not only mechanisms of threat and enforcement (partner control) but also displays 
of moral trustworthiness (partner identification) (Frank 1988, 2001). In this way my embodied responses to 
moral situations provide cause for others to adhere to moral norms as well as signals for trustful 
participation in cooperative activity. 
Extending Moral Cognition 
 
147
those moral worlds. These factors work together to strengthen and maintain the mutual 
reciprocal influence and intimacy of the coupling between agents and their moral 
environments. 
 
It is apparent from the examples provided above that embodiment effects play a number 
of important roles in moral cognitive extension. They provide an epistemic resource 
which focuses our attention towards particular aspects of moral worlds. They also play a 
pivotal role in coupling agents with other agents. Through this agent-agent coupling we 
can form joint intentions and actions, which in turn become resources that can be 
exploited and manipulated by moral agents. And finally, embodiment enables the 
construction of normative worlds as a consequence of forming joint intentions and 
actions within groups. The body is not just the medium through which we engage in the 
world, it plays an important role in the establishment of interactive, reciprocal dynamics 
between agents and their moral worlds.  
 
So far, we have seen that embodiment facilitates close coupling between moral agents, as 
well as the normative structure of their moral world. In the next section we will look at 
how our moral cognitive systems extend beyond the reach of the physical boundaries of 
the body by incorporating external resources into our moral problem-solving routines.  
 
5.4 Extending moral cognition 
 
Humans are born to moral worlds and throughout development they learn to interact 
with those worlds. As moral agents they are embedded within, and reciprocally interact 
with, their moral group. This group and its associated moral systems allow the extension 
of moral cognitive systems. What is central are the resources those groups provide for 
extending the moral mind. They provide the external, cultural structures (moral norms, 
gossip, tracking, memory etc) that can be integrated with (to become part of) the 
individual agents’ moral cognitive system. By incorporating features of our moral worlds 
into their moral cognitive routines, the moral agent is able to reduce internal cognitive 
load and attain cognitive abilities that would not arise independently of the group and its 
moral structure.  
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An instructive way of understanding these processes is by looking at the case of extended 
memory. When certain environmental resources are coupled to the mind in the 
appropriate way they are partly constitutive of memory. Clark and Chalmers (1998) argue 
that environmental artefacts such as notebooks can fulfil this role, where the notebook 
substitutes for the usual role afforded to biological memory. On this view, remembering 
can involve accessing non-biologically encoded information in addition to biologically 
encoded information. Clark and Chalmers ague we should accept such a view because 
biological and non-biological based information encoding often play functionally 
equivalent roles in remembering: “were it to go on in the head, we would have no 
hesitation in accepting it as part of the cognitive process, then that of the world is (for 
that time) part of the cognitive process” (1998:644). The processes of memory are often 
constituted by encoding, storage and retrieval mechanisms that exist beyond the physical 
bounds of the individual. These processes are distributed over the organism and 
physically external aspects of the environment. Importantly, the process of remembering 
can include the cognitive activities of other individuals (Barnier, Sutton et al. 2008).  
 
Barnier and Sutton et al. detail evidence in support of the social manifestation of certain 
remembering processes.5 Their evidence details how group recall of events involves the 
sharing, negotiation and reconstruction of experience. These episodes of collaborative 
group recall influence both the content of the group recollections as well as subsequent 
individual recall of those events. For example, their studies found that collective group 
recall of the death of a famous person produced qualitatively different recollections 
compared to individual recollections. Group recollections tended to show a lack of 
personal identification with the emotional experiences discussed in relation to the death 
(e.g., “people were sad that he died” rather than “I was sad that he died”), whereas 
individual recall more heavily emphasised personal emotional experiences. Furthermore, 
when individual participants were asked to recall the event at a later time, those 
individuals involved in collaborative recall produced qualitatively different recall of the 
event than those who had not taken part in the group. Individuals who partook in group 
recall adopt the memories of the group. Partaking in collective group recall thus results in 
the construction of individual memories that are different to those individuals that did 
not partake in group recall.  
                                                 
5. Here we see a memory specific application of Robert Wilson’s Social Manifestation Thesis: “some 
psychological states of individuals are manifested only when those individuals form part of a social group 
of a certain type” (2001:S269-S270). 
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Further empirical research also tells us that much of memory is a constructive process 
which involves pooling different information sources to (re-)construct memories of 
objects, situations or events. Photographs, for example, are physically external resources 
that we use in recall. But importantly, photographs do not merely trigger established 
memories, they are often active in the construction of memories. We see suggestive 
evidence of this from the large body of work detailing how this process is corruptible. 
People can be easily led to falsely remember past, non-existent events. False narratives 
and doctored photographs induce people to recall experiences that they never had 
(Strange, Gerrie et al. 2005). This evidence suggests that we offload to our environments 
much of the cognitive effort in storing and remembering, which means those 
environments are partly constitutive of remembering.  
 
These examples show that often resources external to the remembering agent do not 
merely play a triggering role by activating storage mechanisms internal to the agent (see 
discussion in Barnier, Sutton et al. 2008).6 Some individual remembering can only be 
realised when the individual stands in particular relation with their social or physical 
environments. Moral groups operate in a similar way by enabling the realisation of certain 
moral cognitions. Individual moral agents offload moral cognitive processing to their 
group. The collective actions of the group provide resources which become constituents 
of the agent’s moral cognition. For example, one of the roles of moral cognition is to 
identify and track the moral behaviours of other agents, but independently we cannot 
commit to memory nor have access to the moral history of everyone in our community. 
But as a group we can collectively remember the behaviours of group members. We can 
discuss (gossip) with others their moral knowledge. We construct shared moral opinions. 
Groups allow the realisation of moral cognitions that are beyond the capacities of any 
one individual. Using others as memory stores, for example, reduces individual cognitive 
load while at the same time amplifying potential group problem solving abilities through 
                                                 
6. According to the triggering view, external resources are not constitutive of remembering: the process 
of remembering is an internal, organism bound process. This triggering account of memory cognition is 
described by Barnier and Sutton et al. as one where the role of physically external resources and 
phenomena is to initiate recall, or provide inputs to the internal encoding processes (cf. linear processing 
cycle of traditional accounts of cognition described in chapter 3: ‘input → cognition → output’). Although 
triggering may be true of some of our remembering processes, Barnier et al. reject it as a global thesis. As 
the evidence shows, in many cases “remembering is a cognitive process that can only be manifested or 
realized when the individuals engaged in that process form part of a social group of a certain kind” 
(Barnier, Sutton et al. 2008). 
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the division of cognitive labour. But the distribution of moral cognition over external 
moral scaffolds is not isolated to moral memory. Groups also act as a collective stores 
and negotiating tools for the construction of resources such as moral norms, concepts 
and the skills with which to navigate our moral worlds. External social mechanisms are 
an essential support for moral cognition. (In section 5.5.1, we will see that these external 
mechanisms meet the requirements for cognitive extension.) 
 
Here we can see the significant role that gossip plays in distributing moral cognitive load. 
Gossip operates as a low cost method by which to disseminate moral information about 
group members. As Robin Dunbar (1996) argues, most of our everyday talk is about 
social relationships and the behaviours of others. An important component of this is 
gossip about the moral deeds (good and bad) and moral reputations of other members of 
our group (Boehm 2000; Sripada and Stich 2005; Joyce 2006). This moral gossip is 
important, for we need to know who to trust and who to sanction. Gossip also allows 
group members to safely attain negative information about “dangerous deviants” in 
private (Boehm 2000:94). It does a very effective job of distributing the cognitive load 
required to track large numbers of agents relatively safely. Through the collective creation 
of socially shared knowledge structures that index the moral reputations of agents within 
a group, we use other agents as epistemic tools to access information about our social 
worlds that we would not easily be privy to on our own.  
 
Gossip also increases the potential costs of defection. Our defections are not only known 
to those that directly witness them, but also to those with whom they gossip, thereby 
increasing the number of potential punishers. Part of the incentive to maintain adherence 
to normative standards is that news of one’s infraction will be passed on to others. The 
low cost transfer of moral information works as a mechanism to maintain moral 
adherence. Collective information stores amplify the threat of punishment, thereby 
reducing the cognitive costs of individual punishment strategies. As such, groups provide 
distributed mechanisms for maintaining normative adherence by reducing the benefits of 
free-riding and hence the temptation to defect.  
 
We see this kind of distributed mechanism in the way that group-wide norms 
encouraging the punishment of free-riders reduce the cost of punishment by distributing 
that cost over the entire group of punishers, through what Boyd and Richerson call 
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“moralistic punishment” (Boyd and Richerson 2004; Bowles and Gintis 2003, see also 
chapter 1). If there is a group-wide norm for punishing defectors or non-conforming 
agents, then the potential threat of punishment can come from any member of the group 
who adheres to that norm. Norms spreading the willingness to punish and the 
subsequent threat of punishment reduce the costs of punishment by spreading those 
costs over all agents, and in turn reducing the average cost of punishment for individual agents 
of the group. Moralistic norms such as these can stabilise a vast range of different 
behaviours (Boyd and Richerson 2004). As group agents we rely on others to maintain 
the threat of punishment, or to at least have the willingness to inform those who will 
enforce punishments. Again, the threat of punishment is distributed amongst the group, 
reducing cognitive load (tracking, identifying, making judgement, and exacting 
punishment) while also increasing the risk to defectors (reduced per head cost of 
punishment and increasing costs of defection). We tacitly rely on moralistic punishment 
norms to minimise the free-riding by others in our group.  
 
Group interactions provide unique opportunities and resources unavailable to individual 
agents because groups fundamentally change the problems that confront the individual 
moral agent, as well as provide the resources and opportunities to solve those problems. 
The solutions to many of our moral problems are group solutions (specifically those to 
do with cooperation and coordination) and they require the appropriate structuring and 
interactions of multiple agents and artefacts. Many of our adaptive problem-solving 
abilities within the moral domain thus arise through the particular dynamics of agent-
group interactions. The relations between the individual moral agent and the group 
structures within which they are embedded are centrally important for understanding 
moral cognition. We have seen that the structure of our moral worlds allows the 
achievement of cognitive processes that would not normally be available to the non-
embedded moral agent. Although identifying, tracking, memorising, and punishing are 
moral cognitive processes available to the non-extended moral cognitive agent, coupling 
with our moral worlds enables their distribution over physically external structures, thus 
furthering their reach through low cost means. By placing moral agents within a web of 
external moral scaffolds, moral cognition is distributed over organism and moral world, 
individual internal cognitive load is reduced and cognitive reach is increased.  
 
So far, I have explained how we, as moral agents, are embedded within a moral world 
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which provides various social supports, allowing the manifestation of certain moral 
cognitive capacities. I will now look at a more specific case, namely how moral norms 
become part of an extended moral cognition.  
 
5.5 Moral norms and cognitive extension  
 
Norms are, to a rough approximation, rules or principles that specify patterns of action 
that are required or deemed to be permissible or impermissible (Sripada and Stich 2005). 
They operate at multiple levels of action; functioning in individual, interpersonal, group, 
as well as broader cultural/social contexts. As we saw in chapter 1, moral norms are 
important for our adaptive success. They are adaptive for both individuals and groups 
because they provide important solutions to cooperation and coordination problems. 
Not all norms (moral or otherwise) are adaptive. As Boyd and Richerson point out, many 
clearly are not (“the adaptive value of ritually handling rattlesnakes is hard to fathom” 
(2004:168)) but, (generally) the normative capacities of agents are. Being able to identify 
and follow norms, and being part of a group that enforces norms, is typically fitness 
enhancing (Bowles and Gintis 2003). Moral norms are also part of our extended moral 
cognition.7 
 
I propose that one explanatorily fruitful way to view norms is as a form of public 
artefact: they are adaptive action-guiding information stores about social behaviour. They 
provide agents with the resource to successfully navigate their social worlds and for 
groups to negotiate cooperation and coordination problems. The information that they 
provide is portable, readily accessible, and reliable. And, much like the case of extended 
                                                 
7. Kim Sterelny (2004) is sceptical of the extended mind thesis on the basis that external cognitive 
resources are corruptible by other agents because they “operate in a common and contested space”. If this 
is a problem for external cognitive resources (although see Clark (2008) in response), it is not clear that it is 
so in the moral case. Although morality operates in a contested space involving negotiation, debate and 
norm violation, it also works to dampen many of their effects. In the case of moral cognitive extension 
there are specific mechanisms that maintain the integrity of the external normative structure. Indeed much of 
the point of moral cognising is to retain the integrity and regularity of normative structure and associated behaviour. Norm 
conformity is supported by, for example, sanction and punishment as well as meta-punishment norms 
enforcing norms of enforcement. These are driven by a raft of motivational mechanisms such as moralistic 
emotions (Bowles and Gintis 2003; Boyd and Richerson 2004). These mechanisms provide what Ehrlich 
and Levin (2005) call “cultural stickiness”, which helps to maintain normative integrity and reliability by 
retarding normative change, and strengthening conformist transmission and minimise temptation to defect.  
Norms and normativity are, by definition, sources of regularity. Therefore it is doubtful that norms acting 
as external cognitive resources are subject to the same corruptibility and outright contestability that other 
external resources might be.   
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memory earlier, they come about via constructive processes involving the interactions of 
multiple agents.  
 
Viewing moral norms in this way, we can see that they are extensions of moral cognitive 
systems. Firstly, they provide us with a ready information store of how one ought to act 
in the social world. Moral norms guide our moral behaviours and the judgements that we 
make about others. Throughout development we learn to use moral norms as 
information stores which we can readily and reliably access. 
 
Secondly, moral norms provide information about how we should expect others to act. If 
I learn that my social group does not do X, then I have reliable (although by no means 
infallible) information that members of my social group will not do X. Moral norms 
provide agents with expectations about the behaviours of group members. In many 
cases, I do not need to track all other agents in my social groups as there is good reason 
to think that because they are from my social group they are subject to many of the same 
normative constraints that I am. Social-wide moral norms are a low cost coordination 
device which we can exploit as information stores about the behaviours of others.  
 
Thirdly, moral norms are part of our extended cognitive apparatus because we rely on 
them to circumscribe the moral behaviour of other agents in one’s social group by proxy, 
thereby reducing the cognitive load required of continuous moral vigilance. One of the 
roles of moral cognition is to proscribe and thus constrain other agents’ behaviours. 
Moral norms do not simply provide us with information about how other agents will act, 
they partially determine the behaviour of those agents. They are action guiding in 
addition to being descriptive. As such, moral norms are part of our moral cognitive 
system, operating to track, manipulate and constrain other agents as if a non-extended 
agent were to do so themselves. One way I can ensure you would not steal money that I 
have left in my room is by staying in the room with you to watch your every move. The 
other method is by knowing that you subscribe to the patterns of behaviour that prohibit 
stealing money. In the latter case, we are offloading much of our moral cognitive work to 
our environments by exploiting the normative structure of our society. I know that the 
local shop owner is unlikely to short-change me because I can reliably assume that he is 
constrained by the norms of our society, irrespective of whether or not his compliance to 
those norms is moralistic (i.e., he thinks it is morally wrong to short change people) or 
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self-interested (i.e., he does not want to get caught). This self-monitoring and self-
guidance by other norm bound agents reduces the brainbound requirements for 
continuous individual moral vigilance. The idea is that we are closely coupled to the 
social-wide patterns of moral behaviour, so that we exploit the normative regularities and 
structures of our moral worlds (cf. mother-infant dyads presented earlier). Moral norms 
operate as part of our extended moral cognitive system by doing cognitive work, namely 
maintaining moral vigilance and constraining other’s behaviours.   
 
5.5.1 Supports as Constituents 
  
There may be some scepticism as to whether we can legitimately include physically 
external, society-wide moral norms as part of our moral cognitive system. This is part of 
a larger issue about what resources are, and under what conditions ought we consider 
resources, a legitimate part of our extended cognitive system; without constraints on 
what is to be considered legitimate parts of cognition, the extended mind faces 
accusations of triviality. In response to these issues, as well as an attempt to bypass the 
inherent boundary bias created by the physical boundaries of organisms, Clark and 
Chalmers propose the Parity Principle:  
 
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, 
were it to go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as part of 
the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (for that time) part of the 
cognitive process. (1998:8) 
 
Here the focus is on the functional nature of the “system” rather than the physical 
boundaries of the organism itself (see also Clark 2008). As I have explained above, moral 
norms are physically external resources which track and control the behaviours of other 
agents. Were we to perform the functionally equivalent tasks in our head, we would 
rightly consider them part of our cognitive processes. Moral norms satisfy the parity 
principle.  
 
Additionally, Clark and Chalmers (1998; Clark 2008) offer a four-point ‘rough guide’ to 
inclusion into one’s cognitive system. We have good reason to include moral norms as 
part of one’s extended moral mind as they satisfy each criterion: 
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1. That the resource be reliably available and typically invoked. 
 
People readily adhere to moral norms. Knowledge of that fact, and the norms which they 
abide by, is readily available to members of the community. As we have seen in chapter 
1, the point of much of morality is to maintain reliable and predictable behaviours of 
group members that generate the benefits of cooperative interaction. In addition to 
guiding our own behaviours, we use moral normative structures as reliable and 
predictable constraints on the behaviours of others.  
 
2. That any information thus retrieved be more-or-less automatically endorsed. It should 
not usually be subject to critical scrutiny (unlike the opinions of other people, for 
example). It should be deemed about as trustworthy as something retrieved clearly from 
biological memory. 
 
People unconsciously abide by moral norms and typically do not question the vast 
majority of their society’s moral norms. Furthermore, most moral norms are treated as 
objective fact rather than matters of opinion. Moral norms reliably describe and predict 
people’s behaviours. Although moral debate occurs, it is only over a rather small sample 
of moral norms.  
 
3. That information contained in the resource should be easily accessible as and when 
required. 
 
Social-wide patterns of moral behaviour in one’s group are readily observable in social 
interactions. Their adherence is predictable and their violations identifiable. The 
normative structure of our moral world is accessible and stable, such that we can use it as 
and when it is required.  
 
4. That the information … has been consciously endorsed at some point in the past, and 
indeed is there as a consequence of this endorsement. 
 
The vast majority of our moral norms will be learned through conscious 
experience/witnessing their violation (including in stories and folklore) and their 
consequences. People feel strongly about the moral norms of their community and 
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endorse them – as shown by people’s adherence to, and objection to the violation of, 
moral norms. Of the vast array of moral norms we abide by, disagreement and violations 
are rare. Moral norms exist and are successful because of this endorsement.   
 
In sum, moral norms satisfy Clark and Chalmers’ criteria for cognitive inclusion and as 
such are part of our cognitive systems.  
 
I have been arguing that we integrate many aspects of our moral environments into our 
moral cognitive processing. They become constituent parts of moral cognition. The 
important point throughout this discussion is that moral cognitive states are not merely 
the products of our moral environments; they are partly constituted by those 
environments.  
 
5.6 Questions of impermanence 
 
One sceptical response to the notion of an extended moral cognition may be based some 
niggling suspicions about the nature of the coupling between organism and environment 
in the moral case. We might have suspicions because agents and their social 
environments are impermanent couplings; we often come into contact and break off 
contact with our groups and environs. The response to this suspicion can be understood 
by returning to the idea of extended phenotypes introduced at the beginning of the 
chapter. Dawkins' extended phenotypes were cases in which the organism's adaptive trait 
extended beyond the organism. For example, the adaptive ability of spiders to catch flies 
and other prey is due to the spider and its web, not singularly the spider or the web. The 
prey catching system consists of both spider and its web (see discussion in Menary 
forthcoming-b). Take away either and the system breaks down. The explanation of the 
adaptive trait (i.e., fly catching) is to be found in the spider-web coupling. The fact that 
this coupling is impermanent, and in some cases fleeting, should not, as Menary makes 
clear, detract from including it in our explanation. Spiders are not continuously coupled 
with their webs but, when they, are they are a part of the fly-catching system. When they 
are not, they have the capacity to be part of a fly-catching system. There is also an 
additional reason to consider the coupled system as legitimately individuated in this way. 
The spider and its web, as a single system, has an evolutionary history of its own. The 
system itself has been shaped by evolution as a prey catching system, and selected because of 
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the adaptive effects of that singular system.  
 
The analogous reasoning in the moral case is that when we are coupled to our external 
environments in the correct manner we extend our moral cognitive system. When we are 
not sufficiently coupled to those external resources, we have the capacity to become 
coupled to them. Much of our moral education involves learning to exercise that capacity 
through the appropriate coupling between brain, body, and world resources. A great deal 
of moral learning is learning to be a part of our morally structured world and the ways in 
which we ought to use that world in our adaptive problem-solving routines. And, as in 
the case of the spider’s fly catching system, our extended moral cognitive system has an 
evolutionary history of its own (we will focus on these aspects in the next chapter). What 
we can conclude then, is that many of our adaptive problem-solving routines of moral 
cognising are locationally wide systems that extended beyond the physical limits of the 
brain and neural system. Those extended elements are, like the spider’s web, constituent 
parts of that system. 
 
5.7 Group interaction and the construction of moral scaffolds  
 
I have touched upon the idea of the construction of moral environments through 
embodiment effects in section 5.3. I will now further explore the establishment of these 
environments. 
 
We externalise many of our moral cognitive processes to influence and be influenced by 
others. We often debate, we argue, we try to convince others and others try to convince 
us. Moral reasoning is not purely an individual pursuit, nor is it solely the product of our 
internal psychologies; it is part of a wider system of interpersonal dialogues and agent-
world interaction (cf. the constructive process of group recall and extended 
remembering). In this way, moral reasoning and moral decision making will often be a 
“communal and collaborative affair” (Clark 2000). At a group level, moral debate is part 
of the mechanisms of collaborative problem solving. The give and take of reasons is an 
important aspect of public moral discourse, and is essential to solve many of the 
problems that face moral groups. Technological advances, for example, bring with them 
a raft of moral dilemmas: IVF, battery farming, stem cell research, genetic and cognitive 
enhancement, embryo cloning, legal and illegal drug use, and contraception to name a 
Extending Moral Cognition 
 
158
few. Environmental factors such as drought and earthquakes may also cause moral 
problems of resource distribution. A public dialectic is a form of group rationality, or 
group problem solving, for coordination and cooperation problems.  
 
The expression of moral disagreement stimulates public moral debate. This intra-group 
disquiet is itself a problem to be solved through repression or negotiation. Modern day 
acceptance of homosexuality and the rejection of slavery, for example, can be seen as the 
product of members within groups challenging moral norms and laws prohibiting 
homosexuality and accepting of slavery. Group moral norms can change when 
agreements and compromises are made, or majority coalitions form. Moral conclusions 
are accepted or sometimes tolerated, or sometimes debate continues. Either way, 
externalising different moral opinions and perspectives helps to bring about moral 
change and enables adaptive flexibility. Much of the time, deciding what is morally right 
and wrong, good and bad, just and unjust is a group process rather than an individual 
exercise. In cases of individual moral decision making, the chosen course of action is 
often grafted on top of already publicly negotiated moral concepts, norms and beliefs. 
Public moral negotiation in this way spreads the cognitive load, whereby much of the 
moral problem solving is done for us through collective group negotiation. Group 
dynamics are central to individual moralities.  
 
An especially instructive way of understanding this is through the conceptualisation of 
what Andy Clark (1996, 2000) calls moral space. We operate in a world of moral concepts, 
beliefs, norms and maxims which mediate our preferences, desires, behaviours, and social 
interactions. They are part of the social space within which we live. Moral space is a 
region of social space, it is “a space which is intrinsically multi-personal and whose 
topology is defined largely by the different – but interacting – needs and desires of 
multiple agents and groups” (Clark 2000:274). Successful navigation of moral space is 
one of the adaptive problems that confront heterogeneous, dynamically structured and 
constantly changing groups. The changing needs and desires of group members are 
sensitive to both internal and external perturbations, such that the topology of such a 
space changes over time as different problems are bought to bear upon the moral system. 
Group cooperative success is, in part, due to the successful navigation of moral space.   
 
Much of the exploration of moral space is contingent. What shapes trajectories through 
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that space will include various historical and situationally specific moral and non-moral 
factors that are bought to bear on moral systems. The fact that Islamic cultures have 
moral prohibitions forbidding the consumption of pork is most likely due to historical 
contingencies rather than any counterfactually robust feature of morality. Cross-cultural 
moral variation attests to such contingencies. However, there also appear to be 
commonalities across different cultures (Rozin, Lowery et al. 1999; Vasquez, Keltner et 
al. 2001). In such cases, our explorations of moral space will often arrive at the same 
location. These commonalities are best seen as convergent adaptive responses to many 
similar topographic features of moral space, responses that are present in every society 
facing similar cooperative and coordination problems, due in part to the particular 
psychological and physiological dispositions humans have. 
 
There are numerous mechanisms for creating and navigating moral space. We have 
already seen the role of embodiment in directing moral thought and action and group 
collaboration. Another important tool for our adventures in moral space is language 
(Clark 2000). It allows the creation of publicly negotiated moral concepts and principles 
that create new regions of moral space and new problems to be solved. According to 
Clark, language affords us the possibilities to “create and explore” this shared social 
space. Inter-subjective perspective taking is central to the collaborative efforts of moral 
problem solving, and language provides a “collaborative medium” through which we can 
give and take multiple perspectives. The linguistic formulation of normative standards in 
the form of principles and maxims provide tools for collaborative problem solving: 
 
Summary moral rules and maxims act as flexible and negotiable constraints on 
collaborative action. Such rules and principles by no means exhaustively reflect 
our moral knowledge, but they are the expertly constructed guides and 
signposts that make possible the cooperative exploration of moral space. 
(Clark 1996:124)  
 
Through the use of moral linguistic terms and labels we can simplify computationally 
complex social space for perceptually based processes of pattern recognition, thereby 
making moral space more visible. The recoding of patterns in linguistic form can then 
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become resources for thought and reason.8 Clark draws an analogy with the way in which 
the concept of money transformed the abstract organisational space of trade and 
associated reasoning in such a way as to enable the evolution of the complex financial 
ecologies we see today: “The image is thus of a potent cascade in which culturally 
acquired tags and labels make available a new quasi-perceptual space in which biologically 
basic capacities of pattern-recognition can be used to negotiate new and otherwise 
cognitively invisible realms” (Clark 2000:276-277).  
 
We can think of how the origination of the concept of fairness transformed our social 
worlds not only through the ways in which we interact with others, but also the way we 
view that world. It enabled us to categorise actions as fair and unfair, to discuss the 
fairness of others and create principles to mediate social transactions and resource 
distribution. These concepts and principles become part of the creation of social 
institutions. They alter the ways in which we organise our social, political and cultural 
worlds and create new problems to be solved (such as norm enforcement) and new 
regions of moral space to explore, through the development of associated concepts of 
equality and equity for example.  
 
The relevant point with respect to extended moral cognition is the way in which socially 
distributed, public linguistic structures create moral space and moral structures (concepts, 
norms, principles, systems of punishments etc) that guide social interaction. These enable 
us to access and identify “otherwise invisible” regions of moral space (Clark 2000). We 
actively participate in these processes and moral cognition is intimately coupled to, and 
supported by, this web of socially-constructed moral space. Much of our moral cognising 
cannot therefore be explained via a reductive explanation of the purely internal cognitive 
mechanisms that reside in our heads. To understand moral cognition is, like Simon’s ant 
walking on a pebbled beach, to account for the dynamic interplay between brain, body, 
and world. Much of moral cognitive complexity is physically external complexity that 
arises through the interaction between agent and the socially constructed moral space 
within which they are embedded.   
 
To further understand the navigation of moral space as group moral problem solving, it 
                                                 
8. See also Dan Dennett: “Once we have created labels and acquired the habit of attaching them to 
experienced circumstances, we have created a new class of objects that can themselves become the objects 
of all the pattern-recognition machinery, association-building machinery, and so forth.” (1996:151).   
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is worth drawing some parallels with Ed Hutchins’s work on the nature of socially 
distributed cognition (Hutchins 1995; Clark 1997). Hutchins’s research explores the ways 
in which many cognitive processes operate across multiple agents and/or our physical 
environments. His most famous account of distributed cognition is the way in which 
naval ships traditionally navigated their way into port. Ship navigation is a cognitive 
enterprise, but importantly one that involves multiple agents (brain and body) as well as 
artefacts and resources external to those agents. Navigation emerges from this 
“heterogeneous assembly”9 and the particular ways in which they are structured and the 
interactions between them. At any one time, no single agent on the ship is fully aware of 
the entire process by which the ship navigates. The act of navigation cannot be attributed 
to any one agent within the process. The ways in which the social structure of the ship is 
organised, and the relationships between agents, play an essential role in successful 
navigation. Ship navigation in this way is a distributed cognitive process, one that can 
only be apportioned to the entire system itself (Hutchins 1995). The augmenting and 
structuring of individual cognitive processes through the use of multiple agents, artefacts 
and their arrangements gives rise to new problems solving skills, such that groups of 
individual “pattern completing brains [can] navigate the unfriendly and mathematically 
demanding seas” (Clark 1997:77).  
 
Looking at moral rules and maxims from this perspective, we can see many are the 
product of collaborative group rationality rather than the aggregation of internally 
structured parametric representations of individual moral agents (re the Hauser-Mikhail 
and evolutionary psychology model of the mind and culture); they are in fact strategic 
group solutions to the collaborative and cooperative problems which groups face. They 
are dynamic and contextualised solutions to various contingent adaptive problems, not a 
set of innate formulaic principles through which culture inputs various parameters to 
arrive at our respective output solutions. The collective creation of moral rules and 
maxims can then become a cognitive resource individual moral agents can exploit. This is 
not to claim that individual moral rules and maximus are entirely the product of group-
level interaction. Individual decisions are not automatically reflective of group decisions, 
and individual interests do not always reflect those of the group. The picture is one 
where groups and the interests (moral or otherwise) of individuals will sometimes 
conflict; group norms will be challenged and negotiated. Individual moral minds are the 
                                                 
9. Clark’s terminology (1997:77). 
Extending Moral Cognition 
 
162
product of the dynamic interaction between individuals and the groups to which they 
belong. 
 
As noted before, the fact that cultures appear to have similar moral rules and maxims 
need not require one to posit innate moral structures in the head. We can look upon 
universality as cultures arriving at similar solutions in navigating moral space. Recalling 
Clark’s financial analogy explained above, one would be hard pushed to find a culture 
absent of trading systems and associated concepts, beliefs, norms and behaviours of 
trade. In more advanced form, money and associated financial ecologies are the product 
of commonly found solutions to recurring resource distribution problems. Yet we would 
not presume that the structure of these systems and the determinants of agents’ 
behaviours within them are due to ‘innate trading or financial parameters’ or something 
similar.10 It may well be the case that the disposition to value is innate and forms the 
basis of trade, monetary and financial systems, but that is quite different from proposing 
that the underlying structure of those systems is innate. Morality is similar in that the 
socially constructed moral ecology that we occupy is structured around embodied 
responses such as sympathy and empathy, and solutions to cooperation and coordination 
problems.  
 
So far we have seen some of the important ways in which we externalise our moral 
cognitive processes in the adaptive problem-solving routines that we employ in the 
navigation of our moral worlds. Through the active engagement of our bodily structures 
and the moral structures in our environments, we transform the cognitive strategies that 
we employ, thus enabling us to become the moral agents we are and to successfully 
navigate our moral worlds as both individuals and groups. We have also seen how this 
real-time navigation is very much enabled by, and grounded in, embodied processes. The 
ways in which moral groups are structured and the various solutions to cooperative 
problems that they find have important fitness effects. Throughout phylogeny and 
ontogeny we construct the social supports and incorporate the external structures 
required for moral cognitive extension. This process occurs over generations and is 
subject to natural selection. By constructing the moral worlds of our own, and future 
generations, our actions have fitness effects upon those generations. In this way we are 
said to be moral niche constructors. 
                                                 
10. Although Cosmides and Tooby (1992) do suggest we have innate exchange mechanisms. 
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5.8 A note on the moral niche 
 
By altering the moral structure of one’s environment we affect not only present group 
members but also future generations of group members. Moral debate therefore changes 
the moral minds of future generations as well as our own by structuring their moral 
worlds and providing group solutions to many adaptive problems. This reduces the 
amount of moral deliberation and debate that would be otherwise required of individuals 
and groups, both within and over generations. If we are born to a world that has already 
solved many moral problems, we do not have to reinvent the moral wheel. We can make 
use of the moral information that is already present in our social environments. In this 
way solutions to many moral problems are distributed over both space and time.  
 
Niche construction is the process by which organisms alter their own environment in 
such a way as to alter the fitness landscape of that environment (Odling-Smee, Laland et 
al. 2003; Sterelny 2003). Engineering habitats in this way may be physical (such as 
termites building their mounds), social (such as social organisation in the case of division 
of labour), or epistemic (such as the manner in which we organise and store information 
in books). Niche construction often has downstream effects; the niche construction of 
one generation has effects upon the next. The classic, and probably most cited example, 
is that of the beaver’s dam. By creating a dam the beaver engineers not only its own 
environment but also the environment of its offspring, thus directly affecting the survival 
of future generations of beavers. Downstream niche construction is sometimes 
cumulative, where one generation alters the niche it inherits from the previous 
generation, and in turn the subsequent generation alters that niche and passes it on to 
future generations, thereby creating agent-environment feedback cycles occurring 
cumulatively across generations. In this way organisms are active participants in 
moulding their own evolutionary trajectories. 
 
In the following chapter, I will argue that this evolutionary process characterises our 
moral worlds. We have the moral cognitive capacities that we do because we are born to 
the moral niche; in turn, future generations have the moral cognitive capacities they do 
because they are born to the moral niche that we provide for them. Through the use of 
embodiment effects and a normatively structured world we pass on moral concepts, 
norms, social structures and behavioural routines to subsequent generations, providing 
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them with the resources with which to become embodied and extended moral agents and 
to help in the creation and maintenance of moral space. By engineering our own moral 
habitats through externalised moral cognition, we create group structured cognitive 
scaffolds which subsequently alter the information available and use of that information 
by future generations. The creation of the moral niche therefore alters the fitness 
landscape of generation N and N + 1.  
 
Importantly, this process is “visible” to natural selection (Sterelny 2003, 2004). In the 
extended phenotype cases that Dawkins (1982) presents such as the beaver’s dam and 
spider webs, traits do not stop at the organism boundary nor do their adaptive effects – 
organisms are not uniquely privileged targets of selection. As we have seen, our moral 
cognitive traits are not fully specified by the internal, psychological mechanisms that 
reside inside our heads. Those extended traits are often the bearers of adaptation: the 
target of natural selection includes dynamic, reciprocally influencing, embodied, cognitive 
feedback loops extending beyond not only the head, but also the body. Furthermore, the 
processes by which we, as a species, bootstrap ourselves from non-moral infants to 
mature moral adults are themselves visible to natural selection. As such, it is not just the 
construction of the moral niche that is visible to selection, but also the downstream 
cumulative effects of the moral niche. In the next chapter I will outline how this plays 
out in the evolution of moral cognition, through a gene-culture (dual inheritance) co-
evolutionary process.  
 
It should be noted that one need not accept a cognitively extended picture of moral 
cognition to accept the coevolutionary dual inheritance account presented in the 
following chapter. In the extended account of moral cognition I have presented here, 
both the development and execution of moral cognition are constituted by biological and 
cultural factors. Under the evolutionary account I will present in the following chapter, 
both developmental/learning resources and beyond the body cognitive resources are the 
product of dual inheritance evolutionary mechanisms. However, in a non-extended, non-
nativist evolutionary account of moral cognition, only the developmental/learning 
resources are the product of a dual inheritance evolutionary system. In other words, even 
if one rejects the extension of moral cognition, a non-nativist account of moral cognition 
is still largely consistent with the dual inheritance account presented in the following 
chapter.  
Extending Moral Cognition 
 
165
 
5.9 Conclusion 
 
In the case where one uses a pen and paper to do long division, it is not the brain that is 
doing the long division, it is the entire system: brain, body, and external environment 
(Clark 1997; Giere and Moffatt 2003). The main thread running through this chapter is 
how our moral cognitive system extends beyond not only the brain and associated neural systems but also 
the boundaries of the organism. Structures external to the brain as well as those external to the 
organism itself enable cognitive tasks to be off-loaded. They also allow the performance 
of moral cognitive tasks that would not be possible without those bodily and 
environmental resources. In many cases it is the entire system that instantiates the moral 
cognitive process, not merely the internal, neural structures within the head. Moral 
cognition is often distributed over brain, body and world. What is also central to the 
above discussion is the ways in which we actively affect our moral environments. We debate, we 
punish, we gossip, we exact moral behaviours. We construct our normative worlds. 
Through the process of actively shaping and structuring our moral environments, we are 
also altering the fitness landscapes of those environments.  
 
In summary, I have detailed four aspects of moral cognitive extension: 
 
1) Embodiment effects are mechanisms that extend moral cognition through 
embodied coupling with other agents and our normative worlds. 
 
2) Social groups act as distributed cognitive tools for tracking, remembering and 
controlling the moral behaviours of other agents, thereby extending the scope of 
our moral abilities.  
 
3) Moral norms are public artefacts which we use as action-guiding information 
stores for our own actions and the control of others’ actions.  
 
4) Groups are essential mechanisms for creating external cognitive resources.  
 
The extension of our moral cognition provides unique adaptive solutions. The fact that it 
is distributed amongst multiple agents and the environment should not detract from the 
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fact that it is a cognitive process. Should these processes be attributed to any non-
extended individual agent, we would rightfully consider them a cognitive achievement. It 
is clear that much of our moral cognitive ability cannot be explained through the singular 
positing of internal representations of external states of affairs (“causal surrogates for 
distal features of the environment” (Chemero and Silberstein 2008)). Our best 
explanations pay close attention to the interactions between brain, body and world. 
Moral cognition is extended cognition. 
 
5.10 Summary 
 
In this chapter I provided evidence in support of the view that moral cognition extends 
beyond the boundaries of our bodies. Based on this fact, explanations of moral cognition 
must include the ways in which external cognitive resources operate as part of our moral 
cognitive system. 
 
The main points to take from the above discussion are as follows:  
 
• Much of moral cognition involves the tracking and controlling of other agents. 
 
• Embodiment plays a special role in coupling agents with the normative world and 
other agents.  
 
• External cognitive resources structure and shape moral cognition. 
 
• Moral norms are public artefacts, storing moral information and reducing much 
of our cognitive load by doing some aspects of our moral problem solving. 
 
• Much of moral cognition is distributed over brain, body and world, including the 
moral scaffolds provided by groups.  
 
• Extended moral cognition creates an extended moral space (moral niche) which 
has fitness bearing effects.  
 
Extending Moral Cognition 
 
167
As in the previous chapter, this chapter details the width of the moral cognitive system. It 
is extended into our environments. Those cognitive extensions are visible to natural 
selection. In the following chapter I explore the role of our moral environments in the 
evolution of moral cognition.   
 168
 
 
6 
6. The Gene-Culture Coevolution of Moral 
Cognition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hominids inherit more than genes from their parents. They inherit both information 
and developmental environments which allow that information to be used. 
(Sterelny 2003:239) 
 
They have shown that these intellectual achievements arise not only from the young 
mind’s surprising capacities for inducing understanding from everyday observation, but 
also from the ways that caregivers scaffold understanding through the structure of daily 
routines or by how they talk with the child about recent events. 
(Thompson, Laible et al. 2003:138) 
 
 
 
Evolutionary ethics has typically neglected the role of culture (Mesoudi and Danielson 
2008) often, one suspects, because it is viewed as playing a proximate role in the 
evolution of human behaviours. Yet such a view misses the novel contributions that 
culture makes to our evolutionary histories (Sterelny 2003; Boyd and Richerson 2004). 
We have already seen that our social environments play a central role in the development 
and deployment of moral cognitive abilities. One of the challenges of an evolutionary 
history of moral cognition is to appropriately account for the role of culture and fit it into 
an evolutionary point of view. In what follows I will present a dual inheritance model of 
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the evolution of moral cognition. Such an account emphasises the ways in which culture 
plays a unique evolutionary role by altering the fitness landscapes upon which natural 
selection acts. What we see in dual inheritance models is that not only does biology guide 
culture but, reciprocally, culture guides biology. In this way our cultural practices can 
radically alter our evolutionary trajectories. This is, I maintain, what has happened in the 
case of the evolution of moral cognition. I first discuss the nature of dual inheritance 
models before looking at how the evolution of moral cognition operates under such a 
model.  
 
6.1 The making of moral phenotypes 
 
The received view in much of evolutionary biology is that, while genes and environment 
combine to produce the phenotype, it is only the genotype that is inherited by the next 
generation; there “is no evolutionary consequential causal influence of N generation 
phenotypes on generation N + 1” (Sterelny 2007:179). The mechanisms of inheritance 
are, therefore, genetic. Spiders’ webs are expressions of the spiders’ web-making genes in 
web-enabling environments, both in the ontogenetic and synchronic sense. Webs are the 
phenotypic effects of genes coded for web making and require both the right ontogenic 
environments as well as the right environments in which to build their webs. In the case 
of the spider and its web, even though the environments are causally necessary for 
phenotype development and expression, it is the genes that code for web making that are 
inherited by the next generation, whereas the environmental constituents are not. Spider 
genes are inherited, spider environments are not.  
 
As we saw in chapter 3, both the individualist moral grammarians and evolutionary 
psychologists believe that the fundamental causal determinants of our (moral) phenotypes 
and the underlying structure of our (moral) cultures are genetic. This fundamental 
structure is universal to all (normal) human beings and exists independent of one’s 
environment and experience, hence the search for universal features of ‘human nature’ 
that apparently signify the existence and shape of such structures (Barkow, Cosmides et 
al. 1992; Tooby and Cosmides 1989; Hauser 2006b). We saw in chapter 2 that one 
argument in support of internal, genetically specified moral structure is the claim that the 
informational resources required for normal moral development (of the moral 
phenotype) are impoverished. The required information must therefore be built into the 
The Gene-Culture Coevolution of Moral Cognition 
 
170
genome. Innate moral structures are necessary, but not sufficient, for the establishment 
of the moral phenotype. However, as I have attempted to show in earlier chapters, an 
innate moral faculty is not necessary for moral cognition.  
 
In evolutionary terms, to talk of our moral cognition is to talk of moral phenotypes. 
Phenotypes are the product of the interaction between genes and environment. This is, of 
course, trivially true and no one denies that non-genetic factors play some role in 
phenotypic development – you cannot grow bones without a reliable source of calcium. 
But on a stronger reading of this claim, developmental environments play a more causally 
significant role in the expression of particular phenotypes, and this applies to both 
cognitive and behavioural phenotypes as much as it does to those of body morphology. 
Subsequently, there is much debate about the role, extent of influence, and effects of 
developmental environments in phenotype expression. Much of the debate, for example, 
between evolutionary psychologists and their opponents has been over the contributory 
role and extent to which developmental environments play in the expression of 
phenotypic traits (Barkow, Cosmides et al. 1992; Gangestad and Simpson 2007).  
 
In contrast to nativist views, I proposed that moral cognition is characterised by the 
coordinated integration of cognitive processes across numerous and disparate domains. 
It often involves problem-solving routines utilising bodily and environmental resources 
through brain-body-world feedback loops. Coordinated patterns emerge from the 
integration of coupled elements that span brain, body and environment. Our moral 
phenotypes are extended and involve the utilisation and manipulation of these elements 
in a reciprocal feedback process. We affect the world and the world affects us, and it is 
through this interaction that we instantiate the moral processes that we do. Viewing 
moral cognition in this light, moral phenotypes are best thought of as embodied and 
extended complex skills that allow us to actively partake in, use (including cognitively 
integrate) and contribute to, the structure of our moral worlds. Because these skills often 
involve the coordinated use of brain-body-world interactions, we should consider those 
bodily and physically external aspects as part of the moral extended phenotype. This 
includes seeing the distributed cognitive processes presented in the previous chapter as 
part of our moral phenotype.1 Moral phenotypes are embodied and extended complex 
                                                 
1. Although the inclusion of group phenomena as part of one’s phenotype may sound rather startling, it 
is no more so than the view that termite mounds are the collective phenotypic expression of a colony of 
termites (Dawkins 1982). 
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skill sets, and I conjecture, they are skill sets that we can learn. They emerge over 
ontogeny from pre-existing (or at least simultaneously developing) non-moral cognitive 
processes and become increasingly cognitively sophisticated over the course of 
development.  
 
These complex skills are bootstrapped from constituent processes via the appropriate 
structuring of our learning environments. Such scaffolds, as we have seen, allow both 
diachronic and synchronic expression of the moral phenotype. This is where our 
developmental environments play a crucial causal role in the fundamental structuring of 
our moral cognitive processes. Such a view does not privilege an internal fundamental 
structure with respect to the ontogeny of moral phenotypes, nor their evolution. What is 
important from an evolutionary point of view is that although selective mechanisms 
depend on the existence of heritable similarity between parent and offspring, they do not 
depend on, and are not sensitive to, the mechanism of inheritance. Here we can draw on 
some work from developmental systems theory, underwritten by the ‘parity thesis’, which 
states that “the roles played by the many causal factors in development do not fall neatly 
into two kinds, one exclusively played by DNA elements the other exclusively played by 
non-DNA elements” (Griffiths and Gray 2005:420). When we think of the causal roles 
of various elements that establish phenotypes, we see they do not map neatly into genetic 
and non-genetic elements. A relevant example of this, and one which we will encounter 
below, are the ways in which evolutionary hereditary systems exist beyond those of 
genetic based systems. This is in contrast to the standard genecentric view which takes 
genes as the sole inheritance mechanism, whereby genes map with inheritance and non-
genetic factors map with non-heritable processes. According to the epigenetic view of 
inheritance, this mapping does not hold. Organisms are embedded in heritable 
environments that are themselves subject to evolutionary pressures. Therefore, it does 
not make sense to privilege genetic inheritance mechanisms as the only heredity systems 
in the evolution, development and expression of phenotypes.  
 
We can see the importance of this view when we consider the role of the environment in 
the development and execution of moral cognition. What is clear from the discussions of 
extended moral cognition undertaken in the previous chapter is that we actively make our 
moral worlds and in doing so construct the normative and informational structures of 
those worlds. The structuring of our offspring provides the constituent resources 
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required for development and expression of the embodied and extended moral 
phenotype. Aspects of our moral phenotype are both genetically and culturally inherited 
and it is the structuring of those environments which allows the intergenerational 
transmission of moral phenotypes. This raises important issues with respect to the 
precise mechanisms of inheritance and the accuracy of transmission of those phenotypes 
which I will address below.  
 
In earlier chapters we have seen how the evolutionary psychologist views the fundamental 
structuring of cognitive phenotypes and their aggregative cultural manifestation as 
coming from the inside in the form of innate (genetic), domain-specific cognitive 
modules. The channel of inheritance for this fundamental structure is genetic. However, 
in the moral case this fundamental structure can be learned. Because moral cognition is a 
learned adaptation, we need to be able to explain both genetic and cultural aspects from 
an evolutionary point of view. The relationship between genetic and cultural factors in 
the evolution of moral cognition is best captured by a dual inheritance (or gene-culture) 
model.  
 
6.2 Dual inheritance models in evolution 
 
As Boyd and Richerson point out in their book Not by Genes Alone (2004), standard 
approaches to evolutionary social sciences have typically treated culture the same as other 
environmental influences. In much the same way that calcium is required for the 
genetically encoded growth of bones, culture is required for the genetically encoded 
expression of various behaviours. From this perspective, natural selection acting upon 
genes is the ultimate cause of behaviour whereas other non-genetic elements merely 
implement the structures encoded into those genes, and in this way play a proximate role. 
We saw exactly this role afforded to culture in the cases of innate moral grammar and the 
evolutionary psychology discussed in previous chapters. But, as we will see, selection 
acting on culture often plays an ultimate role in the evolution of moral cognition.  
 
It is clear that genes have shaped our culture and environment. One of the reasons 
supermarkets exist is because they provide for many of our basic biological needs. Yet 
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what Boyd and Richerson and others2 make clear is that culture is not like other aspects 
of the environment in some fundamental ways. Most notably, much of culture involves 
mechanism of both learning and inheritance. Under certain conditions culture evolves 
cumulatively subject to the forces of natural selection. Culture affects fitness (see dairy 
farming example below), and in this way selection operating upon cultural practices can 
act as an ultimate cause of behaviour, rather than merely a proximate cause. Cultural 
changes can cause genetic changes. Put together, we have a coevolutionary dynamic 
whereby genes and culture exert reciprocal influences on each other that are visible to 
natural selection in both the genetic and cultural channels. Dual inheritance models along 
these lines have been gaining traction in the current literature on the evolution of 
psychological, behavioural and cultural phenomena. For example, Boyd and Richerson 
(2004) have given accounts of how many of our complex cultural phenomena, from 
kayak making to the emergence and sustenance of human ultra-society, are best explained 
via dual inheritance evolutionary models. Kim Sterelny (2003) has presented an account 
of how our folk psychological capabilities are best explained via a dual inheritance model. 
And Stephan Linquist (2007) has recently proposed that the evolution of the complex 
higher emotions is also suitable for such a model.  
 
These models show how cultural adaptations can have selective effects on genetic lines 
of inheritance in such a way as to fundamentally alter evolutionary trajectories. The 
classic and often cited example is the advent of dairy farming and the spread of genes for 
lactose absorption (Boyd and Richerson 2004). After weaning, almost all mammalian 
animals lose the ability to absorb the lactose in milk when their bodies switch off the 
gene for the production of lactase, an enzyme necessary for the digestion of lactose in 
milk. Without this enzyme, lactose remains in the milk and is subsequently fermented by 
bacteria as it passes through the gut thereby producing gas and leading to stomach 
irritation, cramping, bloating and flatulence. Significantly, very high levels of lactose 
intolerance are observed in cultures that do not consume fresh milk. Cultures that 
traditionally practice dairy farming and consume fresh milk on the other hand have very 
high levels of lactose tolerance in their populations. The ability to absorb lactose beyond 
weaning evolved in those cultures that practiced dairying. This is a clear example of 
genetic adaptations evolving in response to changes in cultural environment.  
                                                 
2. See for example Bowles and Gintis (2003), Odling-Smee, Laland et al. (2003), and Sterelny (2003, 
2006). 
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There are some important points to note from this example.  
 
1) Cultures alter genes. The cultural practice of dairy farming alters the fitness 
landscape. Thus there is selection for genes that code for the enzymes that 
breakdown lactose, increasing those genes’ fitness relative to the rest of the 
population and causing the spread of lactose absorption genes.  
 
2) Genes alter culture. When the gene favouring lactose absorption spreads in the 
population that in turn gives rise to selection pressures for increased dairying 
practices.   
 
3) The two work together in a coevolutionary process. Evolution in one dimension (genes) 
influences the evolution of the other dimension (culture) and vice versa. Boyd 
and Richerson colourfully describe this as a process by which the “evolving pools 
of cultural and genetic information carried by human populations are partners in 
a … swirling waltz…. Each partner of the coevolutionary dance influences the 
evolutionary dynamics of the other” (2004:192-193).  
 
4) Cultural inheritance is cumulative and subject to selection. It is not the case that the 
cultural traditions of dairy farming could be recreated anew in each population or 
could appear de novo. The traditions are complex and arise through the 
cumulative modification over generations. Successful alterations are selected and 
kept, whereas unsuccessful alterations are discarded.  
 
5) Genes don’t cause the resultant dairy farming behaviour. The gene itself does not cause 
dairy farming behaviour; genes for production of lactase that enable the 
absorption of lactose are not genes for dairy farming (Laland and Brown 2006). 
But, they do have consequences that induce evolutionary change at the cultural 
level.3  
 
 
                                                 
3. It can be said that genes for lactase increase the probability that the bearer will dairy farm. Although 
Richard Dawkins (1989) would perhaps call these “genes for farming”, the distinction is merely 
terminological rather than substantive. Genes for lactase do not cause dairy farming.  
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Having the gene for lactose absorption increases the relative fitness of agents with that 
gene within milk consuming populations. Groups that undertake dairy farming thereby 
increase the spread of that gene through that population. Culture influences genes and 
genes influence culture. The spreading of the lactose absorption gene “in turn may have 
changed the environment-shaping cultural practices, perhaps favoring more whole-milk 
consumption, or more serendipitously, giving rise to the evolution of ice cream” (Boyd 
and Richerson 2004:192). The genetic makeup of the population is altered in response to 
the culture of that population, and the culture of that population alters in response to its 
genetic makeup.  
 
Dual inheritance theories such as these model both genetic channels as well as cultural 
channels of inheritance. They do this by tracking changes in both the genetic information 
present in gene pool and the cultural information present in cultural pool, as well as the 
interactions between the two (Boyd and Richerson 2004; Mesoudi and Laland 2007). 
One important aspect of this model is that the cultural channel can be cumulative, 
whereby modifications can be retained over time allowing for gradual modification and 
selection to occur in a similar manner to that occurring in the genetic channel. This type 
of model can explain how we come to have complex cultural, habitat-specific 
adaptations, such as dairy farming, that can arise more rapidly than could otherwise occur 
in the case of natural selection operating at the genetic level alone (Boyd and Richerson 
2004). Cultural inheritance allows rapid adaptive response because it can cumulatively 
preserve advantageous changes and reject non-advantageous ones over very short 
timescales relative to genetic evolution. In these types of models, social learning 
mechanisms, such as copying the successful, operate as low cost alternatives to individual 
trial and error learning. They allow the rapid transmission and retention of complex 
adaptive behaviours within one or a few generations rather than over multitudes of 
generations. Hence, one of the perceived advantages of dual inheritance models is that it 
allows us to model the evolution of complex skills without having to commit to the view 
that those skills are encoded in the genome (such is the claim of evolutionary 
psychology). Cumulative cultural change involving domain-general learning mechanisms 
is adaptive “because it can do things that genes cannot do for themselves” (Boyd and 
Richerson 2004:145).  
 
Viewing culture as incorporating an evolutionary efficacious inheritance mechanism 
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raises specific issues about how these complex skills are passed on: we need to explain 
the reliability and fidelity of their transmission. One of the ways these issues of 
inheritance can be resolved is through niche construction. Especially in the case of 
hominids, downstream niche construction provides a robust, high fidelity, and reliable 
channel for the inheritance of cultural information.   
 
6.3 Niche construction 
 
As Kim Sterelny informs us, “hominids are ecological engineers with a vengeance…” 
(Sterelny 2003:149). We physically alter and structure the ecological environments which 
we inhabit. Importantly, by altering and structuring our own environments we are also 
altering and structuring those of our offspring. This environmental engineering will often 
have fitness effects and, accordingly, will often have fitness effects on subsequent 
generations. Building a warm and dry shelter that successfully buffers the occupants from 
the negative effects of the environment increases the relative fitness of those occupants. 
Should the shelter be occupied by the next generation then they will also benefit from 
that altered environment. We alter our environments and those of our offspring in ways 
that have fitness effects on both generations N and N + 1.  
 
Ecological engineering of our physical, social, and epistemic environments is niche 
construction (Odling-Smee, Laland et al. 2003; Sterelny 2003, 2008). Animals change 
their environments in many different ways. Often these changes will be in a manner 
which regulates the fluctuations and variability of environmental conditions that bear 
upon the animal. In this way the animal alters its environment in response to external 
pressures, another example of an organism-environment feedback process. Those altered 
environments in turn have selective effects which provide feedback to an organism’s 
niche constructing behaviour. This behaviour then feeds back to bear upon the 
construction of the niche, and so on (Odling-Smee, Laland et al. 2003; Laland and Brown 
2006). When this feedback process runs across generations, the construction of the niche 
becomes the construction of the niche of downstream generations. When this process 
allows the accumulation of modifications over generations, it becomes an evolutionarily 
significant process. 4  
                                                 
4. This is not to claim that all instances of niche construction are fitness enhancing. But those that are 
fitness enhancing will be selected for whereas those that are not fitness enhancing typically will not.  
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6.3.1 Downstream niche construction 
 
As Odling-Smee, Laland and Feldman (Odling-Smee, Laland et al. 2003) point out, the 
picture of organism-environment feedback processes operating over generations is in 
contrast to many conceptions of natural selection that see lineages as adapting to the 
environments that they inhabit, whereby selection shapes lineages to fit the niche. Rather, 
downstream niche construction sees lineages as altering their environments in response 
to external pressures. The arrow of change therefore flows both ways; lineages adapt 
their environments as opposed to only adapting to their environments. If this is the case, 
then we should expect to see, in addition to adaptations that are responses to the 
environment, adaptations (physical, behavioural and social) that bring about change in 
the environment. This type of niche construction is seen in such cases as termite mounds 
and beavers’ dams where generation N construct and alter the selective environments of 
generation N + 1.   
 
This model of evolution is very important with respect to the evolution of cognition 
because not only are we engineers of our physical worlds, but also our epistemic worlds 
and those of our offspring. Culture is a rich source of epistemic information required for 
cognitive development, so cultural niche construction is relevant for a dual inheritance 
model of the evolution of some of our cognitive phenotypes. The cumulative engineering 
of our cultural worlds works as a system of inheritance in its own right that operates as 
one of the channels in a dual inheritance evolutionary mechanism.5  
 
There are, however, some important constraints as to when niche construction can 
operate as an intergenerational inheritance mechanism. Complex adaptations appear over 
time through the selection of accumulated modifications over successive generations. 
Genes do this very well (Dawkins 1989). Cultural transmission on the other hand is 
subject to a variety of error-inducing effects such as noise and bias which make sustained 
intergenerational transmission over time difficult. For this to happen successfully there 
                                                 
5. There is some debate as how to classify niche construction. Rather than an aspect of cultural 
inheritance, Odling-Smee, Laland and Feldman (2003) view it as a third-channel of inheritance, alongside 
genetic and cultural channels. This is because niche construction need not work by learning in the N + 1 
generation. It is unclear whether this is a substantive distinction or merely a terminological one. Either way, 
this distinction need not concern us here.  
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needs to be some means of sustaining reliable, high-fidelity transmission between 
generations. For downstream niche construction to be of any evolutionary significance in 
the generation of complex cultural adaptations, it too must be a cumulative process and 
therefore must be able to explain the retention of accumulated modifications over 
successive generations.  
 
In the moral domain, numerous mechanisms maintain reliability and fidelity and reduce 
intergeneration information degradation. Downstream niche construction, biased 
learning and participatory learning all play roles in the transmission of moral phenotypes 
from one generation to the next. We see these in the structuring of children’s moral 
environments, psychological biases and children’s interactions with their moral worlds. 
Each process plays an important role in the evolution of moral cognition. Here we can 
start to see connections to the picture of moral cognition as presented in earlier chapters 
and the evolutionary importance of embodied and extended moral cognitive processes. 
This picture of moral cognition was one that (often) “looked outward” and involved not 
only engagement with the world, but the active, embodied and cognitively extended 
manipulation of the world (including the behaviours of other agents). These process of 
manipulation structure the moral learning environments of offspring, restricting and 
directing the moral learning resources available to them.  
 
6.4 A dual inheritance model of the evolution of moral 
cognition 
 
Products of evolution do not arrive on the scene de novo and morality is no different; 
the evolution of morality is an incremental process. Moral norms, for example, evolve in 
a series of stages (Harms and Skyrms 2008). This process involves the accurate 
transmission and retention of modifications in the moral phenotype over time. Under the 
right conditions, successful changes in moral phenotypes can be transmitted to, and 
preserved by, future generations.  
 
Moral phenotypes are evolved complex skills that arise via cumulative modifications over 
generations with components transmitted in both the genetic and cultural channels. 
Moral behaviours and cultural practices alter fitness landscapes, increasing selection 
pressures for genes that code for various (non-moral) psychological capacities that enable 
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the development of moral phenotypes through enculturation. When genes supporting 
these dispositions spread in the population they in turn increase selection pressures for 
cultural practices and resources that scaffold the expression of those phenotypes. These 
include caregiver practices and collective cultural behaviours that support the 
development and execution of moral cognitions. This feedback process is cumulative and 
subject to selection. The environment plays an essential role in the development and 
expression of moral cognitive abilities (moral phenotype) over both phylogeny and 
ontogeny.  
 
One of the problems with dual inheritance models is that cultural learning environments 
are noisy, error prone and developmentally variable (Boyd and Richerson 2004; Sterelny 
2006). If moral phenotypes are partly constituted by heritable environmental resources, 
then the transmission of those resources between generations must be accurate, stable 
and of high-fidelity. Individuals need to have the right moral phenotypes at the right 
time, and it cannot be solely up to the individual learning to make sure this happens. 
Because individual learning alone is prone to error in noisy environments, thereby 
degrading the transmission from N to N + 1, there is problem of accurate transmission 
of moral information between generations.  
 
Within the cultural channel there are different types of transmission within and between 
generations. The first type is horizontal transmission in which information is transferred 
between agents within a generation. The second type, vertical transmission, occurs 
between parents and offspring. The third type is that of oblique transition which occurs 
between non-relatives over generations (an expert may teach non-related children some 
particular skill or adaptive information, for example).6 All three types of transmission 
occur in the moral case and there are various mechanisms that operate within the cultural 
channel that minimise transmission problems, allowing the successful transmission of 
moral phenotypes from one generation to the next.  
 
In previous chapters we have seen many of these transmission processes in action. 
Mechanisms of reputation, punishment and inter-group competition, for example, can 
                                                 
6. Sterelny (2006) divides oblique transmission into two types: ‘Discrete oblique transmission’ occurs 
when only a few individuals transfer information to many in the next generation. ‘Diffuse oblique 
transmission’ occurs when individuals in the subsequent generation are influenced by many in the previous 
generation. These distinctions need not concern us for the present purposes.   
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spread and maintain norms of cooperative action within groups. The moral behaviours 
of group members towards other members can encourage the spread of moral 
information horizontally between agents of the same generation, as well as over 
generations. We have also seen vertical transmission occurring where children adopt the 
moral phenotypes of their parents. Parents teach and structure the child’s learning 
environments such that children can learn how to be moral. Parents also treat their 
children morally and in this way teach by doing; by acting in moral ways they structure 
the learning environments of their children. In the case of oblique transmission, moral 
groups help to structure developmental environments and provide cognitive resources of 
the next generation. We have seen, for example, how cultural group selection can favour 
the spread and maintenance of group cooperative norms which also apply to the moral 
behaviours of new generations. We have also seen downstream moral niche construction 
in the way that groups create a socially shared moral space which is occupied and utilised 
by subsequent generations as developmental and cognitive resources. 
 
I will now look more closely at how moral niche construction, participatory learning and 
learning biases minimise between-generation information degradation. The cumulative 
engineering of our moral worlds is a heritable process whereby our alterations of the 
moral world and the practices which bring about those alterations are passed on to future 
generations. Our (embodied) psychology also biases the information to which we attend, 
strengthening the flow of specific types of information between generations. We also 
learn to become moral agents through the embodied, active and guided exploration of 
our moral worlds. It is through these mechanisms, I argue, that group constructed moral 
information (developmental environments and structures that realise moral cognition, 
such as moral norms, concepts, beliefs, moral practices, parenting practices) is passed on 
to future generations.7 I will examine how these processes fit together in a feedback 
process operating cumulatively over generations which is subject to selection.  
 
                                                 
7. There are various types of moral information that is transmitted between generations. These include, 
for example, specific information about how to act in the moral world such as moral norms and 
prohibitions. It also includes the moral world itself and associated developmental environments. There is 
much overlap between the various types. For ease of presentation, I will generically refer to the various 
types of transmitted information as “information”. 
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6.4.1 Moral niche construction, biased moral learning and 
participatory moral learning  
 
One of the significant points of the preceding chapters was that we are active and 
embodied participants in our moral worlds and that the patterns of behaviours that 
constitute our morally normative worlds exist because we are active and embodied 
participants. Humans create a socially constructed moral environment (i.e., moral niche) 
and use resources of that environment in ways that are central to our adaptive successes. 
Importantly, this moral environment supports both the development and execution of 
moral cognitive processes, operating as a mechanism by which to transfer moral 
phenotypes from one generation to the next. Children receive both explicit and implicit 
instruction from their groups for moral development and how to use the moral world as 
a moral cognitive resource. Generation N’s moral activities engineer the environments of 
their offspring in generation N + 1, thereby directing and structuring the transmission of 
moral phenotype between generations – downstream moral niche construction in action.   
 
As we have seen in chapter 2, there is empirical evidence detailing the ways in which 
parents structure the child’s learning environments and the effects this has on moral 
development. These were examples of vertical transmission between parent and 
offspring. Furthermore, non-related individuals also contribute to the structuring of the 
child’s learning environment and directing their development when caregiving duties may 
be shared amongst non-related adults – an example of oblique transmission. Groups also 
transfer moral information horizontally within generation N, who then transfer that 
information vertically to N + 1. A clear example of this horizontal-to-vertical 
transmission can be seen in the ways groups provide parenting advice and norms of 
parenting practice. If parents adopt the moral phenotypes and parenting practices of their 
group, then they will transfer them to their offspring because those practices are the ones 
the learning child is most likely to experience during development. This is an example of 
frequency dependent bias, whereby what we are likely to learn is biased by the 
commonness of the information that we experience (Boyd and Richerson 2004). We can 
see this type of information transfer in the group production of moral narratives in 
stories and mythologies which are relayed to the next generation. Those moral narratives 
that are not sanctioned by the group are unlikely to be spread amongst members, and 
hence the next generation.  
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Furthermore, studies have shown that much of children’s moral experience is with peers 
and siblings (Smetana 1989). Children of generation N + 1 can obtain moral information 
from generation N via horizontal transmission from their peers in generation N + 1; 
parents teach children, who then interact with other children in their group, thereby 
spreading that information horizontally within N + 1. When we also consider the many 
processes that bring about group conformity of moral behaviours (as discussed in 
chapter 1), we can see there are numerous ways in which generation N structures the 
moral environments of generation N + 1. Group structures help to mitigate errors in the 
transmission of moral phenotypes between generations, increasing both reliability and 
fidelity.  
 
Importantly, it is not only the engineering of our moral worlds that maintain the 
reliability and high-fidelity of these channels. Children also contribute substantially to the 
transmission of moral information between generations because the child’s psychology 
biases her learning experiences. If there is one thing that the poverty of the moral 
stimulus proponents have got right, it is that disembodied non-participatory observers 
will have inadequate resources to become moral agents (see chapter 2). But, as we have 
seen, we are not disembodied, non-participatory observers. Not only are our moral 
learning environments directed and structured, but our psychology biases our 
experiences of our learning environments, focussing attention towards morally relevant 
information and making that information more salient and memorable. Moral learning is 
biased by, and structured around, the embodied reactions of ourselves and others, 
directing the transmission of relevant information. In this way, our social environments 
and our embodied psychologies combine in the production and development of the 
moral phenotype. 
 
The structuring and biasing of our learning environments highlights an important 
relationship between morality and the learning of morality, namely that we learn by doing. 
Much of what we learn in morality is through participating in morality. We learn that it is 
wrong to hit others when we hit others or others hit us. We learn fairness and unfairness 
through the experiencing of fair and unfair situations. Here, generation N acting morally 
towards generation N + 1 serves dual functions, one being that of controlling moral 
behaviour, but also teaching moral behaviour by highlighting the causes and 
consequences of moral violations. We have also seen in chapter 4, the idea that 
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decoupled moral learning involves learning by virtual-doing by way of embodied simulations 
in which we enact our sensory-motor structures as if we were there. These simulations – 
such as in the case of children’s fairytales – are directed by pedagogical practices which 
exploit our embodied psychologies. The developing moral agent learns by biased and 
embodied participation with his highly structured moral environment and the scripting of 
moral episodes by caregivers.  
  
Here I have outlined some of the mechanisms which allow the reliable, high-fidelity 
transmission of moral phenotypes from one generation to the next. Moral development 
is not a case of trial and error individual learning, but a process of social learning. As 
Boyd and Richerson (2004) are at pains to make clear, social learning dramatically cuts 
the cost of individual learning by directing the learner and making the learning target 
more salient (see also Sterelny 2003). Incorrectly interpreting the features of one’s 
environment can be costly. Learning moral disgust norms purely by trial and error alone 
can have disastrous effects upon one’s reproductive success, being able to ‘pick up’ the 
moral phenotypes of one’s social environment is through directed learning is adaptive.  
 
Having outlined the transmission mechanisms (niche construction, biased learning and 
participatory learning) in the gene-culture coevolution of moral cognition involving, I will 
now look at some of the ways these mechanisms are employed.  
 
6.4.2 Moral culture alters psychology 
 
In chapter 2, I demonstrated that our moral environments are not impoverished and that 
we have the environmental and individual resources to learn to identify the moral domain 
from the conventional domain. Emotional capacities, theory of mind, and consequential 
and counterfactual reasoning, combined with highly structured learning environments, 
enable the learning child to identify moral from non-moral norms. I also tentatively 
concluded that in such developmental environments a child can develop basic moral 
concepts based on the emotional responses to harm and welfare. The ability to be moral 
can be learned. 
 
If moral phenotypes are learned phenotypes then there need to be mechanisms that 
enable intergenerational transmission of moral information and environments to enable 
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the use of that information. There are numerous individual mechanisms that facilitate 
this process. One class of these involve the ways in which caregiving practices and 
developmental environments scaffold the developing moral phenotype of the child to 
enable the reliable, high-fidelity transmission from generation N to N + 1. 
 
Importantly, moral development takes time. We are not in possession of many of our 
more complex moral beliefs or concepts until our teenage years (Smetana 2006). It takes 
time for individuals to develop moral beliefs and norms that are different from their 
parents and moral groups, if this occurs at all. It is not often you will find a pre-teen 
moral vegetarian whose parents are not also vegetarian. There “are surprisingly low 
correlations between parent’s and children’s preferences (e.g., for food, music) and much 
more substantial parent-child correlations for values (e.g., political preferences, attitudes 
to abortion)” (Rozin 1999:218). If these values include moral values, this would suggest 
that our moral phenotypes (at least in modern western populations) are mainly 
transmitted vertically from parent to child. This is probably due to long periods of 
juvenile dependence spent in familial relationships as well as the nature of these 
relationships – we spend a lot of our time with parents and they are typically the 
punishers of moral transgressions and the teachers of moral concepts and norms. 
However, it is doubtful that vertical transmission would be the sole channel of 
transmission in all populations. In populations where caregiving is communal rather than 
familial for example, one would expect to see more oblique transmission from groups of 
caregivers to individual children.  
 
We see evidence of the transmission of both biological and cultural aspects of moral 
phenotypes in the development of guilt. Young children who have high levels of anxiety 
are more likely to develop high levels of guilt, if they have been brought up with 
inductive parenting styles as opposed to authoritarian environments. The emerging guilt 
levels of children with low anxiety are not affected by which parenting environment they 
are exposed to (Kochanska 1991; see also discussion in Linquist 2007 with respect to a 
dual inheritance account of the higher emotions). This is a clear example of how the 
development and expression of a moral phenotype involves the interplay between both 
genetic and culturally inherited factors, and its development is structured around 
embodied dispositions, in this case anxiety.  
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There are many ways in which generation N engineers and scaffold the moral learning 
environments of generation N + 1. We encountered many of these in previous chapters 
so I will only briefly address them here:  
 
Moral displays as exemplars – The moral behaviours of parents and caregivers provide 
exemplars of moral displays and scripting of moral experience for the learning child. 
Children experience the causal sequences of, and appropriate responses to, moral 
situations. (See sections 2.4.2 and 2.5.2.) 
 
Parental conflict management and disciplinary practices – Young children are often 
involved in emotionally charged moral conflicts with siblings, peers and parents. 
Constructive and reasoned explanation, as opposed to authoritarian disciplinary practices, 
that appeal to the emotional effects of action during toddler conflict resolution is shown 
to produce higher levels of moral understanding. In learning environments such as these, 
“emotion-laden discourse during conflicts … fosters the development of moral emotions 
such as guilt” (Dunn 2003:340).  (See sections 2.4.2 and 2.5.2.) 
 
Moral and emotional salience of environments – Caregivers’ own moral phenotypes 
structure their care practices thereby structuring the intergenerational transmission of 
moral phenotypes. Parents will point out moral features of their environments because 
they are morally and emotionally salient to them, thereby teaching children their own 
moral phenotypes by highlighting specific aspects of the environment and appropriate 
responses. (See sections 2.4.2, 2.5 and 4.3.1) 
 
Explicit teaching and moral narratives – Members of our community direct and 
explain the narrative of moral performance by ourselves and others. Adults communicate 
causality and responsibilities of moral events to which children have emotional reactions, 
helping them develop the appropriate moral responses (Thompson, Meyer et al. 2006). 
Children’s developmental environments are immersed with fairytales and other stories 
that are imbued with moral themes, actions and concepts that provide exemplars of 
moral behaviours and the scripting of moral episodes. (See sections 2.4.2. and 2.5.) 
 
Moral language and moral discourse – Moral language in the developing child’s social 
environment enable the child to label their moral experiences. Words like ‘naughty’, 
The Gene-Culture Coevolution of Moral Cognition 
 
186
‘wrong’ and ‘good’ enable the child to associate feelings, intentions, and causes with the 
different contexts within which they arise. Caregivers talk to their children in evaluative 
terms such as “when you helped mommy that was good wasn’t it”, “don’t hurt your 
brother, that is bad”. Studies have shown that mothers who frequently refer to feelings 
and moral evaluations in their discussions of moral events raised children who were more 
likely to express guilt for their actions after doing wrong (Dunn 2003). Moral language 
and the linguistic articulation of moral maxims provide a medium within which moral 
agents can engage in moral debate, moral perspective taking, and ultimately collaborative 
moral problem solving (Clark 1996). Teaching children moral language provides the tools 
with which to become active participants in their moral worlds. (See section 2.4.2. and 
5.6.) 
 
These are just some of the ways in which the development of our moral phenotypes is 
supported by the moral niche. By relating embodied responses to causes, consequences, 
behaviours, verbal classifications and social contexts, patterns of behaviours in groups 
and socialisation practices enable the reliable, accurate, high-fidelity transmission of 
embodied and extended moral phenotypes between generations.   
 
In addition to moral niche construction, there are many ways in which children 
contribute to the moral learning situation by biasing the flows of information between 
generations. Children are active and embodied participants in the learning situation. They 
have a raft of non-moral psychological and physiological resources that provide the 
platform for the process of moral elaboration but also bias between generation 
information transmission, thereby reducing noise and error. Capacities such as emotions, 
shared intentions, and imitation all affect the information flows between one generation 
and the next. We saw many of these resources in chapter 2 and have been summarised in 
table 6.1, along with the contributions they make to the transmission of moral 
phenotypes.   
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Table 6.1 Children’s psychological resources that contribute to high fidelity transmission of moral phenotypes  
   
Resource:  Description: Contribution to transmission of moral phenotypes: 
Emotions and 
Emotional 
Contagion 
Emotional displays are a primary means of communication. From birth 
children show basic emotional responding and the ability to respond to 
others’ emotional states (Saarni, Mumme et al. 1998). Often the recognition 
of others’ emotional states will generate the adoption of that state 
(emotional contagion) (Hastings, Zahn-Waxler et al. 2006; Eisenberg, 
Spinrad et al. 2006; Dunn 2003). 
The learning child pays particular attention to emotionally (and 
thereby often morally) salient events which facilitate the joint 
attention in moral learning. 
Shared 
Intentions 
Through the ability to distinguish the directionality of another’s embodied 
signalling (for example via a mother pointing at a dangerous object), 
children attain the understanding that emotional episodes are directed at 
events or objects (Saarni, Mumme et al. 1998).  
Children acquire the capacity to interpret emotional situations and 
assign meaning to particular emotional and moral episodes. This is 
important in the transmission of moral information to the learning 
child.  
Social 
referencing and 
Embodied 
Meaning 
By the end of the first year children are able to pick up on the embodied 
displays of others to evaluate their environment and regulate their responses 
appropriately. (Dunn 2003; Saarni, Mumme et al. 1998). Children as young 
as nine months will use the reactions of others as a guide to behaviour in 
situations of uncertainty (Saarni, Mumme et al. 1998). 
Children start to understand and appreciate the meaning of others’ 
embodied reactions and use those reactions as resources for appraisal 
in moral learning.  
Development of 
the Self 
Much of children’s moral development is congruent with the development 
of self-representation and seeing oneself as participants in a social world. 
This allows the development of “self-referential emotions such as guilt, 
pride, shame, and embarrassment” (Thompson, Meyer et al. 2006). 
Self-representation enables sensitivity to the evaluations of others 
and the feelings (pride and guilt, for example) that arise from those 
evaluations. This motivates agents act in accordance with others 
moral evaluations.  
Intersubjective 
Understanding 
At around 2 to 3 years of age children start to gain an awareness that people 
have divergent mental and emotional states that may differ from their own 
(Saarni, Mumme et al. 1998). 
Intersubjective understanding is important for learning the 
consequences and motivation of peoples’ actions.  
 
Imitation Imitation plays a major role in the learning of cultural skills and is central to 
the evolution of culture as it allows the transmission of cumulative 
improvements over time (Tomasello and Whiten 1999; Sterelny 2003). 
Imitation of moral behaviours and practices supports moral learning 
and the transmission of moral phenotypes. It also enables changes to 
the moral phenotype to be retained in the next generation.  
Active 
Exploration 
Young children will actively explore and test the normative structures of 
their moral environments in a form of trial and error learning. We see this 
in the period of development infamously known as the Terrible Twos.  
Exploring one’s moral environment allows the child to experience 
the moral environment and the consequences of action, gaining 
moral information about that environment used in moral learning.  
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Children are not passive moral learners. They are heavily biased towards, and actively 
explore, particular aspects of a highly structured moral environment which in turn 
exploits these biases to transfer moral information to the child. This mix of social 
transmission and individual exploration form what Sterelny calls hybrid-learning (Sterelny 
2006). It is through these mechanisms, I maintain, that the learning moral child builds up 
increasingly complex and elaborated moral knowledge structures.81(See Figure 6.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8. Note also that this is a multi-stage process where development will be constrained by levels of 
cognitive sophistication; you can’t have concepts of equity without first having concepts of fairness.  
 
Figure 6.1 Culture and the development of moral phenotypes 
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In summary, the reliable, high-fidelity transmission of morally relevant information 
from the moral niche to the developing child enables the development of the moral 
phenotype. This involves:   
 
1) Structured and directed moral learning environments which exploit the 
developing child’s non-moral psychology92 
 
2) Non-moral psychological biases that direct the learning child towards morally 
relevant aspects of the moral niche. 
 
6.4.3 Moral Psychology Alters Culture 
 
We have seen above some of the proximate mechanisms that structure and bias the flow 
of information from moral environments to the developing moral agent – the focus was 
on those mechanisms that facilitate the intergenerational transmission of moral 
phenotype from one generation to the next. This was one half of the feedback loop 
between the agent and their moral niche. The other is that in which the causal arrow 
flows the other way, where psychology influences and structures the moral niche.  
 
We have already seen in chapter 1 how selection as an ultimate cause can favour the 
evolution of moral behaviours. Many moral capacities, norms and practices are selectively 
favoured because they enhance cooperation. Individual selection can operate in favour of 
moral behaviours in small groups. Group-level cultural evolution was necessary for the 
evolution of morality in large-scale groups. In each case, our moral worlds exist because 
of the cooperative benefits they confer. Proximate mechanisms also help determine the 
structure of our moral worlds, because the makeup and nature of our moral worlds is not 
independent of our psychology. Because biases play a central role in the transmission of 
moral information they also affect the structure of our moral worlds. This is a crucial 
point: our beliefs, desires, choices, preferences and embodiment effects have a direct 
effect on the transmission of specific cultural variants, which, as we have seen above, are 
partly constitutive of the moral phenotype.  
 
                                                 
9.  I use the term “non-moral” to denote psychology that is not specific to morality.  
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Psychology helps determine the salience, memorability and motivations to exhibit moral 
information, thereby affecting the transmission of moral information between agents. 
This bears upon the moral phenotypes that develop and, in turn, the patterns of 
behaviours that give rise to the construction of our moral worlds. Take, for example, 
moral norms. Those that have strong emotional content, such as protecting children 
from harm for example, are more salient, memorable and elicit strong motivations; they 
resonate with our emotional sensibilities. It is more likely they will be transmitted 
between agents within a population than norms that promote harming children.  
 
Shaun Nichols (2002a) presents a persuasive account of how these effects play a role in 
the cultural evolution of norms. Through tracking historical patterns of social norms, he 
highlights just how our affective capacities bias the transmission of cultural information 
within cultures. According to Nichols, affect backed norms (such as those to do with 
harm and disgust) have a greater chance of transmission than non-affect backed norms 
and are therefore more likely to spread within and across generations. Because of their 
affective nature they are regarded as more serious, more important and easier to recall. 
This biasing effect is a special case of what Boyd and Richerson (2004) call content bias, 
whereby individuals are motivated to adopt practices which appeal to them or those that 
are deemed to be most successful or advantageous. Content biases depend on the 
content of the information transmitted. Our affective responses operate as ‘cultural 
attractors’ which bias the evolution of moral norms. As Nichols explains, normal people 
have aversive responses to suffering in others. Norms that prohibit harming others are 
therefore more likely to spread through populations over time. Norms that reduce 
negative affect (or increase positive affect) will be more appealing to the psychologies of 
normal agents than norms that promote negative affect or are affectively neutral. There 
are good adaptive reasons why we have affective responses to suffering, and these 
responses can be harnessed by cultural evolution to promote cooperative behaviour. We 
construct our moral niche around the embodied responses of human agents.  
 
Here we can see how the psychology of agents influences the construction of the moral 
niche. Moral cognitive capacities spread amongst populations via cultural group selection 
because they promote group cooperative behaviours. But our affective responses also 
create basins towards which cultural evolution will gravitate. The psychologies of agents 
within a population will therefore have direct effects upon the cultural structure of that 
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population. This will include the types of moral norms, behaviours and parenting 
practices which structure the child’s moral learning environment. (See Figure 6.2.) In this 
way, psychological biases help to ‘fix’ some of the content of moral cultural evolution. 
Some products of cultural evolution will align more closely with our psychologies than 
others. When psychological biases are aligned with moral information, basins of 
attraction stabilise the propensity for that information to remain with the population. 
Moral solutions to cooperative problems that are aligned with our psychology are more 
stable than those that are not.  
 
We can see these types of effects in the dairy farming example encountered earlier. 
Human preferences for the taste of milk provide basins of attraction which norms of 
dairy farming will gravitate towards. If humans found the taste of milk disgusting it is 
unlikely that we would have seen the cultural evolution of dairy farming and hence the 
spread of genes for lactase within dairy farming populations. Taste preferences help 
stabilise the cultural practices that evolve around them, making them more likely to be 
retained in a population as well as be passed on between generations. Similar effects are, I 
maintain, at play in the case of moral evolution.  
Figure 6.2 Moral phenotypes and their influence on the moral niche   
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6.4.4 Putting the Feedback Loop Together Again 
 
So far, we have seen how the construction of the moral phenotype and transmission 
between generations involves multiple mechanisms. The individual develops into a moral 
agent because of his (not exclusively moral) psychology and moral niche to which he is 
born. A combination of scaffolded learning environments interacting with biased 
psychologies facilitates the reliable, high-fidelity transmission of the moral phenotype 
(complex skill) from one generation to the next. Cultural evolution utilises, and is 
influenced by, many of the biases inherent in our embodied psychologies to establish 
groups of cooperative agents. The moral niche itself exists because of the interactions of 
multiple moral agents. Putting these aspects together, we have a stable feedback loop 
occurring over generations that is subject to selection at the group level as well as the 
individual level. Selection at the level of the individual favours those capacities that allow 
the successful cultural elaboration of an embodied psychology that underwrites the moral 
phenotype. At the group level, selection occurs for the construction of a structured 
learning environment (moral niche) that gives rise to the group beneficial moral 
phenotypes. Hence our moral phenotype is a product of biological as well as cultural 
selection operating via a dual inheritance evolutionary model. Importantly the two 
processes impact upon each other. Once we have feedback loops occurring over 
generations involving high-fidelity transmission and incremental change we have 
evolutionary efficacious downstream niche construction.  
 
The cultural generation of primitive moral practices that bring about cooperative benefits 
alter fitness landscapes, leading to increased selection for the non-moral psychological 
capacities which enable the cultural elaboration of the moral phenotype. This includes 
capacities such as emotions, theory of mind and imitation. Their spread within the 
population gives rise to further selection pressures for moral cultural practices (moral 
niche construction) which leverage greater cooperative benefits. This in turn creates 
greater selection pressures for the spread of psychological capacities that favour this 
elaboration, and so on. The two dimensions operate in a coevolutionary process: 
culturally-mediated changes in phenotype cause changes in selection on genetically-
mediated traits, and vice versa. As long as those cumulative improvements are 
maintained over generations we will see the ‘ratcheting up’ of complex moral skills and  
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the elaborate moral and social systems that we see today, and the cooperative benefits 
they bring. This feedback process crossing over brain, body and world is a dual 
inheritance model of the evolution of moral cognition. In Box 6.1 I have given an 
account of how this process operates in a gene-culture coevolutionary model of moral 
disgust.      
 
Box 6.1 Case Study: The Gene-Culture Coevolution of Moral Disgust 
Moral disgust is an emotion-based response to a class of morally forbidden behaviours 
that typically promotes withdrawal of contact and association with perpetrators of those 
behaviours. Rozin et al. suggest that the role of this moral response is a “powerful form 
of negative socialisation” (2000:650) and in this way acts as a mechanism that promotes 
adherence to the social order. 
Rozin and colleagues present evidence that moral disgust is culturally elaborated 
from more basic food related emotional responses and proceeds incrementally through a 
sequence of four stages involving increasing levels of abstraction. The development of 
moral disgust starts with the Core Disgust originating from more biologically primitive 
distaste responses to foul tastes. Core disgust is a uniquely human emotional response to 
protect the body from disease and poison, especially potential contaminants such as 
food, animals and bodily products. It is not witnessed until after infancy, and initially not 
considered to involve concepts of ‘contamination’ such as that seen in more mature 
subjects. Core disgust then proceeds to Animal Nature disgust which involves negative 
responses to violations of the animal-human boundary through to contact and offensive 
sights. This involves responses to such things as death, sexual acts and inadequate 
hygiene. Rozin et al. propose that these involve the rejection of things that remind us of 
our animal nature. The stages of disgust then move to Interpersonal Disgust, involving 
rejection of contact with, and hence potential contamination from, other people and the 
application of more abstract concepts of contamination. The final stage is that of Moral 
Disgust, which involves responses to abstract categories such as racism, murder and the 
degrading treatment of others, often pertaining to violations of the social order. Rozin et 
al. suggest that moral disgust “may represent a more abstract set of concerns about the 
human-animal distinction, focusing not so much on the human body as on the human 
body-politic – that is, the human as a member of a cooperating social entity” (Rozin, 
Haidt et al. 2000:644).   
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The development through the various stages of disgust involves increasingly 
sophisticated and abstract ideas of contamination “requiring a separation of appearance 
and reality” and notions of invisible entities “that are vehicles of contamination” (Rozin, 
Haidt et al. 2000). Full development of the most abstract of these concepts can only be 
achieved with the attainment of a level of cognitive sophistication which does not arise 
until the age of about seven years (in North American children (Rozin, Haidt et al. 
2000)). In this way, the development of moral disgust is cognitively constrained because it is 
dependent on the development and integration of various cognitive competencies. 
Development through these levels is also incremental, progressing from simple to complex 
levels of abstraction.  
There is evidence that this expansion process has a cultural basis. Firstly, studies of 
feral humans found that they do not show disgust responses (Malson, reported in Rozin, 
Haidt et al. 2000). Secondly, core disgust and animal nature disgust show marked 
similarities across different cultures, whereas the more abstract higher levels of expansion 
in the socio-moral categories show greater between-culture differences (Haidt, Rozin et 
al. 1997; Rozin, Haidt et al. 2000). Thirdly, we often see quite rapid change in moral 
disgust prohibitions, as seen by, for example, recent changes in moral attitudes towards 
sex, sexuality and obesity.  
This expansion of disgust is developmentally scaffolded by moral environments. 
The transmission of contamination concepts, norms of behaviour, and associated 
eliciting cues are socially transmitted. For example, infants do not display aversive 
reactions to faeces, but Rozin et al. suggest that children pick up these responses from 
parental behaviour through witnessing acts such as aversive responses to faeces, i.e., 
social referencing. The screwing up of the face and rejection of offending object are clear 
embodied signals to the child which involve expressions of inhibiting bodily entry 
(screwing up of mouth and nose) and expulsion (gape indicating food rejection) (Rozin, 
Haidt et al. 2000). This is downstream niche construction in action. Parental displays 
structure and direct the child’s learning environment through embodiment displays, 
normative action and communication.  
Extended periods of infant and juvenile dependency are likely to play a role in the 
fidelity of the transfer of the moral disgust phenotype. If the learning environment is 
primarily with the parent then they will most likely adopt the moral phenotype of that 
parent. By the time children have reached moral maturity they are less likely to interfere 
with or drastically alter the scaffolding process because they have already adopted the 
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moral dispositions that underwrite that process (see Linquist (2007) with respect to 
intergenerational transfer of emotional phenotypes). 
Children’s basic emotional dispositions for core disgust bias their learning by 
directing them to emotionally salient aspects of their environment and thereby 
reinforcing mechanisms of intergenerational transfer. Parenting practices also exploit the 
psychological dispositions in a child that is already primed for disgust-based learning. In 
this way disgust based emotions operate as basin of attraction which learning processes 
will gravitate towards. Children are much more like their parents with respect to values 
than to preferences (Rozin 1999) and the robustness of this vertical channel of cultural 
transmissions through biasing effects goes some way to explaining why.  
The psychological mechanisms underlying moral disgust norms also operate as 
cultural attractors for the (horizontal) cultural transmission of those moral norms. 
Research by Shaun Nichols has shown that norms “prohibiting actions that elicit 
negative emotions are more likely to survive than affectively neutral norms” (Nichols 
2002a:251), and his research confirms this with respect to norms prohibiting actions that 
elicit core disgust.  
On first appearances, this picture seems applicable for our more biologically 
grounded “core disgust” reactions, but what about more abstract moral disgust? Once 
the association between emotional based disgust reactions and moral actions is made in 
development, then those actions will reliably elicit emotionally grounded reactions, 
thereby biasing and increasing the likelihood of the transmission of disgust norms and 
behaviours. As mentioned above, those associations are less likely to be broken if they 
are acquired during development, becoming individually entrenched. Here we can see 
biased stabilisation effects operating at the level of culture as well as in the feedback 
loops transferring the moral phenotype from one generation to the next. 
Looking at the development and cultural transmission of disgust in this way we can 
see how the cultural elaboration of disgust fits a dual inheritance evolutionary model. At 
the genetic level, selection favours distaste based basic emotional mechanisms and other 
cognitive capacities that allow cultural elaborations of disgust. At the cultural level, 
selection operates on both group norms within a population as well as associated 
pedagogical practices (i.e., the moral niche) that give rise to the cognitively enriched 
disgust based responses. 
As such, core disgust is co-opted by culture to extend the avoidance mechanism 
beyond the initial elicitors of core disgust. There are clear and direct individual adaptive 
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advantages for many of the stages involving poisons, contamination, and disease and at 
the more abstract level the “need to reject many things, including sexual and social 
“deviants”“ (Haidt, Rozin et al. 1997).103The direct adaptive advantages are not always so 
obvious. Think, for example, of how people in Western societies typically find the eating 
of cats morally disgusting whereas eating pigs is not. In cases like these, adaptive value 
often lies is as a mechanism of group conformity and control as well as advertising 
difference to other groups. Through the alienation and stigmatisation of deviant 
individuals, moral disgust operates as a mechanism that protects the social order and 
maintains large-scale social cooperation. Mechanisms that originate in aid of self-
preservation are culturally elaborated to become mechanisms of group coordination and 
cooperation. In the case of group coordination, the content of the norms themselves 
may not be adaptive114but group conformity is. The skill of being able to make 
judgements of moral disgust is learned, in addition to the content of the norms. In other 
words, it need not be the content of the disgust norms that is necessarily adaptive, but 
the complex skill of being able to make disgust based judgements that conform to those 
of your group that is adaptive.  
                                                 
10. Haidt and Rozin et al. point out that we should be careful in proposing biologically adaptive reasons 
for the evolution of disgust (such as poisons and disease etc) for the fact that children do not display 
disgust reactions early on, will often put all sorts of things in their mouths and do not develop ideas of 
contamination until at least 5 to 7 yrs (Haidt, Rozin et al. 1997). They suggest that this could indicate that 
the social function of disgust could be the more important adaptive role of disgust. I agree that we should 
be careful. One reason for late onset could be because long periods of infant and juvenile dependence will 
mean children have limited exposure to dangerous and infectious objects as long as they are adequately 
supervised. However, the age of onset should not matter as to whether there are biological advantages to 
having such knowledge. Biological advantage can also have late onset. It may take a few years for young 
children to learn that cars are dangerous, but that does not mean it is not a biologically adaptive advantage 
for them to do so.  
11. As Boyd and Richerson make clear, sometimes culture is adaptive, maladaptive, or neutral (Boyd 
and Richerson 2004).  
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Figure 6.3 The feedback process of the cultural elaboration of moral disgust 
and the moral niche   
Before concluding this chapter there is one issue I would like to address. I started this 
thesis by outlining many of the mechanisms by which moral cognition evolved. One 
feature was how within-group similarities and between-group differences can be 
sustained through cultural group selection. In subsequent chapters, we have also seen 
many of the mechanisms that account for the transfer of within-group similarities 
between moral agents within and across generations. However, I have said very little 
about between-group similarities in moral phenotypes.  
 
6.5 In Group / Out Group Similarities and Differences 
 
A culture and learning dependent view of morality leads to expectations of moral 
difference between communities. The challenge, therefore, is to show how this account is 
compatible with cross-cultural similarity. In chapter 1 I outlined how cultural group 
selection stabilises uniform moral behaviours that favour cooperation; within-group 
uniformity can be an adaptive advantage. We saw that cultural group selection for 
mechanisms of cooperation only work if there is conformity within groups and variation 
between groups as is required for cooperative enterprises to evolve in large groups. It is 
uncontroversial to claim that there are many cultural similarities within large groups and 
that there are many moral differences between groups. We need only think of moral 
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norms pertaining to marriage, sexual practices, rights and food for examples of these. 
However, if morality is not innate, why do we also see between-group similarities in divergent 
populations? If, as Boyd and Richerson maintain, norms of enforcement and punishment 
can stabilise almost any norm, why are there commonalities between moral cultures?  
 
It would appear that all cultures have moral systems as solutions to cooperative problems 
(to some degree or other), including notions such as fairness and justice. Universality in 
general is touted as prima facie evidence for innateness (Barkow, Cosmides et al. 1992) 
and this is also true in the moral case (Hauser 2006b). Consequently, there is debate as to 
whether there are moral universals. As we have seen in earlier chapters, Marc Hauser, 
John Mikhail and Susan Dwyer believe that we have a universal moral grammar. Jesse 
Prinz (2008a), on the other hand, maintains that there are numerous counterexamples to 
oft cited moral universals such as incest prohibitions and universal norms against killing. 
These counter-examples, Prinz argues, undermine claims of universality and give us some 
reason to doubt moral innateness. However, as both Hauser and Prinz recognise, 
evidence of universality is not sufficient to establish or refute nativism, it needs to be 
presented with acquisition evidence. Moral universals and their role as evidential support 
for nativism are open questions but not ones that I will focus on here. Instead, I will look 
at the lesser claim, that there are some moral similarities between some human 
populations that are more than merely random chance, or obvious selection pressures 
(such as the fact that there are no cross-cultural norms promoting celibacy). Here I will 
briefly look at some of the theoretical tools we have for accounting for cross-cultural 
similarities and the relevance to moral cognition.   
 
We have already seen that learning biases make certain moral information likely to 
spread. Work by Shaun Nichols (2002b) provides examples of how these biases affect 
cultural transmission. Further, with similar selection pressures it is likely that different 
and disparate groups with the same biological drivers and cooperation and coordination 
problems will often converge on similar solutions.125 The example of trade and finance 
from previous chapters can be applied here. Trade and financial systems are cross-
cultural phenomena, if not universal. All normal people have at least rudimentary notions 
of ownership, property, trade, exchange and monetary value. A non-nativist account of 
                                                 
12. See also Dennett’s discussion of “a Good Trick” whereby general intelligence can lead “again and 
again to same bright idea” (1995:487). 
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these systems and associated concepts and behaviours involves the cultural elaboration 
of dispositions to desire and value. Human groups face similar resource distribution 
problems, many of which are solved by the construction of economic systems. The 
evolution of these systems is biased by our non-economic biologies. An evolutionary 
account based in biology and culture would see the emergence of trading system such as 
bartering, leading to more complex systems of money and finance across disparate 
groups.  
  
In the moral case, we are likely to see similar mechanisms. Feedback cycles that involve 
the same innate psychological biases and similar cooperation and coordination problems 
will converge on similar solutions. Physiological and psychological biases are likely to 
give rise to basins of attraction which will, for example, favour the evolution of particular 
norms and not others. In this way culturally unrelated groups will converge on many of 
the same locations in moral space. Some insightful work on the ways convergent 
solutions arise can be seen in Brian Skyrms’ The Evolution of the Social Contract (1996). 
Skyrms applies evolutionary game theory to problems of cooperation and much of this 
work can be read as showing how evolutionary dynamics will often converge towards 
particular strategic solutions to cooperative problems, even from different initial 
conditions. This is not to say that Skyrms claims that there is one true solution to 
cooperative or coordination problems. On the contrary, he claims, for example, a variety 
of different norms can arise: “It is apparent … that the typical case is one in which there 
is not a unique preordained result, but rather a profusion of possible equilibrium 
outcomes” (1996:109; see also, Harms and Skyrms 2008). But Skyrms does show that in 
dynamic interactions, there are stable states which have an increased likelihood of 
evolving – these are basins of attraction for the evolution of cooperative strategies. 
 
Skyrms considers the problem of fairly dividing a cake between two people. Assuming 
that cake possession is correlated to fitness in a reproducing population, for randomly 
paired individuals partaking in symmetric136division of the cake there is one evolutionary 
stable strategy available, a 50%-50% equal division. An evolutionary stable strategy is “a 
strategy such that, if most of the members of a population adopt it, there is no “mutant” 
                                                 
13. A game is said to be symmetric when the outcomes are the same for each player when under the 
same circumstances. i.e., the outcome for player A adopting strategy S, is the same outcome for player B 
adopting strategy S.  The outcomes depend on the strategy being played, not who plays the strategy. 
Symmetric equilibrium is when all players use the same strategy. e.g., all players asking for 30% of a cake. 
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strategy that would give higher reproductive fitness” (Maynard Smith and Price 1973:15). 
These strategies are more likely to persist in populations because they produce greater, or 
equal, fitness outcomes compared to alternative strategies. In cake dividing games such as 
this there is one clearly preferential strategy (see Box 6.2 for more detailed explanation). 
Yet, even in cases where there is no one clear preferential strategy, we still find instances 
of convergent solutions. One example is how, in some circumstances, even very small 
biases can see the universal establishment of particular norms (Skyrms 1996).  
 
In some coordination situations there will be multiple evolutionary stable strategies 
available. Sometimes the payoffs for these strategies will be equivalent so there is no 
principled way to choose between the two. In these situations, we are said to be in a 
position of symmetry. Skyrms argues that breaking of this symmetry can occur due to small 
differences between the participating agent’s resources. He shows that the slightest 
perturbation which alters the cost / benefit of any one player (i.e., induces a bias) will 
alter the reproductive fitness of that player so that the strategies in a reproducing 
population will no longer considered to be symmetrical. Perturbation events create a 
basin of attraction towards which the population will gravitate. Over time, the strategy to 
which the bias leans will dominate the population and will therefore become the norm.  
Box 6.2 Cake dividing games and the evolution of fair division 
We can see why a 50%-50% fair division strategy is likely to arise in a population of cake 
dividers when we look at the other strategies available to cake dividing populations. As 
Skyrms (1996) explains, should a population adopt a strategy of requesting 60% division, 
then each individual gets nothing because they will only encounter others also demanding 
60%. But, if any one individual in the same population were to ask for anything less than 
40%, they would have the rest of the population to cut cake with (i.e., all those asking for 
60%). They would do better than the average of the population and hence have better 
than average reproductive fitness. 
We can also imagine the same outcomes in a population in which all people ask for 
30% of the cake. If any alternative strategy that arises in the population asking for more 
than 30%, but no greater than 70%, that strategy will do better than the population 
average. 
In each of these examples, what we see is that those with the higher payoffs (i.e., 
higher fitness) than the average will increase in numbers in the population. Population-
wide strategies of 60% or 30% are evolutionary unstable strategies because there are 
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mutant strategies which have higher fitness. However, a crucial point is that as those 
mutant strategies spread in the population they become less profitable because they are 
more likely to meet their own kind. A strategy of asking for 70% in a population of 
others asking for 30% will initially have higher than average fitness and therefore spread 
in the population. But, the advantage of this strategy will decrease as their kind becomes 
more common and therefore increase the probability of encountering 70%ers with 
whom they cannot divide cake.  
This leaves only one strategy which is evolutionary stable; that is, when most of the 
population adopt that strategy no alternative strategy can better it. That strategy is 50%-
50% equal division.147In cases where an alternative strategy arises requesting a division 
less than 50%, they will always receive less than the population average. In cases in which 
an alternative strategy arises which requests a division of more than 50%, there can be no 
cake division because any attempted division would be greater than 100%. What we see 
is that 50%-50% equal division is both an evolutionary stable strategy (i.e., unlikely to be 
bettered by any other strategy) as well as an attracting equilibrium, whereby reproducing 
populations of cake dividers will evolve towards a population of 50% cake dividers. Any 
move away from that strategy would induce selective pressures back towards that 
equilibrium. Equal division is a basin of attraction in the cake dividing game. Strategies 
above and below 50% are unlikely to invade the population. Therefore, demanding 50% 
of the cake is the only evolutionary stable equilibrium strategy and more likely to evolve 
in populations of reproducing symmetric cake dividers. Skyrms also shows that in 
bargaining cake division games that involve mixed strategies (i.e., populations have a 
mixture of different bargaining strategies) 50%-50% equal division is still likely to evolve 
from larger numbers of initial starting states than any unfair division strategy, because 
equal division strategies provide large basins of attraction towards which populations will 
evolve. (See chapter 1 in Skyrms 1996). 
 
A useful application of this line of thinking is Neil Levy’s (2004) treatment of gender role 
                                                 
14. Note that a strategy where each member of the population demands 100% of the cake is, like the 
50% strategy, an equilibrium strategy (Skyrms 1996). This is because everyone in the population will get 
nothing, including any mutant strategies that arise, because they are likely to only meet agents undertaking 
the 100% strategy. Therefore the population is said to be at equilibrium. But, the 100% strategy is not a 
stable strategy. This is because if only a small number of mutants arise who ask for 50% or less, then they 
may meet and share the cake with each other, thereby attaining a higher than population average payoff. If 
this were to occur, the mutant strategy would spread within the population. This is not the case with equal 
(50%-50%) division, where no other mutant strategy can obtain higher than average payoff. 
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norms. Child-rearing is a resource allocation problem that has many possible solutions, 
but there are two evolutionary stable strategies that are in a position of symmetry where 
each has the same payoff: either the man can care for the child, or the woman can care 
for the child. In reality, the one solution that we typically see is that the task of child 
rearing is allocated to women. The reason, Levy suggests, is due to physical differences 
between men and women.158Because mothers initially bear the costs of child rearing 
when the child is born (such those of childbirth and breast-feeding), a naturally occurring 
asymmetry arises with respect to the labour allocation of child rearing between the sexes. 
This symmetry-breaking event drives the population towards adopting one coordinating 
strategy over the others. The asymmetry need only be small for symmetry-breaking to 
occur. If these symmetry-breaking features are common to independently evolving 
populations involving the same coordination problems, it is highly likely the same 
coordination strategy will arise in each of the populations.  
 
This work is relevant to the evolution of morality and cross-cultural moral similarities. 
Firstly, independent populations can converge (indeed, are likely to converge) upon many 
of the same solutions to various problems such as resource distribution. We have just 
seen, for example, how evolution will often lead to selection for equal division from 
many different starting conditions and strategies. Basins of attraction can draw evolving 
populations towards certain evolutionarily stable strategies. Fairness is a clear example of 
this. Secondly, symmetry breakers (which often seem rather innocuous and independent 
of the phenomena being explained) can drive the adoption of cooperation and 
coordination strategies in independently evolving populations. Non-moral biases can 
favour the evolution of particular moral norms. Thirdly, much of the point of Skyrms’ 
work is to show that natural selection operates on cultural dynamics, or as Skyrms 
himself explains, “the Darwinian story can be transposed into the context of cultural 
evolution, in which imitation and learning may play an important role in the dynamics” 
(1996:11, italics in original). We can invoke cultural evolutionary dynamics to explain 
many features of populations without the need for innate, domain-specific psychologies 
that evolved in the ‘Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness of the Pleistocene’.   
 
Having seen how moral norms of fairness can evolve, we can hypothesise similar 
                                                 
15. As Levy points out, evolutionary psychologists such as Steven Pinker will often claim that it is 
innate psychological differences between the sexes that evolved in the Environment of Evolutionary 
Adaptedness which best explain gender roles (see Pinker 2002). 
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histories for norms of justice and associated concepts. Concepts such as good, bad, right 
and wrong, and moral prohibitions against cheating and theft, for example, are likely to 
evolve in divergent populations because they are evolutionary stable strategies to 
cooperation and coordination problems.169 We can also imagine Levy’s norms of gender 
roles applying to the morals of sex and sexuality often witnessed across cultures, such as 
non-equivalent moral judgements and norms applying to men’s and women’s sexual 
promiscuities and associated reputations. In the moral case more generally, it is likely that 
biases, even small ones, can result in convergent evolution in divergent populations 
where those biases are enough to establish basins of attraction for norms of behaviour. A 
universal set of basic non-moral emotions, for example, can trigger basins of attraction 
for the evolution of norms as well as pedagogical practices that spread those norms. 
Emotions can therefore operate as symmetry breakers which favour some particular 
moral strategies over others. Human trajectories through moral space are going to be 
constrained by the effects of our underlying embodied psychologies, such that the 
trajectories that groups independently travel will be very similar indeed. Many of our 
moral norms and cultural and moral pedagogical practices will be convergent, culturally 
evolved solutions to cooperation problems. We need not, therefore, appeal to an innate 
universal moral psychology to explain the existence of cross-cultural similarities in moral 
psychology or moral systems.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
  
I have contended that moral phenotypes are learned phenotypes. They are complex skills 
that we learn over the course of development which emerge from the patterned 
integration of aspects of brain, body and world – they involve both biological and 
cultural aspects. These skills cannot be learned individually because individual learning 
environments are typically noisy and prone to error. The learning and expression of 
moral phenotypes requires socially structured interactions with our moral worlds – both 
the development and expression are scaffolded and structured by our moral 
environments. This places particular importance on the role of the environment in 
establishing moral phenotypes. 
 
                                                 
16. This is not to claim that all morality evolves. There are surely other mechanisms at work, but the 
claim is that much of morality evolves this way. 
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These moral environments are themselves the product of adaptive cumulative change 
over generations. In addition to the biological components of moral phenotypes being 
inherited, cultural structures that enable moral phenotypes are also inherited. Together 
these operate as part of a dual inheritance system – aspects of the phenotypes are 
inherited in both the genetic and cultural channels. Because cumulative evolution of 
moral phenotypes requires the reliable, high-fidelity intergenerational transmission of 
moral information, there are some issues around how these phenotypes are inherited 
between generations. I have detailed a number of mechanisms that minimise 
transmission errors in the cultural channel. These allow the transmission of group moral 
phenotypes from one generation to the next. We have also seen that this model is 
coevolutionary. Evolution in one dimension (genes) influences evolution in the other 
(culture) and vice versa. Psychology begets culture and culture begets psychology in a 
gene-culture feedback loop (the psychological/genetic component which does not, as I 
have stressed, constitute an innate moral sense). In this way, culture is an evolutionary 
efficacious mechanism – selection acting on and through culture guides our evolutionary 
trajectories.  
 
In sum, parents direct the social learning of the child. Children also contribute to the 
learning experience by actively engaging with their moral worlds. Both mechanisms 
improve fidelity of transmission in potentially noisy and error prone environments, 
allowing the cumulative retention of variation necessary for natural selection. The 
transmission of moral cultural practices and environments over generations allows the 
cumulative evolution of moral cognition.  
 
Some of what I have outlined may be speculative, but it is none-the-less empirically 
tractable.1710Indeed, many of the empirically informed gene-culture coevolutionary 
models, such as those by Boyd and Richerson, are suggestive of such an account of the 
evolution of morality. Recent empirical work on coevolutionary models in the field of 
morality by Mesoudi and Laland (2007) and Mesoudi and Danielson (Mesoudi and 
Danielson 2008) lend some empirical weight to dual inheritance models in moral 
evolution.  
                                                 
17. Evidence for dual inheritance models themselves is not necessarily evidence for non-nativism. An 
innate moral sense can be consistent with elements of morality being inherited in the cultural channel. A 
proper evolutionary account will therefore involve an account of moral acquisition. Hence, the dual 
inheritance model I have presented in conjunction with the acquisition account of previous chapters 
specifically details a non-nativist account of the evolution of moral cognition.    
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6.7 Summary 
 
In this chapter I have argued that moral cognition is a learned complex skill that evolves 
via a gene-culture coevolutionary process through dual channels of inheritance. Some of 
the main points are:  
 
• Moral phenotypes are a product of genes and non-trivial structural contributions 
from the environment. 
 
• The evolution of moral cognition is suited to a dual inheritance model of 
evolution. 
 
• Dual inheritance models require reliable, high-fidelity transmission in both 
genetic and cultural channels of inheritance. 
 
• Reliable, high-fidelity transmission in the cultural channel is achieved through 
mechanisms such as downstream niche construction, biased learning and 
children’s participation and exploration of their moral worlds.  
 
• Agent-environment interactions create feedback process that runs across 
generations. When this process allows the accumulation of modifications over 
generations, it becomes an evolutionarily significant process. 
 
• Convergent evolutionary processes help explain non-trivial cross-cultural moral 
similarities between groups. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With the recent popularity of evolutionary psychology, nativism has often been viewed as 
the default position in evolutionary accounts of human psychology; our minds are 
collections of genetically specified psychological adaptations that evolved in response to 
evolutionary pressures deep in our lineage’s history. In the case of morality, we are moral 
agents with the moral psychologies and culture that we have because of selection for our 
innate moral sense in response to adaptive challenges of the Pleistocene. The aim of this 
thesis has been to question this picture of morality and to develop alternative 
explanations of the moral mind and its evolution. To conclude, I will briefly summarise 
the core results and outline some future research directions. I will then look at some 
interesting implications, including the constraints on individual moralities, the realisability 
of moral theories, and the costs and constraints of moral obligation.   
 
The alternative account of the evolution of moral cognition presented in this thesis is 
based on a number of key aspects. I detailed how moral cognition is selected to leverage 
the benefits of cooperation, and how there are a plurality of mechanisms through which 
it evolved. However, I argued that moral cognition is not innate; it is a learned 
adaptation. In support of this, I described some of the ways in which our culturally based 
developmental environments play a specific role in the transferring of moral capacities 
from one generation to the next, without recourse to innate moral information. I also 
argued against an assumption inherent in much of philosophy of mind and the cognitive 
sciences: our cognitive processes are bound by the brain and associated neural structures. 
Instead, much of moral cognition incorporates both body and environmental structures. 
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Again, culture plays a central role, supplying resources necessary for both the 
development and execution of moral cognition. One particular aspect I explored was the 
way in which our embodied social interactions create the very moral space in which we 
and importantly future generations operate. We construct our moral worlds and our 
moral worlds construct our moral minds. The moral world we create plays a vital 
evolutionary role in the transmission of moral phenotypes from one generation to the 
next. Pulling these threads together, I developed a dual inheritance model of the 
evolution of moral cognition. I explained how many of our moral cultural practices such 
as niche construction, psychological biases and the ways in which the learning child 
interacts with their world enable the reliable high-fidelity transmission of moral 
information between generations required for the cumulative evolution of moral 
phenotypes.  
 
This view of the evolution of moral cognition leads to many new and interesting research 
avenues, both empirical and theoretical. Future work will involve developing a more 
detailed understanding of the exposure-competence relationship in moral development, 
including further analysis of the influence of parenting practises across and within 
cultures and the role of psychological biases. This will enable us to gain more insight into 
moral learning and help to resolve the nativism/non-nativism debate. As we have seen, 
an embodied cognitive science offers unique perspectives on this research and will 
contribute significantly to unravelling the underlying structure of morality. This will 
require further exploration of the roles that representations and non-representational 
components play in moral cognition and the many ways we integrate the body and world 
into our moral problem-solving routines. Future research in extended moral cognition 
will involve individuating different moral phenomena and identifying the various roles of 
brain, body and world. Progress in understanding the evolution of moral cognition 
requires developing a more detailed, empirically informed, dual inheritance model. We 
need empirical research that tracks the information flows through multiple inheritance 
channels and which locates the specific roles of learning and niche construction in this 
process. The evolution of moral disgust is a model of such research, and the aim is to 
extend this model to other aspects of moral cognising. Moral cognition, in turn, is a 
model for exploring philosophical questions on the nature of explanation in cognitive 
science and the boundary disputes in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Further 
exploration of the relationship between the extended mind and evolution will provide 
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another avenue of future research. The extended mind involves cognitive manipulations 
of the external world which, as we have seen, have important downstream effects on 
future generations which are visible to selection.  
 
The work in this thesis also offers new ways of looking at the moral domain, with some 
interesting implications. A central thread running throughout has been to question many 
of the traditional boundaries of explanation. I did this in two ways. I argued firstly that 
explanations of moral cognition are not confined to the brain and, secondly, that the 
evolutionary project involved redrawing the boundaries within which selection operates: 
selection does not act solely on genes, it also acts upon culture. In each of these 
explanatory frameworks, we saw the significance of the dynamic and reciprocal 
interactions between biology and culture both within an agent’s lifetime and over 
generations. These interactions place central importance on both developmental 
environments and the environments in which the mature moral agent is embedded.  
 
This raises the interesting question as to what philosophical moral thought experiments 
are uncovering. If our decision making is reflected in our responses to moral thought 
experiments, then those experiments are uncovering many of the non-moral biological, 
culturally-specific and evolutionary influences that determine individual moral 
judgements, rather than a deep universal truth about the innate structure of our moral 
psychology. We have already seen how our moral cognitions involve a confluence of 
factors, many of which can arise independent of any moral considerations. 
Understanding these, the situated nature of moral judgement and the framing effects of 
the thought experiments will lead to a better understanding of the determinants of moral 
thought and action.  
 
One consequence of the perspective I have developed is an emphasis on the plasticity of 
human moral cognition; it is rich in possibility. We have good reason to doubt that the 
fundamental determinants of our moral cognitions and moral culture are to be found 
deep in our evolutionary history; our moral brains are not hardwired in our ancestral 
past. Instead, many of our moral capacities evolve as strategic responses to cooperation 
and coordination problems that can arise over comparatively short time scales. Our 
moral worlds and our moral minds can and do change in fundamental ways; the 
trajectory of the development and evolution of moral cognition is open. Yet one of the 
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implications of the account I have provided is that moral development and evolution 
involve both flexibility and constraint that affect individual moralities and group moral 
systems. The source of these constraints and biases differ from that of the nativist 
account in fundamental ways, meaning that different drivers influence the outcomes of 
development and evolution.   
 
We can see these two elements at play in individual moral decision making. Under a 
general learning account we expect a large degree of developmental plasticity and a 
correspondingly large range of individual moralities. Yet there are a number of reasons 
why individual moralities and moral systems will be somewhat constrained. Firstly, the 
long period of juvenile dependence in which moral development occurs limits the variety 
of moral information to which we are exposed, developmentally entrenching that 
information and the moral capacities to which they give rise. Moral change will often be 
slow. Secondly, biases influence the transmission of moral information between 
generations and hence bias the moral psychologies we develop. Thirdly, strong emotional 
and other biases will constrain the types of moral beliefs and behaviours we find salient. 
For example, moral beliefs and judgements that involve emotions such as empathy and 
sympathy are less likely to be subject to strong individual decision-making forces. This is 
because psychological and cultural biases dampen the individual decision making 
involved in the processing and transmission of information. As Boyd and Richerson 
(2004) point out, we tend to adopt the same beliefs as family and friends when decision-
making forces are weak. Finally, the capacity for moral cognition is dependent on the 
worlds within which they are embedded. The structure of those worlds will, therefore, in 
part determine the informational resources available to us, and the cognitions that we can 
and do make. This last point highlights one of the roles that the evolution of moral 
worlds plays in constraining individual moralities. Because our moral psychology in part 
reflects our moral world, the selective effects on those worlds impact on our moral 
psychologies. The evolutionary designs upon those worlds and the fitness benefits they 
confer help determine moral thought and action. Understanding the flexibility and 
constraints on moral thought and action will therefore involve, as I have done in this 
thesis, detailing the interaction between individual and world through an evolutionary 
lens.  
 
This picture of moral cognition and its evolution is relevant to debates about normative 
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theories and the moral actions we choose. For example, the emphasis on beyond-the-
brain structures impacts upon our understanding of the psychological realisability of 
moral theories, the true costs of our moral obligations, and the constraints in satisfying 
those obligations.  
 
At a fundamental level, we want to know if our moral theories that prescribe thought and 
action are psychologically possible for normal agents – are our moral theories 
psychologically realisable? (Flanagan 1991).1 The realisability of moral theories will 
depend on those elements constitutive of moral cognition. For example, certain moral 
theories will simply not be realisable in a population of psychopaths because they lack 
elements, such as particular emotional capacities, to think morally in the right ways. 
Based on the work in this thesis, we can see there are numerous additional realisability 
constraints placed upon moral theories beyond the mere brainbound psychology of 
traditional cognitive science. If moral cognising and the potential resources that support 
moral decision making are dependent on body and world, then they will play a central 
role in establishing the realisability of moral theories in human populations. This will 
include group and information structures and the many biases and constraints they 
afford. What we can do depends on what we can think, and that in turn crucially depends 
on our physical and social environment. With additional consideration to developmental 
and evolutionary effects, we have the tools to consider what types of moral systems are 
possible. 
 
This view of moral cognition and its evolution also impacts upon the way in which we 
identify the costs of, and constraints upon, moral compliance. This is important because 
the costs involved in obtaining a moral end are relevant to our calculations as to how, 
and even if we ought, to pursue that end. Whether we intervene to save the lives of 
others for example, will depend, in part, on how many other lives will be at risk. These 
issues are important for such things as moral satisficing: in pursuit of maximising moral 
outcomes, we may find the sub-optimal implementation of a particular moral norm could 
in fact be worse than adopting an alternative, less demanding norm. Consider our moral 
obligations to future generations in the face of global climate change, for example. We 
                                                 
1. Owen Flanagan specifies the Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism as follows: “Make sure 
when constructing a moral theory or projecting a moral ideal that the character, decision processing, and 
behaviour prescribed are possible, or are perceived to be possible, for creatures like us” (Flanagan 1991:32). 
Note that this is a slightly different claim from “ought implies can” which applies to individual moral 
obligations rather than moral theories.  
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can either mitigate climate change, saving many millions of lives and preventing the 
suffering of future generations. Alternatively, we can focus our resources towards 
adapting the best we can to the consequences of climate change, but in doing so not save 
nearly as many lives or prevent as much suffering. Because of limited time and resources, 
we cannot successfully both mitigate and adapt. However, failure in pursuit of mitigation 
could have disastrous consequences. The subsequent loss of millions of lives would be a 
far greater moral cost than adapting. Therefore, faced with very difficult task of 
mitigation and the very high costs of its failure, adapting to climate change may in fact be 
morally ‘good enough’. Understanding the true cost is important when attempting to 
achieve the best outcome. It is therefore important to understand those factors which 
constrain moral maximisation and the costs involved (Goodin 2009).  
 
Costs and constraints are also important for establishing the demands of our moral 
obligations. Morality places demands on individuals and it is (often) deemed morally 
wrong to fail to meet those demands. However, moral demands vary, as do the costs and 
constraints on meeting them. It is claimed that some moral theories make demands that 
ask too much of moral agents (Cullity 2004). A moral theory that asks the affluent to give 
the vast majority of their money to save the world’s poor, for example, is thought by 
many to demand too much. There are a number of reasons why moral obligations may 
be judged as too demanding. They may be too costly because they ask us to sacrifice too 
much of our way of life; they conflict with other obligations, such as those to friends and 
family; they cause physical or psychological harm; or, they are simply too inconvenient. 
The problem of excessive demands leads us to question how much a moral theory can 
legitimately demand from us, and highlights the importance of understanding the true 
demands of moral theories.2 
 
The case I have put forward is especially relevant to a related problem: identifying the 
demands. Our ability to meet moral obligations may be constrained by difficulties in 
obtaining the information required to take the right course of action, contingent on the 
                                                 
2. It is often claimed that if a moral theory imposes extreme demands it may give us reason to question 
aspects of morality. Garret Cullity (2004) identifies three different views in response to the problem of 
(extreme) demandingness: (1) that the particular moral outlook be rejected because of the absurd self-
denying demands that it imposes; (2) extreme demandingness is a problem for morality itself because the 
unreasonableness of the demand gives one a reason to reject morality; and (3) the problem of 
demandingness is not a problem for morality, but for the life of one who tries to live a moral life – morality 
may be more demanding than what one would like it to be. 
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costs they incur and the resources we have available to satisfy them. The level of moral 
demand often depends heavily on the structures of our social worlds, and especially the 
actions of others. If we all make a sufficient number of small charitable donations, 
thereby satisfying the demands of charity, there is reduced moral demand on individuals 
to make large donations. The ways in which the world is organised is therefore intimately 
related to solving problems of demandingness (Goodin 2009).  
 
In highlighting the role of social structures in moral cognising, the work in this thesis 
contributes to understanding the true costs of, and constraints upon, fulfilling our moral 
obligations and the demands they make. Everyone realises the social world of other 
agents influences the results of any individual’s choice. But this understates its role. 
Because our extended moral cognitive abilities rely on external social structures, those 
abilities will often be constrained by the organisation of those structures. We need, 
therefore, to have the appropriate social structures and organisation in place to scaffold 
the development and execution of the individual moral capacities required to meet moral 
obligations. We need also to understand the transition costs of making changes to our 
moral worlds because they are relevant to the actions we ought to take. The demands of 
moral theories are dependent on the structure and dynamics of our moral worlds and our 
engagement with them. As we have seen, the organisation of our moral worlds has many 
drivers, constraints and biases, including evolutionary effects. Understanding that moral 
cognition and its evolution is reliant on brain, body and world provides new tools for 
establishing the true costs and constraints of morality.    
 
One way of visualising these ideas is by detailing the Andy Clark-style moral space we 
encountered in earlier chapters.3 Moral space is a socially constructed moral ecology 
within which we live. Its shape is in part determined by the diverse and interacting needs 
and desires of its occupants. The creation of tools such as moral concepts, norms and 
maxims help us navigate moral space. The structure and dynamic nature of moral space 
is important for both individual and group moral problem solving, its configuration 
                                                 
3. See also recent work by Marc Hauser (2009). He has recently explored the idea of moral space (or as 
he refers, a ‘moralspace’). Based on the idea of morphospace, which plots all possible morphologies of a 
particular organism, Hauser has proposed applying similar modelling principles to multiple domains of 
human psychology and culture such as linguistics and music, including a moralspace that details all possible 
moral systems. One significant area where Hauser differs from the notion of moral space used here is in 
the role he attributes to innate moral grammar as the central generative element and constraining factor in 
all possible moral systems. This is in contrast to the dynamic nature of a socially constructed moral space. 
(See also Owen Flanagan’s (1991) discussion of ‘psychological possibility space’.) 
Conclusion 
 
213
having consequences on constraints and costs. The possible space we occupy is, as Clark 
tells us, dependent on the histories we have. We have seen that this will also include 
evolutionary histories.  
 
If we conceive of the moral space we presently inhabit, we can also conceive of the past 
moral space we have occupied and future possible spaces we can inhabit. By modelling 
the changes in moral space over time and plotting trajectories through that space we will 
see the various processes that impact upon the likelihood of various future trajectories. 
We can identify the costs of, and constraints upon, changing moral space (i.e., changing 
our moral worlds to meet our moral obligations) and the effects these changes have on 
such things as moral demands. Positive and negative constraints will be represented as 
troughs and hills across the terrain of possible moral space. Some regions will form 
strong basins of attraction towards which nearby trajectories will be drawn. Some 
possible moral space will be uninhabitable or, due to the difficult terrain that leads to 
them, inaccessible. 
 
We can distinguish two types of constraints that bear on moral trajectories. The first type 
of constraint is moral transition costs which estimate the moral costs of adopting future 
moral obligations. These will include such calculations as how many lives are lost if we 
attempt to obtain a moral end, and the consideration of trade-offs that occur in adopting 
principles that are fair to some and unfair to others, for example. The ways in which the 
word is organised can impact on the moral costs of meeting moral obligations and the 
ease of transitions. Systems of greater resource distribution, for example, will reduce the 
price of individual moral commitments to the poor, improving our abilities to meet 
moral demands and reduce moral costs. Although moral transition costs may not 
necessarily make a trajectory less likely, they do figure heavily in our moral calculations. 
 
The second type of constraint is causal constraints. Some moral trajectories are impossible, 
or very unlikely, because of the histories we have, our current location in possible moral 
space, and the structure of the world and human psychology. There will be regions of 
possible moral space that are more psychologically amiable than others as well as better 
structured to meet certain moral obligations and implement change.  
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The work in this thesis has clear ramifications for identifying causal constraints. The 
impacts of evolutionary effects, such as generative entrenchment for example, will 
become apparent. Here the evolution (biological and cultural) and development of 
complex phenomena, such as moral phenotypes, occurs against the background of those 
structures and processes that instantiate them - their evolution and expression depend 
upon upstream structures and processes, meaning they are resistant to developmental 
and evolutionary change (Wimsatt 2007). Aspects of moral cognition and our moral 
worlds are resistant to change because they depend on the structures and processes from 
which they were built – what Wimsatt calls “accumulated dependencies”. This has 
obvious implications for individual moral psychologies. Although morality is learned, 
certain concepts, norms, behaviours and moral resources are generatively entrenched 
features of evolved systems, so it is unlikely we will lose them. The direction of possible 
future moral cognition and moral worlds will be constrained by the requirement to 
maintain those dependencies. We need only think of the many capacities, concepts and 
norms upon which moral thinking relies. These capacities are entrenched because we 
cannot lose them without losing the moral structures which rely on them. Generative 
entrenchment also has implications for group moral change. Concepts of right and 
wrong, for example, are fundamental to the operation and adaptive success of many of 
our group-wide norms and social interactions. They are entrenched features of both 
individual moralities and group moral space, necessary for the existence of the worlds we 
presently inhabit and constraining the future possible moral worlds we can inhabit. 
Trajectories towards future moral worlds will involve both moral transition costs and 
causal constraints. 
 
When we consider this in the context of future possible moral space, we may end up in 
regions from which retreat, or the navigation to new regions, will be difficult and 
sometimes impossible because they involve alterations to generatively entrenched 
features. Our future moral trajectories are thus constrained. Fairness is one example of a 
generatively entrenched component of individual moralities and complex group moral 
systems. The evolution of the concept of fairness provided adaptive solutions to many 
cooperative activities such as food sharing and hunting through to modern day trade and 
exchange. It transformed the ways in which we structure the world, altering the moral 
space which we occupy. Much of this newly reorganised moral world and its adaptive 
benefits depend on the concept of fairness, such as norms that guide our behaviours, 
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institutions, legal systems, as well as new concepts that are further elaborations upon 
fairness. The social construction of complex adaptive structures stabilise the emergence 
of fairness and the developmental processes that instantiate it. The removal of concepts 
such as fairness from our moral world, and the means by which it develops, are unlikely 
to occur because such alterations would have disastrous effects for many of those 
(adaptive) downstream elements that depend on it. The future possible moral worlds we 
can inhabit are constrained by the elements of morality upon which much depends, 
meaning our trajectories through one moral world takes us further away from some 
possible moral worlds and closer to others. Generative entrenchment is an example of 
how costs and constraints (including evolvability constraints) can impact upon the 
organisation of future moral worlds, and in turn the fulfilment of moral obligations.  
 
When we apply these ideas to traditional ethical dilemmas we may find that possible 
solutions similarly lead to locations in possible moral space that are uninhabitable, or 
distant regions which require traversing difficult, if not impossible, terrains. Consider our 
obligations to the world’s poor, for example. Peter Singer has claimed that “if it is in our 
power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing 
anything else morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it” (Singer 1972:235). The 
implication, according to Singer, is that the affluent world ought to make considerable 
sacrifices of their wealth to the third world, as long as it doesn't bring about equal 
deprivation. One of the core components of this view, and that which that underwrites 
his utilitarianism, is Singer’s commitment to impartiality; we must look beyond the 
interests of our own society, and give all people equal consideration of interests. By 
modelling these possible worlds and the paths that lead to them we can get an 
understanding of the costs involved, and the constraints upon satisfying moral demands. 
Occupying regions of possible moral space that satisfy certain moral requirements may 
not be feasible. Even if those regions are themselves habitable, the transition costs in 
reaching them may mean it is excessively demanding to satisfy those moral obligations. 
Furthermore, partiality is an entrenched feature of many of our (adaptive) complex moral 
systems. As we have seen, partial behaviours, such as those towards one’s group, allow 
the generation of cooperative benefits. Major shifts in partiality could have disastrous 
downstream consequences. The generative entrenchment of partiality constrains and 
imposes costs on future moral directions. Evaluating the possibility, cost and constraints 
of our moral theories will involve looking beyond mere brainbound psychology, 
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broadening our explanations to include beyond-the-brain resources and evolutionary 
considerations.  
 
In this thesis I have explained how a non-nativist moral cognition can evolve and how 
we ought to broaden our explanatory scope beyond innate, genetically specified, 
brainbound psychological mechanisms to fully understand moral cognition. Although 
this move away from nativism in phylogenetic, ontogenic and synchronic explanations of 
moral cognition goes against the grain of much modern theorising in the biological and 
cognitive sciences, the work I have presented offers the beginnings of a promising and 
empirically tractable research programme. This will ultimately provide a new and deeper 
understanding of moral cognition and its evolution. 
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